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Abstract 
This thesis comprehensively examines the relationship between corporate debt 
issuance and market timing. The focus is on the different issues of debt market 
timing across the different stages of corporate debt issuance from pre-issue 
considerations, to implementation and post-issue influences. It also covers different 
aspects of debt issue decisions including maturity, yield type and issue volume. 
The thesis starts with an investigation of what motivates debt issue decisions based 
on the framework of risk management, and finds that timing the debt market rather 
than hedging the interest rate exposure is the primary motivation for firms 
choosing yield types and maturities for their newly issued debt. The thesis then 
explores the information and mechanism behind debt market timing 
implementation, and finds that managerial market timings of debt issuances are 
simply responses to fluctuations in market conditions, while their predictions of 
future market variations are generally unsuccessful. Finally, the thesis examines the 
influences of debt market timing on capital structure of firms. It was found that, 
although debt market timing of issue volume results in the abnormal deviation of 
the debt ratio and impacts on firms' capital structures in both the short and 
long-term, managers appear to make no effort to reverse the deviations of capital 
structure. Rather, they continue to time the market afterwards. Therefore, as 
regards the implications for capital structure, market timing has a long-term 
influence. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
I. I. Market timing: A crucial issue in corporate finance 
Neoclassical financial theory assumes an efficient market where prices provide 
accurate signals for capital allocations. In such a market, firms can make 
production or investment decisions and investors can choose securities under the 
assumption that capital prices fully reflect all available information at any time'. In 
the presence of market imperfections, however, there are temporary windows of 
arbitrage opportunities before security is accurately priced. Accordingly, the market 
timing hypothesis emphasizes that the decisions made by firms regarding their 
financial activities and investors' choices of securities depend on timing. In 
corporate finance, market timing refers to the financing policy where firms issue 
securities when the market is overvalued and repurchase securities when the 
market is undervalued. This notion implies that firm managers have the incentive 
to benefit shareholders by timing the market if they believe it is possible. Market 
timing is a crucial issue in corporate finance not only because of market anomalies, 
but also because behavioural factors influence the financial decisions of firm 
managers and investors. The existent deviations of capital market valuations affect 
corporate financing decisions, while market timing influences firms' characteristics 
and values. If a firm's financing decisions capture the possible opportunities of 
arbitrage, managerial market timing adds value to that firm. Conversely, if 
information is promptly and fully communicated in the capital markets or firms fail 
to make financing decisions incorporating the deviations of market valuation, 
market timing may destroy firm values. In this sense, the timing issue plays an 
important role in firms' financing decisions. 
A complete explanation of the timing issue in financing and investment patterns 
requires an understanding of the interaction between two sets of agents, i. e. firm 
1 See Fama (1970,1991) for a review of the literature on efficient market hypothesis. 
managers and investors. According to this notion, the existing literature regarding 
market timing can be roughly sorted into three strands. The first of these comprises 
the empirical studies that have reported clusters of security issuances, including 
initial public offerings 2, seasoned equity offerings 3 and corporate debt 4, with 
fluctuations in market valuation. Specifically, firms appear to sell overvalued 
securities and repurchase undervalued securities 5, and therefore their financing 
decisions are to a large extent determined by the capital market conditions. This 
line of literature has investigated capital issuance waves in the circumstance of 
I 
capital market mispricing, while the majority of these studies have focused on the 
existence of abnormal market valuation. Therefore, the market-side reason is 
emphasized as the precondition and the incentive of market timing for security 
issuance. 
The second strand of studies focused on the pattern of market timing behaviour in 
corporate financing decisions from the standpoint of firm managers who tend to 
adjust the practical implementation of their financing strategies as market 
conditions change. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2000), Baker, Greenwood, 
and Wurgler (2003), and Faulkender (2005) found that firms time debt-equity 
choices, debt maturity and debt yields respectively. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
suggest that persistent historical market timing will shape a firm's current capital 
structure. Apart from the empirical studies, a number of survey studies such as 
those of Graham and Harvey (2001), Brav et al. (2005), and Bancel and Mittoo 
(2004), have provided direct evidence from firms' financial managers regarding 
2 Among others, lbboston and Jaffe (1975), Ibboston et a]. (1984), Ritter (1984), Ibboston and Sindelar (1988), 
lbboston, Sindelar and Ritter (1994), Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998), Lerner (1994), and Gompers, and 
Lerner (2003) found that IPO issuance is positively associated with plausible indicators of market 
overvaluation. 
3 For example, Stigler (1964), Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Jung, Kim and 
Stulz (1996), Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001). 
4 Marsh (1982), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Speiss and 
Affleck-Graves (1999) found that corporate debt issuance tends to vary with the term structure of interest rates. 
Unfortunately, none addressed their findings to managers' intention to time the market. However, recent 
studies, for example, Antoniou et al. (2006,2008), examine the determinants of debt maturity and capital 
structure decisions in capital market and bank oriented economies. 
5A few papers regarding stock repurchases, for example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995,2000), 
found that the performance of repurchasers is significantly higher than other firms with similar size and 
book-to-market ratios. 
2 
their intentions and practical implementations when timing the capital market. The 
responses of firm managers to market conditions were the main focus of these 
studies. 
The third strand of studies to emerge recently has examined the interaction 
between markets and firms as a whole, and explored the rationality of and reasons 
for managerial market timing based on the general market efficiency and irrational 
managerial behaviour theories. As a result, a suspicion arises from the evidence per 
se. Following this line of thought, Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000), and Eckbo and 
Norli (2005) proposed an explanation of market timing evidence from the 
perspective of a risk-retum framework. Schultz (2003) and Butler and Grullon 
(2005) explained the rationality of market timing evidence from the perspective of 
"pseudo market timing". These studies argue that the "seeming" evidence of 
managerial market timing is not proof of managers' ability to time the capital 
markets but rather it is proof of irrational behaviour. For example, Butler, Grullon 
and Weston (2006) indicated that managers' timing activities are generally 
unsuccessful at the aggregate market level, while market timing is simply a fair 
game between firms and investors. Generally, these studies suggest that the issue of 
market timing in corporate financing needs to be reconsidered by involving both 
6 agents simultaneously . 
The impact of the market timing hypothesis on the development of corporate 
finance is essential. It is introduced as a crucial factor to explain a large range of 
financing and investment patterns, while at the same time, there is much room 
before the field reaches maturity. As describing in the subsequent section, this 
thesis explores some issues about debt market timing which remains as the gaps in 
the field. 
6 Baker et al. (2004) reviewed previous literature regarding behavioural corporate finance sorted by the 
irrational investor approach and the irrational manager approach separately. 
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1.2. Issues about debt market timing 
As one of two components on the right-hand side of the balance sheet, corporate 
debt plays a crucial role throughout the life of a firm. Unfortunately, "literature on 
debt financing patterns is surprisingly underdeveloped (Baker, Greenwood and 
Wurgler (2003), p. 262). " When compared to the equity market, debt market timing, 
which refers to raising debt when its cost is unusually low, is different in various 
aspects. Firstly, debt issuance contains specific features which are not involved in 
equity issues, such as maturity, yield, embedded options, credit rates, etc. These 
features create more complications regarding debt issue decisions. Secondly, the 
information on the debt market is less asymmetric. Apart from the private 
information about credit quality, debt is priced according to the public information 
of general debt market conditions, while the costs of debt issuance are determined 
by the variations of market interest rates. Compared to equity markets, where 
investors and managers interact with each other, debt market timing offers a better 
chance to examine the manager-side behaviour. There are few findings in the 
previous studies regarding debt market timing, and the aim therefore of this thesis 
is to examine the following issues which remain as gaps in the literature. 
Most of the literature on corporate risk management has emphasized the role of 
financial derivatives in hedging various risk exposureS7 . An 
implicit assumption is 
that firms that do not use derivatives are not hedging. However, firms could 
manage their risk exposure by means other than sole derivative usage. Specifically, 
corporate bonds can be employed as instruments of interest rate risk management 
based on the immunization strategy. Unfortunately, although widely employed in 
the interest rate risk management of bond portfolios, its application to corporate 
risk management has hitherto stayed at the theoretical stage as shown in the 
textbooks and theoretical papers 8 and has not been examined empirically. Another 
7 There is a great deal of literature examining why hedging adds value to firms. Among others, Stulz (1984), 
Smith and Stulz (1985) Froot et al. (1993), Tofano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), Fok (1997), etc. See details in 
section 2.2.1. 
' For example, Chapter 21.7 and 23.1 in Grinblatt and Titman (2002), Chapter 9 in Stulz (2003) and Stulz 
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assumption of most risk management studies is that firms manage risk exposure 
primarily for the purpose of hedging. However, recent studies have found that most 
firms do not systematically hedge their risk exposure (Brown (2001), Guay and 
Kothari (2003)), and the extent to which they do depends on the managers' market 
views as regards relevant volatilities (e. g. Bodnar et al. (1995), (1996) and (1998), 
and Howton and Perfect (1998)). Many firms adopt "profit-oriented and 
forecast-based" hedging strategies (Glaum (2002)), or in other words, market 
timing. Deduced from recent studies regarding debt market timing (e. g., Baker et al 
(2003), Faulkender (2005)), an interesting question arises about corporate debt, 
that is, whether corporate debt issues are considered to hedge interest rate exposure 
or firms are engaged in market timing with a view to lowering the costs of capital? 
Therefore, an empirical investigation of the basic financial instrument --- corporate 
debt --- and its practical implementations for corporate risk management is needed 
to bridge the above gaps. 
Empirical evidence and survey studies9 have suggested that firms' financing 
decisions contain the market views of the managers. However, the market timing 
hypothesis is still arguable due to multifold implications. For one thing, market 
timing means that managers make financing decisions based on the available 
information to accurately predict future market movements. For another, market 
timing implies that managers try to predict future market movements but may or 
may not do a better job than others. The supportive evidence for the notion of debt 
market timing comes from the co-variations of corporate debt issuance and debt 
market condition variables, while the objections are based on the doubt that 
managers' have the advantage of market information asymmetry (e. g. Butler et al. 
(2005), (2006), Schultz (2003)). There is an obvious difference between intention 
and success in market timing. Therefore, the argument is actually about the 
divergent understandings of market timing. Clarifying the definition of market 
(1996). 
See review of relevant literature in section 1.1 briefly and section 3.2.2. in details, which for reasons of 
brevity are not repeated here. 
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timing is a key issue when attempting to fill the gap and associate the two sides of 
the debate. 
How debt market timing influences the financial characteristics of firms remains an 
open question. If firms do time their debt -equity choices according to capital 
market valuations (e. g. Tagart (1977), Marsh (1982), Kaplin and Levy (2001), 
Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2002)), this would essentially 
alter their capital structures. With no consensus of the traditional capital structure 
theories, the market timing hypothesis offers an alternative explanation. However, 
to what extent managerial market timing, as a behavioural factor, distorts the 
capital structure of firms in certain circumstances is not yet clear. On the one hand, 
market timing may affect a firm's capital structure in the long run (Baker and 
Wurgler (2002)) or only in the short run (Alti (2006)). On the other hand, firm 
managers treat market timing as an important financing strategy (Graham and 
Harvey (2001)). The interest here is in the evolution of capital structure under the 
influence of market timing behaviour and managers' strategies to deal with the 
distortion. Therefore, an investigation of the influence of market timing on capital 
structure may create an entirely new theory or introduce a solution that bridges the 
existing gap between the traditional capital structure theories. 
In general, market timing creates a fascinating area where very different views 
about the interactions between firm managers and investors, and very different 
normative implications regarding the phenomenon in capital markets introduce a 
rethinking about corporate finance. However, the lack of an integrated theoretical 
framework and inconsistencies in the findings reported in the literature provide a 
strong motivation for further investigation of the market timing hypothesis in 
corporate financing policies. 
1.3. Structure and findings 
The aim of the present thesis is to extend the literature by filling the gaps regarding 
6 
the above market timing issues as regards corporate debt issuance. Underlying the 
thesis is the consideration that, when firms raise debt funds for investment projects, 
various decisions regarding debt financing need to be made. These issues are 
determined by both internal and external factors. To what extent market timing 
affects firms' debt issue decisions is the main concern of the present thesis, while 
the mechanism that is managers' judgements about market conditions and the 
consequences of debt market timing are also the objective of the study. 
The main body of this thesis consists of three empirical chapters. All three of these 
chapters examine the relationship between corporate debt issuance and debt market 
timing, while they are each dedicated to different questions as regards debt market 
timing across different stages of corporate debt issuance from pre-issue 
considerations, to implementation, and then to the post-issue influences. 
Specifically, Chapter 2 investigates the underlying motivations regarding debt 
issue decisions, and Chapter 3 explores the information and mechanisms behind 
debt market timing implementation, while Chapter 4 examines the abnormal 
phenomenon of debt market timing and its short and long-term influences on the 
capital structure of firms. In addition, the chapters are distinguished with each 
other by focusing on different aspects concerning corporate debt issue decisions. In 
particular, Chapter 2 focuses on the choice of the yield type and maturity for the 
newly issued debt, Chapter 3 examines the variations of debt maturity across 
different market conditions, and Chapter 4 focuses on debt issue volume in the hot 
debt market. Therefore, collectively, the three empirical studies, constituting the 
thesis as a whole, comprehensively examine the relationship between corporate 
debt issuance and market timing. 
Chapter 2 examines the hedging effect of debt issuances on the interest rate 
exposure of firms, determined by either internal or external factors. The 
preconditional hypothesis is based on the theory that, by effectively designing the 
maturity structure and choosing the optimal yield type for a newly issued debt, debt 
7 
issuance can be used as an instrument of hedging corporate interest rate risks as 
long as the interest rate sensitivity of the debt is negatively correlated to the 
pre-issue interest rate sensitivity of the firm's total assets. Based on this assumption, 
the chapter examines whether firm managers consider hedging interest rate risks 
when making decisions about debt issuance. This was done by measuring the 
pre-issue interest rate exposure of the debt issuers by stock price sensitivity to 
interest rates, and it was found that firm-specific interest rate exposure had little 
explanatory power over the yield type choices and maturities of the debt issues. 
Rather, the debt maturity and yield types appear to vary with the indicators of the 
debt market conditions for both the market aggregate data and pooled firm-level 
samples. Therefore, the results in this chapter reveal that firms do not use debt 
issuance as an effective instrument for hedging interest rate exposure as indicated 
by risk management theory. On the contrary, timing the debt market was the 
primary motivation when firms chose yield types and maturities for their newly 
issued debt. Since market timing is actually a kind of speculation on beating the 
possible opportunities of market imperfections, referred to as "selective hedging"10, 
these results are heuristic to corporate risk management with a different theoretical 
framework other than "volatility minimization". Firm managers tend to maximize 
firm values by any means, while the costs of hedging risk exposure have to be 
lowered to a minimum. In addition, yield type choices of debt issues associated to 
debt market movements add empirical evidence which has been hitherto ignored 
by the literature regarding debt market timing. 
Chapter 3 extends the conclusions of Chapter 2 11 and examines whether firms can 
successfully time the debt market based on the argument in the recent literature 12 . 
10 Stulz (1996) refers to "selective hedging" where firms choose only hedging the "downside" risk exposure 
but speculating as the volatility adds firm values. 
11 1 hereby thank Professor Alexander Butler from the University of Texas at Dallas for his comments on the 
paper version of Chapter 2 of the present thesis. The fundamental question addressed in Chapter 3, to a large 
extent, comes from his suggestion regarding the concept of forward-looking market timing. 
12 The argument is whether co-variations of debt issuance and debt market conditions suggest successful 
market timing. The debate focuses on "psuedo market timing" (e. g. Butler et al. (2005,2006), Shultz (2003)) 
and "genuine market timing" (e. g. Baker et al. (2002,2003,2006)). See details in the literature review of 
Chapter 3. 
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The view in the literature 13 actually mixes the two different concepts of 
successfully timing the market and trying to time the market, which emphasize the 
results and the processes of market timing respectively. In this chapter, "timing" is 
defined as managers using current and historical information to successfully 
forecast future market variations, in contrast to managers' passive responses to past 
information. The concepts offorward market timing, which refers to the prediction 
of future market condition fluctuations, and backward market timing, which 
denotes responses to past information, are introduced to examine whether 
managers possess informational advantages concerning possible changes in the 
debt market conditions and then take advantage of possible arbitrage opportunities. 
The hypothesis is that if managers are trying to reduce the costs of their debt 
capital based on accurate predictions of future markets, it would be expected that 
they would issue more (less) debt before the costs of the debt issuance implied by 
the debt market conditions increases (declines). Likewise, if the hypothesis is 
applied to the pattern of debt maturity, debt maturity is positively related to the 
subsequent debt market conditions with respect to the costs of long-term debt. 
However, the empirical results of this chapter suggest that there is no convincing 
evidence that the firms issued more or longer-term debt before the costs of the debt 
or long-term debt increases. Conversely, the aggregate debt issue volumes clearly 
varied as did the relative levels of interest rates compared to their historical levels. 
This suggests that the managerial market timing of debt issuance is only a response 
to fluctuations in market conditions; managers do not possess informational 
advantages over the other market participants and as a result their predictions of 
future market variations are generally unsuccessful. Therefore, the conclusion links 
the previous mixed and plausible evidence together and substantially clarifies the 
argument concerning the timing ability of managers when it comes to debt 
issuance. 
13 The majority of evidence regarding debt market timing comes from the identification of the relationship 
between a firm's debt issue decisions and debt market condition factors, such as term structure. 
Among others, 
these studies include Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and 
Opler (1996), Datta et al 
(2000) and Baker et al. (2003). For Baker et al. (2003) the favoured explanation 
is that firm managers are 
trying to time the market. 
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Traditional capital structure theories provide no universal explanation for the 
financing decisions of firms, and the influences of market timing on capital 
structures are unclear. Therefore, Chapter 4 examines debt market timing with 
respect to abnormally high issue volumes in the hot debt market, and its short and 
long-term effects on the capital structures of the issuers. As well as timing the yield 
type and maturity of the debt issuances, it can be seen that the firms also time their 
debt issue volume. A hot-market dummy variable was introduced to measure the 
differences between various corporate financial characteristics in both hot and cold 
market debt issues. When the debt market is hot, as measured by the aggregate 
issue volume, firms believe that the market conditions to be desirable in terms of 
capital cost reduction and tend to issue excess debt which is more than their 
minimum requirement of capital. The excess debt issues cannot be explained by 
large debt capacity, fast growth or investment opportunities but are attributable to 
the timing behaviour. Therefore, the hot debt market captures the market timing 
intentions of firms. As a consequence, the debt ratios of hot market debt issuers 
deviate from their pre-issue levels and are significantly higher than those of cold 
market issuers. More importantly, the hot market effect on issuers' capital structure 
persistently exists in the long-run. Moreover, the evidence shows that the firms did 
not appear to make any effort to reverse the deviations in their capital structures. 
Rather, they continued to time the market in the post-hot-issue period. Therefore, 
the implication for capital structure is that market timing has a long-term influence 
in shaping the firm's capital structure. Referred to as the market-oriented pecking 
order hypothesis, these results are consistent with the findings of Baker et al. (2003) 
that the capital structure of firms is the aggregate outcome of historical market 
timing. As well as presenting this new evidence regarding the effect of market 
timing on debt issue volumes, this chapter also extends the traditional capital 
structure theories by introducing market timing as an alternative explanation. 
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1.4. Contributions to the literature 
In this thesis, each empirical chapter contributes to the literature on debt market 
timing from specific angles. Chapter 2 examines the determinants of corporate 
debt issuance and their effect on the framework of interest rate risk management. 
The majority of risk management studies have focused on the financial derivative 
instrument, while the theoretical hedging function of corporate debt as a basic 
financial instrument has not been examined empirically. This chapter fills that gap 
by examining the underlying attitudes of managers to hedging interest rate 
exposure when issuing debt. Market timing, rather than hedging, in corporate debt 
issuance reflects the large gap that exists between risk management theory and 
practical implementations. Moreover, in contrast to the traditional risk management 
theory, the empirical evidence in this chapter suggests that "value maximization" 
or "selectively hedging downside risk exposure" rather than "volatility 
minimization" is in fact the underlying motivation of corporate risk management 
implementation. Furthermore, the evidence of timing debt yield types contributes 
to the growing field of market timing theory. As most of the previous evidence is 
concerned with debt maturity, the findings of debt yield timing suggest that market 
timing is a comprehensive issue concerning corporate financing policies and 
should also be considered in various aspects of the financing decisions of firms. 
Chapter 3 extends the literature based on the recent hot debate regarding the effect 
of market timing on corporate debt issues. Since there is a gap in the literature 
regarding whether the significant relationship between the co-variations of 
corporate debt issuance and debt market conditions captures the market timing 
intentions of firms, by distinguishing two different directional forms of market 
timing (forward and backward- looking) this chapter examines whether managers 
possess informational advantages and are capable of taking advantage of the 
windows of arbitrage when timing the market. The evidence here suggests that the 
firms were passively responding to past information about market condition 
fluctuations rather than successfully predicting future variations of the debt market. 
This notion explains the mixed and plausible evidence of debt market timing in the 
literature, and bridges the gap between the market timing hypothesis and the 
efficient market hypothesis. In addition, as well as the aggregate macroeconomic 
data, a large firm-level sample consisting of more than 17,000 new corporate 
public debt issues covering the period 1970 - 2006 offers a convincing basis from 
which to comprehensively examine debt market timing while accounting for 
important bond features and firm-specific financial characteristics. 
In Chapter 4, a new fact of managerial market timing on debt issuance is described. 
Among the studies examining debt market timing, the overwhelming majority have 
focused on debt maturity, with only a small proportion investigating debt yields 14 
while debt issue volumes have been ignored completely. This chapter examines the 
hypothesis of excess debt issuance in hot debt markets and finds that debt issuers 
regard hot markets as windows of opportunities to reduce the costs of capital. The 
extent to which the market is hot determines the market timing behaviour, and 
reflects firms' desires and actual activities as regards debt issues. Therefore, this 
chapter contributes new evidence of debt market timing in hot and cold-markets 
from the aspect of debt issue volume. More importantly, with the absence of a 
universal capital structure theory, it sheds some light on the implications of market 
timing for the traditional framework of capital structure theories. It investigates 
how firms adjust their capital structure in the short and long-term when the debt 
ratios apparently deviate from normal levels due to market timing activities. It was 
found that market timing played an important role in the financing policies of the 
firms, and that their persistent behaviours in timing the hot debt market shaped 
their capital structures in the long run. 
The present thesis as a whole contributes to the literature and then is certainly of 
interest to financial researchers in several aspects. First, it comprehensively 
14 Among others, evidence of debt maturity is shown in Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay and Smith (1995), 
Stohs and Mauer (1996), Baker et al. (2003), and of debt yield in Faulkender (2006). 
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explores the various aspects of market timing involved in corporate debt issue 
decisions, including maturity, yield and volume. Firms attempt to reduce the costs 
of debt capital by coordinating all these aspects of debt issuance with the market 
variations. It extends and integrates previous scattered empirical evidence 
regarding debt market timing in the literature and shows that market timing is a 
prevalent managerial behaviour and a fundamental strategy, rather than an 
occasional phenomenon in corporate financing policies. Second, after a certain 
period of time when the hypothesis of efficient market and rational investors and 
managers dominates financial studies, behavioural finance opens a door toward a 
realistic world with the presence of market imperfections and irrationality. This 
thesis not only reveals evidence regarding managerial market timing on corporate 
debt issuance, but also examines the underlying mechanism of market efficiency 
which has been the subject of much debate in recent literature 15 . The plausible 
evidence regarding the ability of firm managers to successfully time the debt 
market is due to the mixed definition of market timing. The clarification of the 
definition bridges the two sides of the argument, and reveals the implications 
underlying the empirical evidence of debt market timing. The misguided notion of 
managers' arguable superior information and their actual passive responses to 
market conditions explain the reasonable existence of timing activities from the 
standpoint of market efficiency as well as raising the questions of behavioural 
motivations for further research. Third, the growing field of market timing theory 
will inevitably trigger a stream of research regarding the effects and consequences 
of market timing on the financial characteristics of firms. The present thesis is 
arguably one of the earliest studies in this field. It contributes by incorporating 
market timing into the traditional capital structure theories. There is no universal 
theory of capital structure, while the market timing hypothesis offers another 
explanation of the formation and evolution of capital structure due to its long-term 
influence on the financing policies of firms as revealed in the present study. In this 
regard, this thesis is in the forefront of behavioural corporate finance and will, as a 
15 See footnote 2 and the literature review in Chapter 3 for details. 
13 
result, stimulate further investigations on the effects of managerial market timing 
on other corporate financial activities and firm characteristics. 
In addition to financial researchers, the revelations of the present thesis should 
draw the attention of both firm managers and investors. On the one hand, since the 
ability of managers to detect and generate market imperfections when timing the 
market affects firm values, investors are supposed to judge the underlying 
motivations of managers' financial decisions comprehensively and how firms' 
hedging or timing policies directionally bet. Therefore, the thesis suggests that an 
understanding of managerial market timing can help investors to better estimate the 
real financial status behind the financing policies of firms, and then make their own 
investment decisions. On the other hand, managers are supposed to consider the 
hedging function of debt financing in their corporate risk management strategies as 
suggested by immunization theory, although this has been ignored in practical 
applications, Moreover, based on the conclusions of this thesis, managers should 
examine to what extent debt market timing reduces the overall cost of capital, and 
whether there is the possibility of bounded rationality and overconfidence in timing 
the debt market. 
In addition to practitioners of financial markets, the findings of the thesis should 
also be of concern to economic policy makers or market regulators. An essential 
conclusion of this thesis is that corporate financing decisions are heavily 
determined by the judgment of managers on capital market conditions (debt market 
in this thesis). Moreover, the variations in debt market conditions rest with 
fluctuations of interest rates, while the adjustments of basic interest rates in turn 
rely on the judgment of financial market regulators on the situation of the economy. 
Therefore, with a correct anticipation on the potential reactions of firm managers to 
the fluctuation in debt market, policy makers should treat the impact of collective 
behavioural distortions of managerial market timing on the capital markets as an 
influential factor and then convey the accurate information of market condition 
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variations when making their macroeconomic decisions regarding interest rate 
adjustment to avoid the market-wide misallocation of capital. On the other hand, in 
the case of the presence of capital market misevaluation, the regulators can take 
advantage of managerial market timing as an instrument to adjust the misallocation 
of capital. Overall, a profound understanding on managerial market timing as 
revealed in the present thesis helps the market regulators to better maintain the 
financial markets on the right track. 
All in all, the thesis suggests that market timing should draw more attention and be 
critically considered by looking at the various issues of corporate finance from 
comprehensive angles. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate Debt Issues and Interest Rate Risk 
Management: Hedging or Market Timing? 
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. Rethinkingfinancial risk management 
Standard corporate risk management theory emphasizes the role of derivatives in 
reducing financial risk exposure. The majority of the existing literature regarding 
corporate interest rate risk management examines how firms use financial 
derivative instruments to manage their interest rate exposure, an implicit 
assumption of which is that firms that do not use derivatives are not hedging. It is 
supposed that firms are changing or managing their risk exposure simply by using 
various financial derivatives. However, evidence shows that in practice compared 
to the magnitude of the overall assets of firms, the magnitude of derivatives usage 
appears to be small (e. g. Brown (2001), Guay and Kothari (2003)), and firms with 
more volatile cash flows such as small firms make far less use of derivatives than 
otherwise more stable (large) firms (Stulz (1996)). This evidence contradicts the 
"variance-minimization" notion of the modern risk management theory and 
indicates that the impact of derivatives usage on risk management is limited. Thus, 
the question that emerges is why do firms not fully hedge their risk exposure by 
using derivatives, or do they use means other than derivatives to manage risks? 
Another implicit assumption of most of the studies that have examined the value 
creation of risk management is that firms manage risk exposure primarily for the 
purpose of hedging. However, recent studies have revealed that most firms do not 
systematically hedge their risk exposure. Rather, the extent to that firms hedge their 
risk exposure depends on their market views of expected relevant volatilities 
(Bodnar et al. (1998)). Most firms attempt to hedge risks with the view that they 
can correctly predict the future movement of the market. They adopt 
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"profit-oriented and forecast-based" (Glaurn (2001)) hedging strategies or, put 
differently, they time the market. Again, this notion induces the rethinking of 
corporate risk management. 
2.1.2. Corporate debt issuance in risk management 
In theory, firms could manage their risk exposure by means other than sole 
derivative usage, especially when the conditions for derivatives usage are limited. 
Although financial derivatives are popularly used as the prominent instruments of 
risk management, it should be noted that derivative financial instruments whose 
values depend on those of more basic underlying assets are only accessory 
instruments for revising risk exposure. As derivative financial instruments become 
increasingly prevalent, the risk management functions of basic financial 
instruments like stocks or debt seems to be ignored. 
Firms issue public debt primarily for the purpose of raising investment funds. 
However, the values of the debt depend heavily on interest rate variations. Newly 
issued corporate debt will significantly affect the capital structures and costs of 
firms. Moreover, their corporate debt issues will essentially influence their overall 
interest rate exposure. Most existing studies have examined how firms use 
contracts of financial derivatives accompanied by debt issues to hedge interest rate 
exposure, However, evidence shows that, the magnitude of derivatives usage is far 
from enough to hedge the overall risk exposure, compared to the firms' overall 
assets (Brown (2001), Guay and Kothari (2003)). Although there are various 
explanations for this phenomenon, an important point that should not be ignored is 
that corporate bonds per se can be employed as instruments of interest rate risk 
management (Grinblatt and Titman (2002), Stulz (2003)). Therefore, debt issues 
should involve considerations of interest rate risk management. 
In principle, "nonfinancial institutions should be able to immunize firm value 
against changes in interest rates to some degree by matching the interest rate 
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sensitivity of their assets and liabilities through active interest rate risk 
management (analogous to duration matching for financial intermediaries)... " 
(Bartram (2002) p. 107). The value of a firm's assets, VA, is the sum of its equities, 
VS, plus its debt, VD, (i. e. V4 = Vs + Vj)). A firm's overall interest rate risk exposure 
is tightly linked to the interest rate sensitivities of its equities and debt. If, at time t 
= 0, a firm measures the risk exposure of its equity as having a positive interest 
rate sensitivity (for example, share prices go up when interest rates rise 16 3 i. e. 
0výV '> 0), issuing a bond with a negative interest rate sensitivity, i. e. , <0, ar ar 
will reduce the interest rate exposure of the firm's overall assets. By deliberately 
adjusting the interest rate sensitivities of their equities and debt firms can hedge 
their interest rate exposures. One of the most important tools for measuring the 
interest rate sensitivity of a bond value is the "price value of a basis point 
(PVBP) ý917 , which can be explained as 
how much a debt's price will increase in 
response to a one basis point decline in a debt's yield to maturity. Another tool for 
controlling the interest rate exposure of debt that is closely linked to the PVBP is 
Duration, which is defined as a weighted average of the waiting times for receiving 
future cash flows. Since smoothing cash flows is one of the most important 
purposes of risk management, the duration of the debt which is dependent on its 
maturity and yield type can be employed as a crucial measurement of controlling 
the overall interest rate exposure of firms when issuing debt. Thus, with the 
measurements of PVBP and durations, firms can choose suitable yield types and 
maturity of debt, which determine the interest rate exposure, for the purposes of 
interest rate risk management. Once managers have measured the interest rate 
exposure of the firm or investment project, they can reduce the interest rate risk 
exposure by issuing a debt with suitable yield types and maturities, the value of 
which moves in an opposite direction from the value of the firm or project as the 
16 Under certain conditions share prices go up when interest rates rise. 
For example, increase in interest rate 
may change the depreciation of a firm's tangible assets in the sense of accounting. 
Some other cases finns' 
product prices may increase with the rate of interest. 
17 The price value of a basis point (PVBP) is often referred to as the 
"dollar value of a basis point decrease" or 
"DVO I ". 
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interest rate varies. Then there is no need to enter into accompanying derivative 
contracts. From the risk management point of view, the basic underlying financial 
instruments should attract more attention than derivative financial instruments. 
2.1.3. Motivations of corporate debt issue decisions 
The basic issue of this chapter is concerned with what motivates firms' choices in 
debt issuance. If corporate debt per se is the effective instrument of interest rate 
risk management, the question arises as to whether firms virtually make full use of 
debt issues for hedging purposes, or more specifically, whether firms attempt to 
design a reasonable yield and maturity structure 18 for the newly issued debt with a 
target interest rate sensitivity to match its initial risk exposure? Much of the 
literature has attempted to empirically disclose the sources of value creation from 
risk hedging through comparisons of the cross-sectional variations19. Most of the 
conclusions regarding value creation are based on the implicit assumption that 
firms manage risks primarily for hedging purposes. However, recent survey studies 
(e. g. Graham and Harvey (2001)) and empirical evidence (e. g. Baker et al. (2003)) 
show that firms' financing decisions including debt issuance are determined by 
managers' intention to time the market to reduce the costs of capital. Therefore, 
from the perspective of interest rate risk management, this chapter examines the 
latent motivations behind corporate debt issues. Specifically, it explores whether 
firms consider the purposes of hedging interest rate exposure or timing the market 
to lower their capital costs, or both. 
If firms are hedging, the choices regarding the interest rate exposure of their debt 
should be driven primarily by the interest rate sensitivity of the firms' values or 
expected cash flows. Provided that the firm's value is sensitive to interest rates, 
it 
18 Hart and Moore (1994) suggested that firms tend to match the maturity of their assets and 
liabilities based 
on the joint hypothesis of information asymmetry and contracting costs. 
19 Among others, Dolde (1995), Tofano (1996), Geczy et al. (1997), 
Graham and Roger (2002) indicate 
hedging adds firm value due to financial distress costs. Smith and Stulz 
(1985), Grahm and Smith (1999), 
Geczy et al. (1997), Fok (1997) analyze the hedging motivation of the conex tax 
function. Geczy et al. (1997). 
See Fok (1997) about costly external financing, Ljungqvist (1994), Demarzo and 
Duffle (1995) and Breenden 
Viswanathan (1998) about information asymmetry, and Tofano (1996), Roger (2002) about manager 
interests 
and the reasons behind hedging risk exposure. 
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can reduce its overall interest rate exposure by issuing a debt position with a 
desirable interest rate exposure, which should be designed to be in the opposite 
direction to the interest rate exposure of the firm's pre-issue assets. W ith this regard, 
a comparison of the interest rate exposures prior to and after debt issues will show 
the hedging effects of possible derivatives contracts accompanying the debt 
issuances. 
If firms believe they can time the market and thereby reduce the costs of capital, 
the debt issues should be driven by debt market condition factors, such as the short 
and long-term interest rates, inflation, etc. Accordingly, it makes sense that firms 
might change their decisions concerning debt issues as these market condition 
factors vary. Deducing intuitively, for example, firms will have more incentive to 
issue debt when the expected debt returns are lower than they otherwise would. 
Also, firms will tend to borrow long-term and fixed debt when debt market 
conditions suggest the cost of long-term debt is relatively low. Consequently, how 
economic factors such as inflation and interest rate variability determine the 
market-level changes in debt issue types identifies whether firms are timing the 
debt market to lower capital costs or hedging volatilities of interest rates. 
In contrast to most studies concerning corporate risk management, this chapter 
focuses on the relationship between interest rate risk management and the basic 
financial instruments --- corporate debt issues. The UK market is 
investigated 
using the debt issue data of the non-financial public firms. The empirical strategy 
in this chapter is to investigate the effects of corporate debt issues on the interest 
rate exposure of firms and the relationship between corporate debt issues and debt 
market factors, and then to explore whether the firm-specific interest rate exposure 
or debt market factors determine the decisions of firms regarding debt issues. 
2.1.4. Findings and implications 
In general, the main findings are as follows. Firstly, notwithstanding the intuitive 
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judgment that corporate debt issues essentially influence the interest rate exposure 
of firms, a quantitative analysis was conducted to examine this notion. The results 
show that a relatively high percentage of firms are subject to sensitive stock prices 
and to the interest rate volatility. Moreover, the two-sample t-test between the stock 
interest rate sensitivity prior to and after the debt was issued suggests that the 
corporate debt issue events significantly changed the interest rate exposure of the 
firms. The asset interest rate sensitivities increased considerably after the debt was 
issued, which supports the intuitive judgment. This provides a starting point for 
further research in terms of corporate debt and interest rate risk management. 
Secondly, by using the quarterly aggregate data, it was found that the debt issues 
were significantly correlated to debt market factors such as inflation, real 
short-term interest rates and term spread. As inflation, real short-term interest rates 
and term spreads increase, firms have more incentives to issue floating rate and 
long-term debt. The results imply a close connection between the decisions 
concerning corporate debt issues and the exogenous market factors. Thirdly, in the 
investigation of the firm-level debt issue data, which involved both the 
firm-specific interest rate exposure generated from the stock price interest rate 
sensitivity and the debt market condition factors, it was found that the yield types 
and maturities of the corporate debt were significantly driven by the market 
condition variables, while there was no evidence of any relationship between the 
firm-specific interest rate exposure and the choices of debt yield types and maturity 
horizons. Therefore, the hedging motivation is not empirically relevant to UK 
corporate debt issuance. On the one hand, managers are trying to time the debt 
market by responding to changes in the macroeconomic environment. These results 
are consistent with the empirical literature concerning corporate debt issues. On the 
other hand, it seems that firms do not realize or implement interest rate risk 
management when issuing debt. Taken together, these results suggest that firms are 
timing the market when issuing debt in an effort to lower their costs of capital 
rather than implementing the interest rate risk management mechanism. 
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This chapter brings forward a new point of view regarding the employment of 
corporate debt to manage interest rate exposure, which the literature has hitherto 
ignored, and empirically examines the underlying determinants of corporate debt. 
The chapter refers to the work of Faulkender (2005) but differs from it in some 
important ways. The measurement and the definition of interest rate risk factors of 
the firms were modified and more stylised than the typical facts regarding debt 
market timing in the UK. Moreover, as well as yield types, this chapter also 
examines debt maturity, which is one of the most important components of 
corporate debt structure and risk exposure measurement. Thus, corporate debt and 
interest rate risk management are documented in an integrated way. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature on hedging and market timing, which includes the traditional theories of 
corporate risk management and recent developments as well as previous studies 
with respect to the determinants of corporate debt issues. Section 2.3 develops an 
empirical strategy to examine the alternative hypotheses. Section 2.4 provides a 
description of the data and Section 2.5 presents the empirical results and the main 
findings. Section 2.6 gives conclusions. 
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2.2. Theories and literature review 
2.2.1. Early risk management theories 
Under the neoclassical setting, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that, in a 
frictionless market with the absence of information asymmetries, transaction costs 
and taxes, the financing policies of firms are irrelevant. By the same logic, this 
notion implies that shareholders can choose strategies to change the exposure of 
risky assets regardless of the firm's hedging policies. As a result, firms do not 
necessarily have any comparative advantage over individual investors. Logue and 
Oldfield (1977) developed a model to show that in an efficient market hedging of 
foreign exchange rate risks is unimportant. They argued that if exchange rate 
fluctuations are uncorrelated with the movements in the general market, the 
variation of a subsidiary's value reduced by hedging is unsystematic, and therefore 
can be diversified away by investors anyway. In other words, firms gain nothing in 
expected value from avoiding exchange rate risks. However, if this theory is 
correct, why is it that in practice firms implement risk management policies 
regarding their investments? 
Since the middle of the 1980s, a considerable body of literature has discussed 
corporate hedging activities by focusing on why hedging can make sense and 
under what conditions corporate hedging activities can increase firms' values (e. g. 
Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot et al. (1993)). Contrary to the perfect 
market proposition, various explanations of potential rationales for corporate uses 
of derivatives financial instruments have been presented to identify the market 
imperfections which make the volatility faced by corporations costly. Therefore, 
risk management theories argue that hedging policies for volatility reduction can 
actually increase firms' values. These market imperfections that explain why firms 
should hedge their risks can be roughly categorized as follows: costs of financial 
distress, convex tax function, costly external financing, infon-nation asymmetry, 
and managerial risk aversion. 
23 
Financial distress costs. The probability of bankruptcy will create costs for the 
firm, such as direct lawsuit costs. Hedging can avoid the firm's financial distress 
by reducing the probability of bankruptcy resulting from the failure to repay the 
debt and thereby lower the present value of the costs of bankruptcy (Smith and 
Stulz (1985)). Although most firms believe they are far from bankruptcy, they 
cannot guarantee staying out of financial distress for all time which leads to the 
probability of substantial indirect losses, for instance, losing excellent employees 
and stable suppliers. Therefore, as long as the costs of the risk management 
programme are lower than the present value of financial distress costs or 
bankruptcy costs, risk management adds value to firms. Most empirical studies 
have found a positive relationship between firms' hedging and the expected 
probability of financial distress by employing alternative proxies, such as leverage 
ratios (e. g. Dolde (1995), Tufano (1996), Howton and Perfect (1998), Spano 
(2004)), leverage ratio multiplied by market to book ratio (Graham and Rogers 
(2002)), and Altman's Z-score 20 (Brown et al. (2006)). A number of recent studies 
have examined the relationship between liquidity risks and hedging levels, and 
provided evidence for the notion that firms with lower liquidity and higher 
leverage are more likely to use derivatives (e. g. Geczy et al. (1997), Fok (1997), 
Kom (2003)). 
Convex tax function. Tax plays an important role in most financial 
decision-making, including hedging. The tax benefits of hedging have been 
indicated in a number of studies. If taxes are a convex function of earnings, in 
other words, if progressive taxation is adaptive, firms can benefit from hedging 
(Smith and Stulz (1985)). The logic is straightforward. If effective marginal tax 
rates are an increasing function of the pre-tax value of corporations, then the 
after-tax value of the firms is a concave function of its pre-tax value. As long as 
hedging reduces the variability of the firm's pre-tax value, the expected tax 
20 The Z-score suggested by Altman (1968) is defined as: Z=1.2(working capital/total assets)+ 1.4(retained 
earning/Total assets)+3.3(EBIT/Total assets)+0.6(market value of equity/Total debt)+ I. O(Sales/Total assets). 
According to Altman, the greater a company's Z-score the lower the probability of it encountering financial 
distress. 
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liability is reduced and then the expected after-tax value of the firm is increased. 
This logic is especially adaptive to profitable firms with volatile earnings and 
firms that have positive earnings for most of the time but occasionally suffer a loss. 
The point to be noted is that tax incentives would not be an inducement to firms 
facing a significant probability of negative earnings and unable to carry forward 
all their losses to subsequent periods. In a word, hedging increases firms' values 
because of the asymmetric treatment of taxation. By using simulation methods, 
Graham and Smith (1999) showed that the average tax savings from a 5% 
reduction in the volatility of taxable income corresponds to 5.4% of the expected 
tax liabilities. However, the empirical studies do not give consistent support to the 
theory of tax incentives. The evidence shows that most firms smooth their income 
by using financial derivatives and benefit from hedging only to a very limited 
degree so that the tax benefits are in practice much smaller than they are in theory. 
Moreover, the studies have found no clear evidence that firms hedge in response to 
tax convexity (Geczy et al. (1997), Fok (1997), Graham and Rogers (1999,2002), 
and Graham and Smith (2000)). Therefore, the tax incentive for corporate hedging 
is still plausible. 
Costly external financing, If a firm's internal cash flows are volatile, this 
variability may result in either variability in the amount of external funds or 
variability in the amount of investment. Due to the information asymmetry, 
external financing is supposed to be more costly than internally generated funds. If 
the cash flows are not enough to support its investment programmes, the firin may 
abandon a positive NPV investment opportunity because the shareholders will 
have the incentive to under-invest if the gains accrue primarily to the debt holders 
(Myers 1977). Hedging reduces the incentive to under-invest and therefore will 
add value to the firm by stabilizing the cash flows available to attractive 
investment opportunities. This rationale implies that firms with more growth 
opportunities, for which R&D expenditures and book-to-market ratios proxy 
in 
most empirical studies, are more likely to use derivatives financial 
instruments to 
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hedge cash flows (Geczy et al. (1997), Fok (1997)). Meanwhile, a firm's degree of 
hedging is relevant to the extent of the high costs of external financing and 
pronounced information asymmetry between the management and outside 
investors (Glaum (1999)). 
Information asymmetry. Managers are intuitively assumed to have superior 
knowledge with respect to their firm's potential risks and uncertainties. On the one 
hand, shareholders have an incentive to obtain precise information regarding the 
firm when deciding whether to continue or abandon their current investments. On 
the other hand, the managers have an incentive to obscure the information received 
by investors to reduce their compensation risks. Ljungqvist (1994) demonstrated 
that managers with private information about their firm's exposure to risks may 
use financial derivatives to engage in speculation instead of hedging. Therefore, 
information asymmetry raises the demand for risk management for the purposes of 
noise reduction and information transparency. (DeMarzo and Duffie (1995)), the 
accounting report standards in principal countries recently required firms to 
publish their derivatives uses and hedging activities (FRS 13 published in 
September 1998 in the UK and FSAS 119 in August 1997 in the US). Breenden 
and Viswanathan (1998) developed two models to explain why firms hedge, based 
on a theory of managerial responses to asymmetric information. The assumption is 
that if managers are only concerned about their reputations, high ability managers 
will wish to better exhibit their performance to investors and outside observers by 
hedging uncontrollable risks. Therefore, hedging improves the information 
available to investors regarding evaluations of management performance and 
firms' prospects. In practice, this theory reveals the potential reason why 
prevailing terms with respect to corporate risk management appear in managers' 
compensation contracts. 
Management interests. Compared to shareholders or outside investors, managers 
are not fully diversified. Most of their wealth depends on the distribution of the 
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firms' payoffs. As a result, they may implement risk management programmes 
induced by their own interests rather than for shareholder value maximization. To 
eliminate the agency costs, managers are compensated by guarantees of contracts 
if they fulfil hedging activities that maximize shareholders' value. However, 
compensation contracts affect managers' incentives to implement risk management 
programmes in different ways. On the one hand, managerial share ownership 
provides managers with the incentive to hedge risks, while on the other hand stock 
options induce them not to hedge risks due to the positive relationship between the 
value of options and stock price volatility (Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano (1996)). 
Meanwhile, the tenure of firms' managers affects the interests of their risk 
management. Tofano claimed that firms whose CFOs are newer in their jobs seem 
to manage a larger proportion of their risks. In contrast to other theoretic 
determinants of risk management, managerial interests, skills and performances 
seem to be particularly relevant (Tufano, (1996), Rogers (2002)). However, the 
empirical evidence in support of the managerial argument is weak. Some of the 
studies found no evidence or have even claimed opposite results (e. g. Geczy et al. 
(1997), Fok (1997)). 
In summary, from the middle of the 1980s, risk management theories have 
developed by identifying various corporate hedging determinants. However, 
empirical evidence to support these theories is mixed and questionable. 
Improvements to the theory are needed to further highlight the potential factors of 
corporate risk management. 
2.2.2. Hedging, speculation and selective hedging 
Early works on corporate risk management assumed that firms use derivative 
financial instruments purely for hedging purposes, and "the benefits of derivatives 
usage accrue solely from the alleviation of market imperfections" (Adam and 
Fernando (2006), p. 286). Most of the hedging research regarding corporate risk 
management has examined whether the corporate use of derivatives is based on 
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the traditional corporate risk management theories. They tested the hypothesis that 
there is a relationship between financial instrument usage and the Potential 
motivations. The empirical results, however, are mixed. Theories that explain risk 
management as a means to reduce the costs of financial distress, to eliminate the 
firm's dependence on external financing, or to reduce expected tax liabilities are 
not strongly supported (e. g. Howton and Perfect (1998), Graham and Rogers 
(1999)). 21 Therefore, a more basic question arises: do firms really accept the 
theories of risk management and comprehensively employ financial instruments to 
hedge the risks they face in their practical management? As a matter of fact, a 
firm's use of financial instruments can both hedge existing exposure and create 
extra risks. In contrast to the traditional risk management theory which derives 
rules from the objective of variance minimization (Carcano and Foresi (1997); 
Brenner et al. (2005)), numerous survey studies have shown that not all firms use 
derivative financial instruments purely for the hedging purpose. This raises a doubt 
regarding the assumption that firms are risk averse. Two essential facts reveal that 
the hypothesis of hedging might not hold. 
Firstly, while there is good evidence in a number of studies using various testing 
models showing that it is consistent with the risk management theories, it ignores 
the point that the corporate derivatives usage appears to be a small component of 
the overall risk of non-financial firms. If firms expect to minimize volatilities, they 
should fully hedge the risk exposure faced. Brown (2001) found that the impact of 
derivative instruments has a limited effect on the firm's cash flow so that 
traditional theoretical risk management motivations are unlikely to explain 
derivatives usage. Guay and Kothari (2003) used a large sample to provide more 
evidence by examining the magnitude of corporate derivatives compared to the 
magnitude of their overall exposure. They indicated that corporate derivative 
21 Howton and Perfect (1998) found that even though derivatives use in a non-random sample of large US 
firms was strongly related to the theoretical usage determinants, derivatives use in a random sample of firms 
was largely unrelated to these variables. Graham and Rogers (1999) summarized the empirical papers that had 
studied why firms hedge Nvith derivatives. Evidence of the various determinants of corporate hedging is not 
clear and consistent. They claim that a considerable number of these studies fail to prove the assumed 
relationships between derivatives usage and the proxies of the determinants. 
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usage appears to be only a small part of the overall risk profile of the non-financial 
firm. Their conclusions are consistent with Brown (2001), that motivations other 
than hedging, such as internal budgeting, performance evaluation and analyst 
forecast error concerns, significantly influence the objectives of derivatives 
programmes. In addition, large companies tend to hedge more than small ones (e. g. 
Fok (1997)). Compared to large firms, small firms should be affected more by 
market fluctuations and thereby suffer more from risk exposures. However, larger 
firms are more inclined to self-insure their exposures due to a stronger confidence 
in their capability to predict the market. A positive size effect is consistent with the 
notion that firms do not hedge with derivatives unless the benefits are larger than 
the fixed costs of establishing a hedging programme (Graham and Rogers (2002)). 
Second, if firms are risk averse they should aim to minimize the volatilities. Many 
companies appear to employ risk management strategies for pursuing goals other 
than volatility reduction, There exists evidence that risk management 
implementations in many cases are driven by the motivation of speculation rather 
than hedging considerations (e. g. Ljungqvist (1994)). The speculation mentioned 
here does not mean that firms use derivatives for risk premiums. Instead, a 
considerable number of firms attempt to take a chancy market view when deciding 
on their hedging policies (e. g. Bodnar et al. (1995,1996,1998), Howton and 
Perfect (1998), Glaum (1999)). Firms seem only to seek to avoid the losses of bad 
outcomes but reserve the benefits of good outcomes, which involves different 
hedging strategies based on market predictions. Stulz (1996) referred to this type 
of speculation as "selective hedging", implying that firms use financial 
instruments not primarily to minimize volatilities, but to hedge the downside risks 
instead. This explains why firms do not systematically hedge their risk exposures 
and tend to hedge only a very limited proportion compared to their overall risk 
profile; the extent to which they hedge depends on their view of future relevant 
volatilities. If they believe that the risk exposure may change in a way that will 
increase their firms' value, they might hedge the exposure at a low level or even 
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not hedge at all. Otherwise, they might hedge at a relatively high level compared 
to the exposures. By incorporating the concept of "selective hedging", risk 
management theory was essentially improved from "variance minimization" to 
"elimination of costly lower-tail outcomes" and also explains the actual corporate 
use of (derivative) financial instruments, which in most cases is driven by the 
management's market views about the potential risks. However, if volatility 
fluctuates in a predictable way, volatility forecasts are important for risk 
management, otherwise the market view based on volatility forecasts may be 
misleading (Christoffersen and Diebold (1997)). 
A number of survey studies have provided further evidence in support of Stulz's 
theory through the direct and original investigations of corporate hedging activities. 
In a survey of corporate derivatives usage, Dolde (1993) showed that 90% of the 
firms, which comprised 244 Fortune 500 companies, claimed that they had taken a 
view on the market direction of interest rates or exchange rates and modified their 
position to accommodate these views. Moreover, the average size of users of 
derivatives was greater than non-users. The Wharton survey series (Bodnar et al. 
(1995,1996,1998)) showed that managers of more than 60% of the firms 
surveyed found it difficult to avoid letting their own market view affect their 
hedging decisions both on hedge timing and hedge size. On the other side of the 
Atlantic, Grant and Marshall (1997) revealed that a significant number of UK 
firms sometimes used derivatives for "yield enhancement". In a similar fashion, 
Glaum's survey (1999) of German companies showed that, following very 
heterogeneous risk management practices, the majority of firms adopted 
"profit-oriented, forecast-based" selective hedging strategies. Meanwhile, he 
predicted that firms with low leverage, high profitability and large market value 
are more inclined to use forecasts in their hedging strategies. 
Recent empirical works are consistent with the above survey results. By catching 
the percentage changes of debt with the floating exposure after swapping 
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incorporation relative to the term spread over time, Faulkender (2005) found that 
corporate interest rate risk management practices were driven by speculation or 
"myopia" rather than hedging considerations. He found that, as the yield curve 
steepens, firms are more likely to have floating rate debt to reduce their short-term 
interest payment relative to locking in at a higher fixed rate, otherwise firms are 
inclined to raise funds at a fixed interest rate. Therefore, term spread as a strong 
determinant of the selected interest rate exposure suggests that managers may be 
speculating. Adam and Fernando (2006) investigated the cash flows from firms' 
derivatives transactions and shareholder value and found considerable evidence of 
selective hedging. They concluded that although hedging increases shareholder 
value, the cash flow gains from selective hedging are small at best. Brown et al. 
(2006) showed that the manager's market view has an important impact on 
corporate hedging policies. Consistent with Adam and Fernando (2006), their 
findings indicated that firms rarely have an advantage when timing the market to 
significantly increase firm value. 
If "market timing" were indeed prevalent in corporate risk management strategies, 
risk management theory should be "focused not on variability minimization, but 
rather on down-side-risk elimination" (Stulz (1996), p. 9). As a result, the 
fundamental aim of corporate risk management can be viewed as the purchase of 
"out-of-money put options" that eliminate the down side risks while reserving the 
upside benefits of the volatilities. How to selectively eliminate the probability of a 
"bad outcome" rather than fully cover exposures becomes the emphasis of hedging 
strategies. Therefore, a series of new methodologies have been developed to model 
risk exposures. Harris and Shen (2006) found that, compared to minimum variance 
hedging, which is sometimes known as pure hedging and ignores the speculative 
component related to the expected returns of the hedge portfolio, minimum 
value-at-risk (VaR) hedging offers a significant improvement. Topaloglou et al. 
(2002) developed a conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) model for multicurrency 
asset allocation and claimed that this model attains superior results in terms of 
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both higher returns and lower volatility. In addition, Beltratti et al. (2004) 
developed a scenario-based optimisation model of selective hedging strategies, 
which is a more general and dynamic approach because the hedge ratio may 
change across assets and over time. Their results indicate that transaction costs 
play a very important role in the selective hedging strategy. 
To hedge or not to hedge? How much is hedging needed? These questions cannot 
be answered simply by following the traditional theories. As more attention is 
drawn to the practical implementation of risk management strategies, the latent 
motivations of firms' risk management that the literature has hitherto ignored need 
to be further explored. 
2.2.3. Corporate debt issues and interest rate risk management 
Most of the research regarding risk management has been concerned with 
derivative financial instruments, which are empirically plausible for the majority 
of firms for the management of their overall risk exposures. Such research does 
not take into account that firms which do not use financial derivatives may not 
face the risk that a derivative contract can remedy, or they may hedge risks by 
means other than derivatives. More importantly, it ignores the important fact that 
the values of derivative financial instruments are based on those of more basic 
financial instruments. From the perspective of risk management, derivative 
financial instruments are the means of controlling or changing the volatilities of 
basic underlying financial assets such as stocks, debt or foreign currencies. There 
are more significant effects of the basic financial instruments to manage risk 
exposure. Grinblatt and Titman (2002) indicated that a newly issued debt can 
essentially change a firm's interest rate exposure. When correctly aligned with 
firm-specific interest rate exposure, corporate debt can be used as an effective 
instrument of interest rate risk management. Where the interest rate sensitivity is 
moving against the direction of the firm's value as well as there being a suitable 
maturity matching the firm's future cash flows, corporate debt acts as the direct 
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tools of interest rate risk management. In such a case, there is no need for the firm 
to enter into an adjunctive derivative contract. However, firms seem to fall over 
themselves to use derivatives rather than debt designs to manage interest rate 
exposure, whereas the debt market conditions rather than the motivation of 
hedging determine corporate debt issues. Moreover, few empirical studies have 
directly examined the relationship between debt issues and interest rate risk 
management, nor has any underlying theory been developed. 
Early empirical studies examined the determinants of corporate debt issues 
focusing on the relationship between debt maturiry and firm-specific 
characteristics. Wessels (1988) found a negative correlation between size and 
short-term debt with the implication that smaller firms cannot afford the high issue 
costs of long-term debt. Mitchell (1991) indicated that information determines the 
maturity of new debt. He also found a negative correlation between debt maturity 
and leverage (Mitchell (1993). Barclay and Smith (1995) showed that larger firms 
with lower market-to-book ratios have longer debt maturities, while Guedes and 
Opler (1996) reported that larger firms with higher growth opportunities are more 
likely to issue short-term debt. Stohs and Mauer (1996) found a positive 
relationship between asset maturity and debt maturity. They also found evidence 
that firms' earning surprises, tax rates and debt ratings all affect debt maturity. 
These early studies reveal evidence of the correlation between the debt maturity 
and firm-specific characteristics. 
Recent literature has paid more attention to the relationship between debt maturity 
and debt market condition factors, although the notion that debt maturity is related 
to debt market conditions can also be found in several early studies. After 
Bosworth (197 1), White (1974) and Taggart (1977) revealed that the market level 
of corporate debt issues is influenced by interest rates, more debt market factors 
were included in studies concerning debt maturity. Brick and Ravid (1985) found 
that a decreasing term structure renders short-term debt optimal. Guedes and Opler 
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(1996) also indicated that the maturity of debt issues is negatively related to the 
term structure. Baker et al. (2003) found that debt market conditions such as 
inflation, real short-term interest rates and term spreads predict excess debt returns. 
Moreover, at the market level, the long-term share in aggregate total debt issues is 
negatively related to all these variables. These results, when put together, indicate 
that firms are trying to time the debt market in an effort to reduce the costs of 
capital. This interpretation is supported by the evidence that the ratio of aggregate 
short to long-term debt is low when there are expected excess long-term debt 
returns. However, they also indicated that despite suggestive evidence it cannot be 
determined whether these are reducing the overall cost of capital because of the 
usual difficulties of testing debt market efficiency. Kaplin and Levy (2001) 
comprehensively examined corporate security issues, including both stocks and 
debt, and revealed that the ratio of aggregate short-term to aggregate long-term 
debt issues is highly correlated to the macroeconomic conditions. Antoniou et al. 
(2006) examined the determinants of debt maturity in the framework of taxes, 
contracting costs, signalling, liquidity risks and maturity matching. Their study 
sheds light on the static long-run relationship between debt maturity and both 
firm-specific and market-specific factors. Apart from the effects of firm size, 
market-to-book ratio, asset maturity, earning volatility, tax rates and liquidity, their 
results also revealed that the impacts on debt maturity decisions of market-specific 
factors, such as market equity premium, term structure, share price performance 
and interest rate volatility, are relevant in the UK. 
Although it is widely accepted that there is a negative correlation between 
expected debt returns and corporate debt issues, which suggests that firms are 
timing the debt markets, most of the studies have focused only on debt maturity 
and debt market conditions, ignoring the interest rate yield types of corporate debt 
issues. A public debt issue must involve the consideration of yield type choice 
apart from maturity. The yield types of corporate debt are related but not always 
consistent with maturity. A firm faces various options in terms of debt yield 
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choices which are applied to the interest rate risk management. While various 
derivatives contracts are employed as accessorial instruments for adjusting the 
initial interest rate exposure, yield type choices are still important considerations 
when making decisions regarding debt issues. The yield type choices between 
fixed and floating rates are closely but not solely linked to the firm's interest rate 
exposure. Moreover, the latent determinants of a firm's decisions regarding debt 
yield type choices reflect the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the interest rate 
risk management. However, few papers, with the exception of Faulkender (2005), 
have investigated the issue of interest rate risk management in debt analysis. He 
filled this gap by examining the relationship between the interest rate exposure 
choices of corporate debt issues and interest rate risk management. In contrast to 
other studies, he investigated whether the selected interest rate exposure is 
influenced by the market conditions or the firm's cash flow interest rate exposure. 
He argued that if the objective of interest rate management is to hedge, then firms 
that have cash flows that are positively correlated with the interest rate should 
prefer floating interest payments, whereas firms with cash flows that are either 
uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the interest rate will prefer fixed interest 
payments. Alternatively, if a firm's chosen interest rate exposure is not correlated 
to the cash flow interest rate sensitivities, it may be determined by an alternative 
objective other than hedging when issuing new debt. Specifically, they may time 
the market in an effort to reduce the cost of capital. Simultaneously involving two 
categories of explanatory variables, both the firm-specific risk exposure and the 
debt market condition variables, Faulkender (2005) examined which behaviour the 
firms were engaging in. However, his study does not cover the issue of debt 
maturity. Moreover, his sample set was restricted to one typical industry only and 
is therefore limited in supporting a convincing conclusion. 
2.2.4. Summary 
Since the 1980s risk management has become an increasingly prevalent topic of 
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corporate finance. The literature regarding risk management goes beyond the early 
theories, which dominates the majority of risk management research with attempts 
to disclose market imperfections and the effects on firms' hedging activities. 
Considerations of the subjective behavioural elements in risk management 
practices has shed light on risk management implementation as influenced by 
managers' views of future market movements. In this sense, there exists room for 
improvement to risk management in theory as well as practice. 
This chapter examines the determinants of corporate debt issues within the 
framework of interest rate risk management and contributes to the literature in 
several ways. Firstly, few prior studies on interest rate risk management have 
explicitly investigated the effects of the basic financial instruments, specifically 
corporate debt. This is important because the yields of corporate debt are closely 
connected to interest rate variability. Any newly issued corporate debt essentially 
changes the firm's capital structure and future cash flows, and thereby changes the 
firm's interest rate exposure. As regards the management of interest rate risk, 
corporate debt per se is more important and more direct instruments than 
accompanying financial derivatives contracts. Therefore, research regarding debt 
should include the crucial component of interest rate risk management theory. This 
chapter bridges this gap by connecting corporate debt issues to interest rate risk 
management analysis. 
Secondly, there is copious literature on firms' debt where the focus is the structure 
of debt maturity. This chapter also examines firms' choices of interest rate yield 
types, which few studies have explored. This is meaningful because if a firm's 
interest rate exposure is significantly different from zero, it can be offset by a 
floating rate debt. Conversely, a fixed rate debt would be the optimal choice where 
the firm has no significant interest rate exposure. The likelihood of choosing fixed 
versus floating rate debt can therefore be predicted by estimating the firm's 
interest rate exposure, from both the firm and market level. 
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Finally, this chapter ýexplores the latent motivations behind corporate debt issues, 
because hedging may not be the firm's primary objective. There is some doubt 
regarding the validity of the hypothesis that firms are risk averse, and so an 
attempt is made to show that there is a dominant objective. Put differently, the 
question as to whether managers take advantage of new debt issues in order to 
hedge interest rate exposure or whether they are used for non-hedging purposes is 
tested. This chapter aims to examine the interest rate exposure of the firms and the 
market condition factors, controlling for firm-specific factors such as firm size, 
and development opportunity. 
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2.3. Empirical strategy and methodology 
2.3.1. Hypotheses 
Firms issue debt primarily to raise capital, while the details of any debt issue 
scheme will involve comprehensive considerations. For instance, the firm needs to 
decide the reasonable principal value of the newly issued debt to avoid either 
under- investment caused by insufficient funds or unnecessary capital costs due to 
over-financing. Meanwhile, the firm should take into account the timing of the 
issue in order to match the investment project with the market environment. 
Moreover, choices of debt maturity and yield type essentially influence the firm's 
future cash flows and interest rate exposure. All these factors are determined by 
the underlying motivations accompanying the debt issues. With the aim of 
bridging the gap in the literature regarding corporate debt issues and interest rate 
risk management, as discussed above, this chapter examines whether firms take 
advantage of newly issued debt for interest rate risk management or are simply 
timing the market in an effort to reduce the costs of capital, as well as determining 
the maturities and yield types of newly issued corporate debt. Guided by these 
objectives, this study sets forth two hypotheses: 
HI: The purpose of firms' debt issues involves considerations of hedging 
interest rate risk exposure. 
H2: Firms'debt issues are driven by debt market conditions in an effort to 
lower the costs of capital. 
The first hypothesis implies that the characteristics of debt issues are driven by the 
extent of the firm's interest rate exposure with the intention of lowering the 
impacts of interest rate volatilities on the firm's expected cash flows and values. In 
other words, the firm is hedging based on its specific interest rate exposure. 
However, the second hypothesis suggests that the firm's objective is to time the 
debt market in an effort to increase shareholder value by incorporating its market 
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views into the financing policy decisions. Put differently, the firm is speculating 
for risk premium. These two hypotheses may not be alternatives in the practical 
sense. It is possible that the expected market movements can be of benefit by 
reducing the firm's initial interest rate exposure. In such a case, the interest rate 
exposures of newly issued debt may be consistent with both hypotheses. Therefore, 
the hypotheses tests will need to involve both univariate and multivariate tests to 
discover the dominant incentive behind the debt issues. 
In this chapter, three stages have been executed to test the hypotheses. Firstly, the 
firms' interest rate exposure prior to new debt issues was measured. The initial 
interest rate exposure determines whether firms are supposed to adopt specific 
strategies to hedge the current risk exposure, and how they should accommodate 
the new debt with the existing interest rate exposure and the additional exposure 
caused by the newly issued debt. The after-event interest rate exposure was 
measured to see whether the debt issues significantly altered the firms' initial 
interest rate exposure as well as whether or not the firms intended to hedge their 
risk exposure when issuing the debt. Secondly, the question as to whether there is 
a significant relationship between corporate debt issues and debt market condition 
factors was explored using the market-level aggregate debt issues. If this is the 
case, it provides evidence corresponding to the second hypothesis that firms are 
timing the debt market. Finally, the above two stages were jointed measured by 
including both the firm-specific interest rate exposure and debt market condition 
factors to examine the determinants of the corporate debt issues. This final stage 
should shed some light on the research question, i. e. do firms hedge or time the 
market? 
2.3.2. Impacts of debt issues on firms 'interest rate exposure 
Firms face interest rate risks if the variability of the interest rates leads to volatile 
cash flows or firm values. The interest rate risk comes from two sources: the assets 
interest rate sensitivity and the debt interest rate sensitivity. In the case where the 
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cash flows of the assets are sensitive to the interest rates, with the intention of 
hedging interest rate exposure, the firm should make the cash flows of the debt 
sensitive to the interest rates as well, the sign of which is on the opposite to the 
sign of assets. Thus, the firm's interest rate exposure will be fully hedged or, to 
some extent, reduced. Every new debt issue produces an opportunity for the firm 
to adjust their interest rate exposure. As new debt will change the capital structure, 
capital costs and cash flows, and therefore the interest rate exposure, firms should 
include them in their considerations as regards interest rate risk management. If 
the objective of the interest rate management policy is to hedge, the firm with 
assets sensitive to interest rates should measure the risk exposure of its equity and 
acquire a debt position with an opposite risk exposure to reduce the interest rate 
exposure of the former. In the case where the cash flows or assets are not 
correlated with the interest rates, the firm will expect the new debt to be 
insensitive to interest rates. Following this logic, a measurement was taken of the 
firms' asset interest rate exposure before the debt was issued to determine which 
strategy was likely to be adopted and then the incremental interest rate exposure 
resulting from the newly issued debt was examined by investigating the firms' 
asset interest rate exposures after the debt was issued. Since firms choose the 
exposure at the time of the debt issuances, investigating whether they significantly 
reduced reflects the firms' hedging strategies. In many cases, firms enter into 
derivatives contracts contemporaneously with the accompanying newly issued 
debt in order to manage the interest rate exposure. A direct comparison between 
the interest rate exposure before and after the debt issues comprises the 
information of possible derivative contracts, which reveals whether or not firms 
adopt hedging strategies to manage their interest rate exposure and the additional 
exposure resulting from the new debt. 
First we need to define the interest rate risk, and there is a wealth of literature on 
this issue. The key question is: what and how many risk factors are needed in 
measuring the exposure to interest rate risk? First of all, the simplest method 
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introduces one factor only, the yield to maturity, with the assumption that the yield 
curve moves in a parallel way. However, an accurate measure needs to consider 
other possible factors as well, and the complication of modelling has impeded 
studies in this field. Therefore, various methods were produced in trade-off 
between parsimony and accuracy. Brennan and Schwartz (1979)22 used one 
short-term and one long-term rate to measuring the firms' asset interest rate risk 
exposure 23 . Meanwhile, the market returns were involved to control the systematic 
risks and therefore for the purpose of firm-specific interest rate exposure 
measurement. 
In terms of dependent variables, Faulkender (2005) employed 20 quarterly cash 
flows covering five fiscal years prior to the debt issues to measure the firms' 
interest rate exposure, This measurement introduces several potential problems. 
First, it could be argued that a five-year period is too long as the financial 
characteristics of the firms may change markedly. It is difficult to exclude the 
influence of confounding events on firm's interest rate exposure. On the other 
hand 20 observations can be said to be too small to accurately measure firms' 
interest rate exposure. Second, measuring cash flows could be problematic since 
firms usually decorate their financial statements by smoothing out their cash flows 
(Kaplin and Levy, (2001)). Third, due to the discontinuous nature of cash flows 
(cash flows are reported only periodically) they cannot be accurate measures of 
firms' interest rate sensitivity as cash flows ignore the interest rate volatility during 
the period between the two reported dates. Finally, under efficient market 
hypothesis, if cash flows are sensitive to the interest rates, the information they 
contain is reflected in the stock prices. On the one hand, stock prices are instantly 
observable reflecting investors' expectations on firm values and hence they do not 
suffer from the limitations of cash-flow. Hence stock prices are better proxies to 
represent managers' financial decisions corresponding to the changes in capital 
market environment. Specifically in this model, the firms' stock returns for the 50 
weeks prior to the debt issues were used to estimate the initial interest rate 
" They developed an arbitrage model of the term structure of interest rates based on the assumption that the 
whole term structure at any point in time may be expressed as a function of the yields on the longest and 
shortest maturity default free instruments. 
" In Faulkender (2005), 6-month LIBOR is chosen as the only benchmark interest rate because most 
commercial debt is primarily tied to LIBOR if it is floating. Moreover, the variability of LIBOR rates plays the 
role as the indicator of interest rate movements. 
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exposure, which was measured by the asset sensitivity to changes in both the short 
and long-term interest rates. The following regression was run to examine the 
interest rate exposure based on the stock prices. 
Ri'l =a +)IR,,,,, +A,, I,,, c,, t (2.1) 
where Rij is the weekly stock return of the ith stock at the week t. R,,,, is the 
FTSE-all index returns as the proxy for the market return. The weekly changes of 
the three-month Treasury bill rates, I,, and ten-year Treasury bond rates, Iij, proxy 
the short and long-term interest rate exposure, respectively. &j and fljj measure the 
ith firm's operation exposures to the short and long-term interest rates prior to and 
after the debt issues 24 . The comparisons of P, or fl, prior to and after each debt 
issue show the influences of the new debt issues on the firm's interest rate 
exposure. If during the 50-week event window there was more than one debt issue 
event, they were consolidated into a sole event to avoid overlapping, and the 
measuring period was extended to the week before the earliest event. In order to 
measure the effects of the debt issues on the firms' initial interest rate exposure 
and to identify the underlying intention accompanying them, the interest rate 
exposure after the debt was issued was tested using the same method as that used 
for the period prior to the events. 
When looking at the situation prior to a debt issue event, four instances may 
appear in the results which imply the different behaviours the firms were engaging 
in. Firstly, if the stock prices were sensitive to the interest rate before the debt 
issue but became insensitive after the debt issue, the event has influenced the 
firm's interest rate exposure significantly. This may result from either a designed 
hedging purpose or unintended outcomes accompanying the debt issue. The result 
caused by each potential reason exhibits the favourable influence of the 
debt issue 
on hedging the firm's interest rate exposure. Secondly, if conversely, the stock 
24 The model is actually CAPM-based with the applications of the efficient market 
hypothesis and 
information communication process. The explanatory variables are examined contemporarily 
One-lagged 
explanatory variables are also examined but with consistent results 
in both features of individual 0 and the 
overall distribution of the whole sample, therefore not reported. 
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prices were insensitive to the interest rate before the debt issue but became 
sensitive after the debt issue, the newly issued debt clearly creates the additional 
interest rate exposure but the firm has failed to eliminate its influences. Thirdly, if 
the interest rate sensitivity of the stock prices is insignificant before the debt issue 
and remains unchanged after the event, the new debt may have had a negligible 
effect on the firm's interest rate exposure, which implies that the interest rate 
exposure created by the new debt has been hedged. Finally, the most complex 
instance arises where the sensitive interest rate exposure of the pre-debt-issue 
stock prices remains significant after the debt issue. Depending on the extent of 
the P changes, a decrease of P implies that the new debt has offset part of the initial 
interest rate exposure, while an increase of P may result from additional interest 
rate exposure created by the new debt. In short, by examining the influence of the 
new debt on the firm's initial interest rate exposure, it is possible to reveal whether 
the corporate debt was used as instruments for hedging instruments interest rates. 
2.3.3. Market-wide choices of corporate debt issues and debt market conditions 
After examining the influences of the debt issues on the interest rate exposure of 
the firms, a further exploration was made into whether corporate debt issues are 
related to market conditions. In contrast to examinations of individual observations 
to discover the impacts of debt issue events, here the potential exogenous 
influences from the market-wide view were documented. It would seem intuitively 
that decisions regarding debt issues are inevitably influenced by exogenous factors, 
and indeed this has been indicated by a number of previous studies (e. g. Guedes 
and Opler (1996), Kaplin and Levy (2001), and Baker et al. (2003)). These 
exogenous debt market factors involve various measures of interest rates, inflation 
rates, term spreads and expected excess debt returns. For example, interest rates 
and inflation rates, which play the role of indicators regarding economic growth, 
induce firms' debt issuances and financing policies. It also makes sense that an 
increase in interest rates may induce firms to issue short rather than long-term debt 
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to reduce capital costs. Additionally, when the yield spread curve steepens, firms 
tend to borrow at floating and short-term debt rates (Faulkender (2005)). Although 
many studies have explored debt issue choices in a cross-section, Baker et al. 
(2003) examined the variations in the maturity of new debt issues as connected to 
the debt market conditions by employing the aggregate debt issue data. Their study 
showed that the levels of long-term debt as part of the total debt issue during given 
time periods were determined by inflation, the real short-term rates and term 
spread, while other variables such as the credit spread and credit term spread were 
not significant. Meanwhile, they claimed that the expected variation in excess debt 
returns predicts the levels of the long-term debt, which suggests that firms are 
timing the debt market. In line with Baker et'al. (2003), the aggregate debt issues 
data was used in this chapter to determine the general tendency of the debt issues 
regarding both debt maturity and yield type choice to correspond to the 
movements of the debt market conditions. Although this fully aggregated data 
might "hide any cross-sectional differences in behaviour that might be due to 
variation in firin characteristics" (Baker et al. (2003), p270), this possibility is 
explored in the subsequent section which analyses the cross-sectional data with the 
controls of firm-specific characteristics. 
According to the results of Baker et al. (2003) and Faulkender (2005 )25 , debt 
market conditions are represented by three variables: inflation, realized real 
short-term interest rates and term spread. Although it could be argued that other 
market factors may also represent the characteristics of the debt market, it is 
believed here that the above three variables represent the principal tendency of the 
debt market and the purpose of this work is to identify the relationship between 
corporate debt issues and the debt market qualitatively rather than accurately 
predict firms' debt issues. In addition, as long as a pronounced relationship is 
2' Faulkender (2005) concluded that term structure determines firms' interest rate exposure choices although 
he also included credit spread in the models. Baker et a], (2003) involved seven variables concerning the 
debt 
market conditions which also included the expected inflation, the credit spread and the credit term spread, 
but 
only inflation, the realized real short-term interest rate and the terrn structure are significantly correlated 
to the 
debt issue choices. 
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found between the debt issues and debt market under the current assumptions, 
whether or not all possible market variables are involved is not crucial for the 
conclusion. Only if the assumptions are not proved would it be necessary to 
consider whether any other important factors have been ignored. Therefore, 
whether there is a need to further examine the debt market structure depends on 
the test results. 
With this objective, the market-wide debt issuing tendencies of different types of 
debt categorized by yield types were examined as well as by length of maturity. 
The debt issues were sorted by interest rate exposure choice, specifically, the 
floating rate and the fixed rate debt. Meanwhile, all the observations were 
categorized by the lengths of maturity. This raises an issue concerning the 
definitions of long and short-term debt. Usually a debt with a maturity of longer 
than a year is regarded as a long-term debt from the accounting point of view. 
However, since the majority of public debt is longer than a year, the definitions of 
long and short-term debt vary across different studies. For example, in an early 
study conducted by Modigliani (1966) all public debt was sorted into several 
categories. Debt with a maturity of no longer than two years was regarded as 
short-term, while those with a maturity of longer than 12 years were long-term 
debts. The rest was intermediate debt. The methods employed in various other 
studies include a maturity of three years which divides the long and short-term 
debt (Barclay and Smith (1995)), and three years and seven years to divide the 
long, medium and short-term debt (Kaplin and Levy (2001)). Following the 
Federal Reserve, Baker et al. (2003) categorized the long-term debt by types as the 
sum of "industrial revenue debts", "corporate debts" and "mortgages-, which 
is 
specifically employed in the US debt market. Therefore, how to divide long and 
short-term debt by maturity is a subjective choice. The standard usage was 
employed here to define debt with a maturity of less than five years as short-term 
debt, and more than ten years as long-term debt. The rest are medium-term 
debt. 
To test the robustness of this definition, an alternative measure was employed to 
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check its validity. The following regression (2.2) was run to examine the 
determinants of the market-wide debt issues and to reveal whether or not there was 
a relationship between the debt issues and the market conditions. This involved the 
debt market factors including inflation (INF, ), the real short-term interest rate (the 
difference between the inflation rate, INFt and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, 
GS,, )26 and the term spread (the difference between the I 0-year Treasury bond rate, 
GD, and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, Gs, ). 
D, =a+ bINF, +b 2(G,, - INF, )+b JGLI - Gs, ) + c, (2.2) 
Where D, denotes the aggregate percentages of the deal numbers of floating rate 
debt, fixed rate debt and the long, medium and short-term debt for each quarter 
respectively. Therefore, the dependent variable was standardized by generating the 
levels of all types of debt over the total debt issues to eliminate the measurement 
error which may exist in the changes in the deal numbers 27 . Under the market 
timing hypothesis, when firms expect the interest rates to decline during the period 
of the debt's maturity, they will prefer floating rate debt to fixed rate debt 
(Faulkender (2005)). Moreover, if the long-term interest rate is higher than that 
expected by the firms, there is a greater incentive to issue short rather than 
long-term debt, and vice versa (Baker et al. (2003)). Therefore, apart from 
investigating the contemporary relationship between all types of debt issues and 
the market factors, the extent to which the differences between the various types of 
debt were affected by the market condition factors was also examined to reveal the 
underlying behaviour and preferences behind the choices of debt issues. Since this 
fully aggregated data might "hide any cross-sectional differences in behaviour that 
might be due to variation in firm characteristics" (Baker et al. (2003), p. 270), this 
26 Following Baker et al. (2003), 1 implement the Kalman filter procedure of Fama and Gibbons (1982), 
decomposing the Treasury bill rate into inflation and the real short-term interest rate. There are two concerns 
with this analysis. On the one hand, the decomposition depends on a structural assumption about the process 
of the real interest rate. The real rates are better able to reflect the market interest rates and the variations of 
corporate debt issuance desires than nominal rates. On the other hand, inflation rates are employed separately 
as a proxy of economy conditions to reveal the influences of the overall economy on corporate debt issuance, 
in contrast to the real interest rates in debt markets. 
27 As suggested by Baker et al. (2003), if the numbers of different debts issued are volatile, the levels of 
various types of debts over the total debt issues more accurately measure the preferences than the changes. 
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possibility is explored in the subsequent section which analyses the pooled data of 
the individual debt issue events by controlling the firm-specific characteristics. 
It is unsure whether the underlying relationship between debt issues and debt 
market factors is contemporary or whether there is a lead-lag, because managers 
28 
usually make predictions regarding market movements before making decisions . 
There are no clues re garding the procedures followed by firms when making 
market predictions, but they are more likely to make judgements about the debt 
market tendency based on the current available information where there are three 
or six months before the issuing date. Therefore, a more convincing way to 
investigate this is to involve the lagged debt market variables in the regressions, if 
managers do make decisions based on the current available information. In 
addition, a more direct method to test whether all available information at the time 
of making a debt issue decision is embodied in that decision is by examining the 
lagged independent variables, because if firms do time the market when issuing 
debt, the aggregate debt issues during the previous period must comprise all 
information available at that moment. This is analogous to investment analysts 
making technical analyses based on the current stock prices and the past tendency 
of price movements. Firms may refer to the opinions of other firms concerning 
their views of the debt market which are embodied in the aggregate debt issues at 
that moment. Another advantage in doing this test is that it is more robust to 
include the influences of other explanatory factors regarding the debt market 
conditions excluded from the regressions. This allows entry in an unrestricted way 
and explains at least as much about the variations in each type of debt issue as the 
above three debt market variables do. Moreover, if there is a significant issuing 
tendency for the various types of debt across time periods, that is to say, debt 
issues are auto-correlated in a time series, this will provide strong evidence that 
firms make debt issue decisions according to their view of the market, i. e. they are 
timing the market. 
28 Baker et al. (2003) indicated that the relationship 
between the corporate debt issues and the market 
conditions is found to be contemporary. 
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The auto-regression models (2.3) were built as follows, Sorted by yield types and 
the lengths of maturity, the dependent variable, dt, is replaced by the time series of 
quarterly deal numbers or deal values of floating rate debt, fixed rate debt5 
short-term debt and long-term debt in every test respectively. According to the 
debt issuing procedure, there is usually a three to six month time-scale (one or two 
lags for the quarterly data) between producing the debt issue plans and 
implementing the issues. Therefore, the number of lags, i, takes I or 2 respectively. 
In order to eliminate the influence of economic growth and the preference 
variations of the debt choices, a time trend, Tt, was introduced into the model. 
i 
a T, + Lýbjd, + (2.3) 
1 
Apart from the changes of aggregate quarterly deal numbers and deal values 
across the time periods, the levels of the different types of debt, d', over the total 
issues of the debt market, DI, were also tested as shown in the auto-regression 
(2.4). With the same notations as the regression (2.3), the dependent variable, d'ID', 
is replaced by the percentage of quarterly deal numbers or deal values of floating 
rate debt, fixed rate debt, short-term debt and long-term debt over total debt issues 
in every test respectively. The number of lags, i, still takes 1 or 2 respectively. 
However, because the levels already contained the effects of economic growth, the 
time trend was not involved in the model. 
d, id 
=a+Lbi ' +c, 
(2.4) 
D, I D, -) 
In short, in this sub-section, the issue of whether debt market conditions affect the 
yield types and maturity of corporate debt issues is examined. Meanwhile, the aim 
was to make comparisons between the various types of debt to reveal what 
determines the choices firms make concerning the yield types and maturity of their 
debt issues. Therefore, a model involving three debt market variables was 
employed to examine these assumptions. In order to eliminate the effect of not 
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including the potential debt market factors in the regressions, the lagged 
independent variables of the debt issues were used to explain the current variations, 
which identifies the market tendencies of the debt issues and the firms' underlying 
intentions and behaviour when making decisions. 
2.3.4. The determinants of corporate debt issues 
After exploring the incremental interest rate exposure generated by the newly 
issued debt, which identifies the essential effects of the new debt on the firms' 
initial risk exposure, as well as examining the relationship between the 
market-wide debt issues and the debt market conditions, the determinants of the 
corporate debt issues, i. e. whether the firms were primarily concerned with 
matching the interest rate exposure of their assets to their liabilities or timing the 
market to lower the costs of capital, were then examined. If the firms were 
hedging, the debt issues should be driven by the firm-specific interest rate 
sensitivity. Alternatively, if they were attempting to time the market and lower the 
costs of capital, the debt issues should be linked to the market condition 
movements. Following this logic, multivariate tests were carried out involving 
both the firm-specific interest rate exposure and the debt market variables, to 
examine both hypotheses synchronously and disclose the dominant motivation. 
Since the market-wide aggregate data ignores the cross-sectional variations of the 
firm-specific characteristics, the firm-level data is better able to identify the 
differences in the preferences of debt financing. Therefore, the pooled firm-level 
data was used in the regressions rather than the aggregate data. Using the interest 
rate exposure prior to the new issues, given potential measures of hedging and 
market pricing, and a number of control variables, probit regressions (2.5) were 
estimated to detect the determinant factors of the firms' choices of debt yield types 
and maturity. 
Di =a+ blfl, + b2AJ 
32 
L c,, Y,,, ++ ci 
j=l 
(2.5) 
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A Explanatory variables. 
Consistent with the estimation of firm-specific interest rate exposure, the sample 
contains 579 debt issues - adjusted by the event windows. The independent 
variables comprise three sets of variables for different objectives respectively. 
Firstly, asset interest rate sensitivity, P,, i and Pl, i measure the ith firm's operation 
exposures to the short and long-term interest rates prior to the debt issues, which 
are generated from regression (2.1). If the firms are hedging, the yield type choices 
and the maturity should be related to the initial interest rate exposure. In the period 
prior to the debt issues, the hedgers may select the desirable yield type of the new 
debt according to the firm's interest rate exposure. Specifically, if the interest rate 
betas are positive, which implies the firm's stock prices will increase as the 
interest rates rise, and vice versa, the firm will prefer a floating rate debt for the 
objective of smoothing the firm's value, because the cash flows of the new debt 
will balance the volatilities resulting from the positive interest rate sensitivity of 
the stock prices. Alternatively, firms that are either negatively correlated or 
uncorrelated to the interest rates will prefer a fixed rate debt in order to eliminate 
the additional risk exposure caused by the new debt. The concern here is with the 
significance and signs of the coefficient of the betas. Therefore, in addition to the 
primary measure of interest rate exposure generated from the previous tests, the 
measure was modified to verify that the results are robust to the specifications of 
the interest rate exposure. Aside from quoting the estimated interest rate betas 
directly, the interest rate exposure was specified by the dummy variable which 
takes values according to the signs of the betas estimated from the model (2.1). 
The interest rate exposure also affects the debt maturity. Working on the 
assumption that there is hedging, the firm with a significant risk exposure will 
have more incentive to issue a short-term debt to weaken the effects of the 
incremental risk exposure. Otherwise, a long-term debt will be preferred, ceteris 
paribus. 
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Secondly, the debt market variables used were similar to those employed in the 
regression (2.2). yij denote a series of variables regarding the debt market 
conditions in the corresponding months when the debt was issued. Inflation, the 
real short-term interest rate and term spread were introduced as the basic debt 
market condition factors. These macroeconomic variables were employed to 
measure the costs of debt at the time when the debt funds were raised. If a firm's 
likelihood of distress changes over time with changes in the economy, the decision 
regarding the firm's raising of debt funds may change with the state of the 
economy. Then, the inflation rate plays the role of economic indicator. If firms are 
trying to reduce their short-term costs of capital in response to changing market 
prices, their interest rate exposure should vary with changes in the short-term 
interest rate. In addition, the term spread reflects the variations between the short 
and long-term interest rates, which may affect the firms'judgment regarding the 
long-term tendency of the interest rate variability and, in turn, their preference of 
debt maturity. 
A number of control variables were included to eliminate the effects of 
firm-specific characteristics on the debt issue preference. ýOjj denote the control 
variables of firm size and market-to-book ratios corresponding to the time when 
the debt funds were issued. According to the literature regarding capital structure 
choices and the determinants of debt issues, the preference of debt issues varies 
across firms with different financial characteristics. Consistent with Myer (1977), 
Barclay and Smith (1995) indicated that firms that have few growth options, or are 
large, have more long-term debt. Baker and Wurgler (2002) found that firms with 
high market valuations, as measured by the market-to-book ratio, raised fewer debt 
funds than those with low market valuations. In addition, Guedes and Opler (1996) 
involved a number of variables regarding the debt issuers' characteristics, and 
found that firm size and the market-to-book ratio both significantly affected the 
maturity of firms' debt. Therefore, firm size and the market-to-book ratio were 
controlled as the proxy for the firms' ability to achieve particular exposures and 
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growth opportunities, because both variables are widely accepted as important 
factors affecting firms' debt issues. Moreover, since the main objective is to 
explore the firms' attitudes toward interest rate risk management, other variables 
revealed in the literature were ignored and this topic is left to future studies. 
B. Explained variables 
Although there is a wealth of literature that has focused on debt maturity, few 
studies of corporate debt issues have considered the interest rate exposure choices 
from the risk management point of view. In this chapter, the determinants of both 
the yield types and maturities of the firms' new debt have been examined 
respectively, notwithstanding targeting the consistent objective. 
The probit regression was estimated for the firms' choices of interest rate exposure 
for the new debt with the explanatory variables. This examined the determinant 
factors for firms choosing floating or fixed rates for their debt funds. The 
dependent variable Di was set as the dummy variable which took the value of one 
if the yield type of the debt was floating, and zero otherwise, in the regression 
(2.5). Apart from the yield type choice, the choices regarding debt issues also 
involve the debt maturity. As with the choice of yield type, decisions regarding 
debt maturity may be affected by either exogenous or endogenous factors. On the 
one hand, since the firm's value varies as the different debt maturity changes the 
future cash flows, the firm with a plan for raising debt funds will consider 
matching the debt maturity to the time horizon of the investment project, as well as 
matching the future cash flows of both the debt funds and the investment project to 
avoid the extra volatility of the cash flows. On the other hand, exogenous factors 
may induce firms to consider debt issue strategies as other than or more than to 
hedge risk exposure. If the debt market conditions suggest that the costs of a 
long-term debt are predictably low, firms will prefer to raise long-term debt funds 
rather than the short-term debt to lower the costs of capital, even if the short-term 
debt financing is enough to meet the need of the investment fund. Therefore, it is 
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necessary to examine debt maturity as the indicator of whether the firms are 
hedging or timing the market. As the alternative specification of the regression 
(2.5), Di takes the value of positive one (+I) if the debt was short-term and 
negative one (-I) for long-term debt and zero otherwise. Finally, the dummy 
dependent variable of debt maturity was replaced by the year horizons of debt 
maturity in the regression (2.5) to directly examine the firms' debt maturity 
choices and to eliminate the potential bias resulting from the definitions of short 
and long-term debt. 
In short, this regression examines whether it is the firm-specific interest rate 
exposure or the debt market conditions that determine the firm's interest rate 
choices for new debt issues, controlling the firm size and the MTB ratio. Finally, 
after presenting the initial regressions to test whether firms are hedging or timing 
the market, alternative specifications were used to separate out the different 
interpretations of the findings. Following these were numerous robustness checks 
to determine whether the effects found for the entire sample were symmetric or 
whether the factors that motivated particular exposures differed, based on the 
source of the funds and the relative size of the debt issue. As documented below, 
the empirical findings are robust to all these alternative specifications. 
2.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
A sample set was built of the corporate debt issues of non-financial firms in the 
UK covering the period 1986 - 2004. In this section there is first a description of 
the selection procedure for the firms in the sample and the information about the 
debt collected for these firms. This is followed by a definition of the debt market 
variables and then the data is presented. The data regarding the debt market factors 
is translated into the aggregate types to accommodate the targets of this chapter. 
The basic data employed in this chapter is the corporate public debt issues, which 
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were quoted in the Securities Data Corporations (SDQ Platinum. The debt types 
cover all convertible and non-convertible debt, preferred stocks and 
mortgage/asset backed and private debt. From all the firms with debt issues, the 
non-financial firms in the UK market during the sample period 29 based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code were selected. The financial firms 
with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 were excluded from the sample. An initial 
sample of 1,518 debt issues was obtained. However, subject to the estimates of the 
firms' asset interest rate exposures, which involve the firms' stock prices, only the 
public firms remained. The information contained in each debt issue observation 
also includes principal values, issue dates, years to maturity, S&P and Moody debt 
credit rates, and interest rate yield types. Using these selection criteria, a sample of 
742 debt issues from 217 firms, for the period 1986 - 2004, remained. Without a 
restriction of issue size, the smallest value of observations is 0.62 million US 
dollars. Table 2.1 presents the annual distribution of the debt issues sorted by 
maturity and yield types. In general, 67% were fixed rate debt, 23% were 
short-term rate debt (a maturity of less than five years) and 32% were long-term 
debt (a maturity of over ten years). As seen from the time series, the variations of 
the debt deal numbers tended to increase over time. This may have been due to the 
market-wide trend of debt issues, because the sector growth of the economy will 
stimulate the expansion of the debt market. Moreover, some specific factors in the 
debt market may have introduced an incentive for the firms to raise debt funds. 
This is examined in the empirical work. 
Table 2.1 Sample Annual Distributions 
Corporate debt issue data was collected from Securities Data Companies Platinum (SDC). The debt types 
cover all convertible and non-convertible bonds, preferred stocks and mortgage/asset backed and private debt 
issued by UK non-financial public firms which have codes available on Datastream. A sample group of 742 
debt issues from 217 firms, spanning the period from 1986 to 2004, remains. The whole sample is sorted by 
yield types and maturity horizons. Defined as the standard usage, short-terin debt has the maturity of no longer 
than 5 years, while long-term debt has the maturity of longer than 10 years. 
29 The SDC provides the data regarding the corporate public debt issues from 1985. However, because the 
LIBOR data which is used to estimate the firms' initial interest rate exposures is only available from 2 nd 
January 1986 in the DataStrearn International, we started our sample period from 1986. 
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Short-term 
debt 
Median-term 
d ebt 
Long-term 
debt 
Fixed rate 
debt 
Floating rate 
d ebt 
An nual issues 
1986 2 4 2 8 0 8 
1987 3 7 2 5 7 12 
1988 10 1 8 17 2 19 
1989 3 3 5 6 5 11 
1990 3 5 6 2 12 14 
1991 8 9 11 14 14 28 
1992 6 10 6 12 10 22 
1993 3 18 9 15 15 30 
1994 1 11 11 7 16 23 
1995 3 9 9 11 10 21 
1996 5 17 9 23 8 31 
1997 8 27 20 33 22 55 
1998 3 20 21 30 14 44 
1999 9 21 27 45 12 57 
2000 36 27 18 59 22 81 
2001 26 29 22 57 20 77 
2002 21 35 17 45 28 73 
2003 11 48 26 70 15 85 
2004 13 30 8 37 14 51 
Sum 174 331 237 496 246 742 
It can be seen that two-thirds of the deals were fixed rate debts. This level is, to 
some extent, lower than expected because previously the majority of the corporate 
public debt had adopted a fixed yield. This raises the question consistent with the 
hypothesis as to why firms sometimes prefer to issue floating rate debt. The 
difference between the short and long-term debt heavily depends on the manual 
separation. This is checked in the robustness test. Table 2.2 presents the sample 
statistics using the categories of yield types and lengths of debt maturity. 
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Table 2.2 Sample Statistics 
Panel A displays the maturity statistics of the whole sample and the sub-sample sorted by yield types and 
maturity. Panel B displays the quarterly aggregate debt market factors and corporate debt issues. Inflation is 
the real quarterly inflation generated from the announced UK consumer price index (CPI). The real short-term 
rate is estimated as the three-month Treasury bill rates minus actual inflation. The term spread is the difference 
between the 10-year Treasury bond rates and the three-month Treasury bill rates. (1) to (5) denote the 
aggregate quarterly deal numbers of the floating rate (Df), fixed rate (DF), short-term (D, ), medium-term (D,, ) 
and long-term (DI) debt; (6) to (10) denote the aggregate percentages of deal numbers of all types of above 
debt to the total issued debt during each quarter. Panel C displays the pooled data employed in the multivariate 
hypotheses tests. Beta-pre-Glt and Beta-pre-Gst denote the stock price interest rate sensitivity to the short and 
long-term interest rates before the new debt issues. Other market condition variables are defined as in Panel B 
but generated at the dates of issuance events instead of aggregate types. 
N Mean SD Median 
Panel A Sample maturity statistics 
Total sample 742 
Maturity (year) 14.5 20.2 10.1 
Fixed rate bonds 496 
Maturity (year) 12.6 12.2 10.1 
Floating rate bonds 246 
Maturity (year) 18.8 30.8 8.1 
Long-term bonds 237 
Maturity (year) 21.69 24.53 11.03 
Medium-term bonds 331 
Maturity (year) 6.93 1.16 7.13 
Short-term bonds 174 
Maturity (year) 2.37 1.27 2.28 
Panel B: Quarterly aggregate data statistics 
Quarterly debt market conditions Correlarions 
(1) Inflation (%) 76 3.77 2.20 3.13 (1) (2) [0.2161 
(2) Real short-term rate (%) 76 3.91 1.61 3.77 
(2) (3) E-0.2551 
(3) Terrn Spread (%) 76 0.04 1.78 0.21 (1) (3) [-0.3321 
Quarterly aggregate bond issues 
Difference (t-Value) 
(1) Df 76 3.1 3.1 3 (1)-(2) [-4.357]*** 
(2) DF 76 6.3 5.8 5 
(3) Ds 76 2.2 2.7 1 (3)-(4) [-3.6991*** 
(4) Dm 76 4.3 4.1 3 (4)-(5) [1.9741** 
(5) DI 76 3.0 2,5 3 (3)-(5) [-2.294]** 
(6) Dfl(DF+Dfi 76 0.36 0.29 0.33 (6)-(7) [-5.720]*** 
(7) DFI(DF+Dl) 76 0.63 0.30 0.67 
(8) Ds1(D1+Dm+Ds) 76 0.23 0.41 0.35 (8)-(9) 
[-3.2981*** 
(9) Dm1(D1+Dm+Ds) 76 0.24 0.28 0.25 (9)-(l0)[4.3721*** 
(1O)D11(D1+Dm+Ds) 76 0.17 0.43 0.33 (8 1 
)-(10)[1.240] 
Panel C: Cross-sectional variable statistics 
Beta-pre-Glt 579 0.013 0.758 0.084 
Beta-pre-Gst 579 -0.092 1.782 -0.174 
Inflation (%) 579 2.95 1.58 2.76 
Gst-Inflation 579 3.26 1.39 332 
Glt-Gst (%) 579 0.21 1.38 
0.32 
MV ($Mil) 579 4504.23 8062.48 
2101.61 
MTBV 579 2.47 8.34 
2.02 
Maturity (Years) 579 15.07 21.42 
10.14 
and *** correspond to the differences of each pair of variables 
being 
** * significant 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
, , f with the t-statistics of based on one-tailed mean comparison 
tests with unequal 
t o respectively, in respec 
variances. 
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Panel A categorizes the yield types and horizons of debt maturity. On average, the 
whole sample had a maturity of 14.5 years. The sub-sample of floating rate debt 
had a higher mean and standard deviation on both the maturity and principal 
values than the sub-sample of fixed rate debt. Therefore, the floating rate debt was 
heterogeneous. 
According to the proposed empirical strategy regarding the market timing tests, 
the raw data was translated into aggregate quarterly data. Panel B presents the 
quarterly aggregate statistics of the debt market condition variables used in this 
study, including inflation, the real short-term interest rate (the difference between 
the short-term interest rate and the realized inflation rate), and the term spread (the 
difference between the long-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate). The 
inflation rate was estimated from the monthly CPI data from the UK National 
Statistics. The UK National Statistics provided the monthly CPI data back to 1988 
only. Moreover, the measures of the CPI data were not coincident during this 
perio 30 - To avoid losing more sample observations, the estimated inflation rate 
conducted by Jim O. Donoghue (2005)31 was adopted. The three-month Treasury 
bill rates and the ten-year Treasury bond rates were used as proxies for the short 
and long-term interest rates respectively, both of which were collected from the 
Thomson Financial Datastream. It can be seen that the signs of the real short-term 
30 The UK Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), from 10 December 2003, is known as the CPL The 
HICP was launched in 1997 in response to the need for a Europe-wide comparable measure of inflation (as 
required by the Maastricht Treaty). The HICP measures inflation, each month, in the European Monetary area 
as a whole and individually measures and compares each Member State. Eurostat has published this measure 
as the UK HICP since 1997. However, the UK had not used the HICP as the measure of inflation until the end 
of 2003. 
In the Pre-Budget Report on 10 December 2003, the Chancellor of the Exchequer changed the UK inflation 
target from one based on the Retail Prices Index (RPI), excluding mortgage interest payments, to one based on 
the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP). Reflecting the new role as the main UK domestic measure 
of inflation for macroeconomic purposes, the National Statistician decided that the UK HICP would now be 
known as the Consumer Prices Index in all National Statistics releases and publications. This should not be 
interpreted as implying that there is any intention to develop the CPI differently from the HICP. The CPI and 
HJCP wi I] remain one and the same index. Since the HICP was only available after 1997, the CPI now used in 
all national statistics and publications is estimated by using the standard of the HICP structure. However, the 
UK National Statistics only provides the monthly HICP (CPI) from 1988. 
An alternative measure of inflation is the producer price index (PPI), provided by UK National Statistics as 
well. However, since it only covers the items of goods brought or sold by manufacturers (See details in 
National statistics report: The guide to producer price index), consumer price index (CPI) will be a better 
measure of the inflation due to our sample which comprises not only manufacturers but also service providers. 
31 jiM O. Donoghue (2005), Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices: Historical Estimates, Office for National 
Statistics. He estimated the HICP (CPI) during the early periods from 1975 to 1987 and from 1988 to 1998 
respectively due to the availability of raw prices. 
57 
rates and the term spread varied over time. The long-term rate was not always 
higher than the. short-term rate during the sample period, which may have induced 
the firms to decide the debt maturity according to the slope of the yield spread if 
they were seeking to reduce the costs of capital. The quarterly issues were 
cumulated. All the pairs of quarterly aggregate data, apart from the short and 
medium-term debt, were significantly different both as regards the issue numbers 
and the levels, which indicates that the tendency of the debt issues were correlated 
to the yield type and maturity. 
Panel C presents the sample statistics of the firm-level individual observations 
rather than the market-level aggregate data. An event window was constructed for 
each debt issue. As described in the section on methodology, if more than one 
consecutive debt issue of an issuer had a time interval of shorter than 50 
continuous trading weeks, they were consolidated into one single event to make a 
comparison of the initial interest rate exposure and final exposure. Therefore, only 
579 debt issue events were retained. The 'beta-pre-Glt' and 'beta-pre-Gst' denote 
the asset sensitivity to the long and short-term interest rates prior to the debt issues. 
The market condition variables, market values and market-to-book ratios were 
recorded for the debt issue dates generated from DataStrearn as the control 
variables employed in the multivariate hypotheses tests. Subject to several 
observations of the market-to-book ratios, some were discarded if the 
market-to-book ratio was negative or larger than 10, which meant a loss of eight 
32 observations . All the explanatory variables corresponded 
to the dates of the debt 
issues. 
In addition, based on the sample set of the debt issues, the corresponding data set 
of stock prices quoted from DataStrearn was built. For each observation, the daily 
observations of stock prices during the periods of 50 weeks before and after the 
event windows of the debt issues were collected to estimate the firms' asset 
32 The sample size of 742 shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 already excluded these outliers. 
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interest rate exposures. 
2.5. Empirical results and implications 
2.5.1. Findings 
The debt issue decision is one of the firm's most important financing choices. 
When deciding how to finance a project, the firm must choose between debt and 
equity. If debt is chosen, the interest rate yield type and the maturity of the debt 
must also be chosen. The choices of debt yield type and maturity are determined 
by comprehensive factors. From the risk management point of view, the impact of 
corporate debt issues on the firm's interest rate exposure raises the question as to 
whether firms consider hedging interest rate exposure when issuing debt or are 
simply timing the market to reduce the costs of capital. Thus, the behaviour which 
firms are engaged in during the process of raising debt funds is either hedging or 
speculating. The theory with respect to interest rate risk management by using debt 
funds is currently far from enough to support the corporate implementation of 
interest rate risk management. Moreover, few empirical studies have disclosed 
evidence that identifies the underlying intention of debt financing. As described 
earlier, two hypotheses are set forth in this study to examine the determinants of 
firms' debt issue decisions regarding the yield type and maturity choices. Apart 
from specific firm characteristics which determine a firm's debt financing, as 
suggested in previous studies, the main focus here is on the influence of interest 
rate exposure on corporate debt issues. This section presents the empirical findings 
of the hypotheses tests. 
The main findings are as follows. Firstly, the impacts of the debt issues on the 
firms' initial interest rate exposure were examined. The results show that the firms' 
interest rate exposures changed significantly after issuing the debt. This change is 
more likely to be attributable to the natural influence of the newly issued debt than 
a designed result of the firm's purposeful strategy. Secondly, there was a 
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relationship between the debt issues and the exogenous market condition factors. 
All types of debt were affected by the debt market momentum. Meanwhile, the 
features of the debt issues were significantly related to the debt market condition 
factors. Finally, are firms considering hedging the interest rate exposure or timing 
the debt market when issuing debt? It is clear that it is the exogenous market 
factors rather than the firm-specific interest rate exposure that determine the yield 
type choice and maturity horizons of corporate debt issues. Put another way, the 
results support the market timing hypothesis. 
2.5.2. Impacts of debt issues onfirms'interest rate exposure 
Although it may be intuitive to assume that new debt will affect the firm's interest 
rate exposure, a quantitative examination is necessary to verify this. The interest 
rate exposure before the debt issues and the changes in interest rate exposure after 
the debt issues were estimated to examine the hedging strategies it was assumed 
the firms were adopting and those they actually used. The stock price sensitivities 
to both the long and short-term interest rates were used as measures of the asset 
interest rate exposure, as shown in Model (2.1). Table 2.3 presents the overall 
results of the estimated interest rate exposures of all the debt issuers. 
A comparison between the interest rate exposure prior to and after the debt issue 
events shows that more than 56% of the debt issue events (324 of 579)33 
significantly altered the initial interest rate exposure of the debt issuers by either 
creating additional risk exposure or cancelling out the original risk exposure. For 
example, in terms of short-term interest rate exposure, 106 initial interest rate 
exposures were significantly different from zero, but half of them were positive 
and the rest were negative. Only 26 of these 106 observations kept the interest rate 
exposure significantly positive, while the rest became insignificant after the 
debt 
issue events. In addition to the initial interest rate exposure, 114 after-event 
33 This percentage is lower than we expected, which may potentially result 
from the relative magnitudes of 
the debt issued. In Section 5.5 we examine the size effect on firms' decisions regarding 
hedging or market 
timing, 
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interest rate exposures were significantly different from zero, 78 of which were not 
significant before the debt issue events. The signs of the estimated interest rate 
exposures showed no clear discipline. It is perplexing that the interest rate 
exposures did not exhibit a given tendency. Rather, the directions of the changes 
varied across the observations. Part of the initial interest rate exposures died out 
after the debt issues, while a considerable share of the sample created additional 
risk exposure. This casts a suspicion as to whether the changes to the firms' 
interest rate exposures after the debt issues can be attributed to purposeful 
strategies or were unintentional results. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the 
difference between the pre-issue and after-issue interest rate exposure for the 
sample as a whole. 
By using the two sample t-test to examine whether the debt issues essentially 
changed the firms' interest rate exposures, it can be seen that the after-event 
interest rate exposure was larger than the initial interest rate exposure. On 
examination of only the significant sub-sample, which contains all significant pre 
and/or post-event interest rate exposures, it was found that the impacts on the 
interest rate exposure were more significant at the 5% level. Moreover, if the firms 
were intending to hedge the risk exposure, the after-event interest rate exposure 
should have significantly decreased or died out. In contradiction of the hedging 
hypothesis, the mean of the pre-event exposure was small and insignificant, while 
the after-event exposure became large and significant, which is in line with the 
prior assumption that debt is normally negatively related to the interest rate and 
this creates an incremental interest rate exposure for firms. Thus, Table 2.3 shows 
that the newly issued debt essentially changed the firms' interest rate exposures. 
Moreover, this change is unlikely to be due to a designed result conducted by the 
issuer. instead, this result can be attributed to the impact of the debt issues on the 
firms' interest rate exposures. 
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Table 2.3 Impacts of Debt Issues on Firms' Interest Rate Exposure 
The stock returns of 50 weeks prior to and after the dates when the corresponding individual debt is issued 
form the event windows for the estimates of the influences of new debt issues on the sensitivities of stock 
prices to the interest rate variability. If in the range of the window there are more than one debt issue events, 
they are consolidated into a sole event, and the window will be extended further. After this adjustment, there 
are 579 firm-issue observations remaining based on Table 2.1. For each observation, the weekly stock returns 
for the 50 week period prior to the debt issue are used to determine the sensitivity of the firm to changes in the 
short and long-term interest rates. 
Rj, 
1 =a+; vRm, l +, 
8,, 
iI,,, +, 
81, J1,1 + ci, l (2.1) 
RO =a+ RMJ + 'O"J", + 
AJI'l + E0 (2.1 
where R,,,, denotes the returns of the FTSE all index as the proxy for the market returns, I,,, is the weekly 
variations of the 3-month Treasury bill rates, and Il,, is the weekly variations of the 10-year Treasury bond rates. 
Bsj, B1, j, B, i' and fll/ measure the firms' interest rate exposures to the short-term and long-term interest rates 
before and after the debt funds were raised respectively. The differences between Bs, j and B,,,, Bl,, and fl// 
reflect the influence of the debt issue on the firms' interest rate exposure. 
Panel A shows the differences between the interest rate sensitivities before and after the debt issue events for 
the whole sample. Panel B only covers observations which have at least one significant coefficient, in other 
words, the samples with a significant variation in interest rate exposure after the debt issue events (324 
observations). 
,8 Difference Difference 
Panel A Whole sample 
Mean 0.013 -0.192 [-1.372]* -0.092 -0,442 [-L270]* 
SD 0.758 0.783 1.782 2,608 
Number of observations 579 579 
Panel B Significant sub-sample 
Mean 0.043 -0.473 [-2.75 1 -0.106 -0.427 1.452]* 
SD 1.113 1.682 3.973 2.691 
Number of observations 324 324 
* and ** correspond to the differences of each pair of variables being significant at 10% and 5% respectively, 
in respect of with the t-statistics of based on one-tailed mean comparison tests with unequal variances. 
2.5.3. Exogenous effects on debt issues 
This sub-section presents an examination, from the market-wide view, of how the 
yield types and maturities of the corporate debt issues were affected by the debt 
market conditions. The focus is on the aggregate time series daia rather than the 
firm-level data because the aim was to examine the market-wide tendency of the 
debt issues as the debt market conditions vary, as corresponds to the aggregate 
version of Baker et al. (2003), who studied the market-wide decisions regarding 
the maturity of debt issues. This solely tests the second hypothesis regarding 
market timing. The debt issues were examined using the pooled firm-level 
data in 
the subsequent section to explore the cross-sectional differences resulting 
from 
variations in firm characteristics. 
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It seems intuitive to assume that the decisions firms make concerning yield type 
and maturity choices are affected by exogenous factors. An examination was first 
made to determine whether there was a debt market tendency regarding the debt 
issue choices. As described in the section 2.4, the quarterly aggregate debt issue 
observations were categorized by yield type and maturity length. The debt yield 
types were categorized as floating and fixed rate. On the other hand, the maturity 
lengths of the debt were divided into short, medium and long-term debt by five 
years and ten years. All types of debt were examined respectively to see whether 
they exhibited an obvious tendency, in other words, whether the past aggregate 
information regarding the debt issues had affected the firms' debt issue decisions 
in the subsequent period. It was found that the debt issues tended to increase over 
time, which may have been due to the growth of the economy or changes in 
fashion regarding the firms' financing policies. To control for growth in the 
economy, the time trend was introduced in the auto-regressions. Different lags in 
the respective tests were examined. Furthennore, the levels of the various types of 
debt scaled by the total issues during each period were examined to measure the 
changes in debt issues over time, which more accurately controlled for the effects 
of economic growth. Therefore, the time trend was not involved when measuring 
the level of debt issues. 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the auto -regressions for all types of debt. Both the 
deal numbers and the aggregate issue values of the debt during each quarter were 
examined. All the variables exhibited a first order auto-correlation, but no 
variables of debt issues that were second order auto-correlated were 
found. Apart 
from the values of these variables, the percentage levels were also auto -correlated. 
These results suggest that the decisions of the firms' regarding their 
debt issues 
were affected by the market tendency. Moreover, all the significant coefficients 
were positive. Therefore there exists momentum effectiveness 
in the debt issue 
market. The increase of a given type of debt issue will 
lead to a further increase of 
the debt in the subsequent period. In addition, the coefficients of the time trend 
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were significant and stayed positive. This suggests that there indeed exists an 
increasing tendency of debt issues over time. 
An important objective of this section is to explore the relationship between the 
corporate debt issues and the debt market conditions. Following the method 
employed above, an investigation was made, from the market-wide view, into 
whether the changes in debt market conditions predicted debt issues with different 
yield types and maturity horizons, or, put another way, whether the specific 
movement pattern of the debt market conditions provided greater incentives to the 
firms to issue specific types of debt. The market factors involved in the tests 
included inflation, real short-term interest rates and term spread. The 
contemporary relationship between the debt issue variables and the market factors 
was examined. One lag was taken for the market factors as the robustness check 
because from the results above, the levels of debt issues were first order 
auto-correlated, which suggests that the information for the quarter before the 
issue date influenced the debt issues at the market-wide level. The dependent 
variables were the time series of the aggregate deal numbers of debt with different 
yield types and maturities for each quarter. If the deal numbers of the quarterly 
aggregate debt issues are a noisy measure of the underlying debt market conditions, 
the levels of these variables (the sub-samples over the total sample) were also 
examined to more accurately measure the relationship between the debt issue 
preference and the debt market factors. 
Table 2.5 shows the levels of all the debt types over the total debt issues, and it can 
be seen that all the dependent variables were significantly correlated to the market 
condition factors. Panel A shows that the floating-rate debt exhibited an opposite 
tendency to the fixed-rate debt under certain market conditions. In other words, the 
level of the floating rate debt was positively correlated to the market condition 
factors, while the level of the fixed rate debt moved in the opposite 
direction. 
Firstly, if the term spread decreased or there was a flat yield curve, the firms were 
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more likely to issue a fixed rate debt than a floating rate debt. This is consistent 
with Faulkender (2005) in that firms tend to issue a floating rate exposure when 
the yield curve is steep. Secondly, the positive signs of the coefficients suggest that, 
with high inflation and interest rates, firms prefer a floating rate to a fixed rate 
debt. Panel B shows that as the market condition factors varied the levels of 
short-term debt exhibited an opposite movement to those of the tong-term debt34 . 
The percentage of short-term debt increased as the real short-term rates suggested 
the lower cost of such debt. Moreover, as the yield curve of the term structure 
became steep, short-term debt became favoured over long-term debt because of 
concerns about capital costs. The issuances of the long-term debt exhibited a 
reverse pattern. Therefore, these results suggest that, at the market-wide level, 
firms adjust their debt maturity according to the debt market conditions. The 
evidence, as a whole, shows that firms make decisions regarding yield type and 
maturity based on responses to the current market conditions as well as 
expectations of market movements in the near future. 
Several implications flow from these results. Clearly, in terms of the debt yield 
types, firms tend to select a less costly according to the exogenous market 
environment. Therefore, they will choose the floating rate for newly issued debt 
because the costs of capital implied by inflation and short-term rates are relatively 
high and are expected to be lower in the future. Otherwise, firms will prefer the 
fixed rate in order to lock in the "expected" increase in costs. A more implicit 
interpretation about yield type choices is that these market variables implicitly 
proxy for the time-varying costs of the interest rate risks. As suggested in Estrella 
and Mishkin (1996), a steep slope in the yield curve is correlated with a low 
likelihood of economic recession. During the non-recessionary time, the likelihood 
of distress is relatively low, and so the cost of bearing interest rate volatility may 
34 One lag was taken for the market factors as the robustness check because it was 
found that all the 
dependent variables exhibited the first order auto-correlation, which suggests that the 
information for the 
quarter prior to the issue date influences the debt issues at the market-wide 
]eveL The results from the lead-lag 
relationship are similar to the contemporary tests examined earlier. In the interests of 
brevity, the lagged 
results have not been reported here. However, the results are available upon request. 
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be lower. Thus, firms are better able to endure interest rate exposure by choosing a 
floating rate. Conversely, firms tend to lock in their interest payments when the 
volatile interest rate payments are costly during economic recessions. The capital 
costs also explain the choices of debt maturity. Firms tend to shorten the maturity 
of new debt when the long-term rate is relatively too high compared to the 
short-term rate as implied by a steep yield curve. Meanwhile, when a low inflation 
and interest rates suggest a growth of economy, firms would be more confident to 
issue a long-term debt than a short-term debt as their ability of enduring risk 
exposure is relatively high. In short, the behaviour of market timing emerges from 
the corporate debt issues. 
In summary, the range of evidence indicates that market timing is an important 
aspect of real debt financing decisions. This phenomenon is embodied in the debt 
issue market as a whole. On the one hand, the firm's debt issue is affected by the 
current tendency of the corresponding debt that reflects the expectations regarding 
future market movements. On the other hand, a firm's preference for choosing 
particular interest rate exposures and the maturity lengths for new debt varies 
according to the changes in debt market conditions in an attempt to time the 
market to reduce the costs of capital. 
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2.5.4. Hedging or market timing 
Since the market-wide aggregate data ignores the cross-sectional variations in the 
firm-specific characteristics, the cross-sectional firm-level data will be better able 
to identify the differences in preferences of debt financing. Both the hypotheses of 
hedging and market timing were examined by involving the first-specific interest 
rate exposure generated from the stock price sensitivity to the long and short-term 
interest rates, and the debt market variables employed in the previous section as 
well as controlling for firm size and market-to-book ratios to reveal the 
determinants of the corporate debt issues regarding the yield type choices and the 
length of maturity. It has been assumed that if firms are hedging the interest rate 
exposure the yield type choice and debt maturity should be determined by the 
interest rate exposure before the debt issue. If firms are timing the debt market, 
their choices of debt issues will be driven by the market variables. 
Probit regressions were employed to identify the likelihood of the yield type 
choices, i. e. floating or fixed rate debt, and the length of the debt maturity, i. e. long 
or short-term. To eliminate the potential bias resulting from the subjective 
definitions of long-term and short-term, the tobit regressions on the debt maturity 
were also examined. Table 2.6 presents the results of this analysis. The first thing 
to notice is that the firms' initial interest rate exposures (betas) do not predict the 
probability of the choices made as regards yield type or debt maturity. If the firms 
were hedging, the sign of the coefficient for the beta should be positive, suggesting 
that they were matching the exposure of their assets to the exposure of their debt. 
However, the coefficient in the results is statistically insignificant 35 and does not 
35 Since the interest rate exposure, P, are not fixed, but estimated in the time-series regression (2.1). the 
estimated errors of the coefficients are asymptotic. Therefore the Shanken's correction is made to adjust the 
standard errors of the, 8 coefficients. Following Shanken's (1992), the adjusted standard error of the estimated 
coefficients of in the regression (2-5) is Ad. Se = 
ý(_I+__c US--Var,, _IT_T+_V_ar, 1T 5 where c= A_, I-fiA YX 
is the 
coefficient matrix of factors in the time-series regression (2.1), Ef is the covariance matrix of 
factors in 
time-series regression (2.1). We obtained cl=0.34 for all sample (panel A, Table 2.3) and c, =0.57 
for 
significant interest rate exposure (panel B, Table 2.3) respectively, and adjusted the standard errors and 
t-values of fl coefficients in Table 2.6. The t-values of fl coefficients in Table 2.7 and 
Table 2.8 have been 
adjusted as well. All adjustments of coefficients and standard errors are verified by Litzenberger/Ramaswamý' 
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exhibit the expected sign for the above analysis. This suggests that the firms with a 
positive interest rate exposure were no more likely to have floating rate debt or a 
specific length of debt maturity than those with a negative exposure. Therefore, 
this finding does not support the hypothesis that firms are hedging the interest rate 
exposure when choosing the yield type and maturity of new debt. 
To examine whether firms really were not matching the firm-specific interest rate 
sensitivity of their assets to their liabilities, or whether the measure is just 
mis-specified, the alternative measures of the asset interest rate exposure, flij 
and fl, j, were also examined using the robustness checks. Firstly, the value of the 
estimated long-term and short-term interest rate exposure, flij or fl, j, was taken 
only where it was statistically significant in Equation 2.1 and took a value of zero 
otherwise. Secondly, following Faulkender (2005), a discrete measure of the 
interest rate exposure, 61, i and flj, was also used, which took the value of 
positive one (+ 1) when the estimated exposure, fl Ij or fl, j, was significantly 
positive, negative one (-1) when it was significantly negative, and zero otherwise. 
This specification was adopted because firms are assumed to adopt different 
hedging strategies if the interest rate exposures that they face have different signs. 
More specifically, firms that face a positive asset interest rate exposure will benefit 
from the floating rate debt in the reduction in the volatility of stock prices resulting 
from interest rate movements. The results of these two additional specifications are 
reported accompanying with the initial one in Table 2.6. The results from using 
these specifications are nonetheless similar to the above finding that initial interest 
rate exposures do not affect choice of yield type or debt maturity. The only weak 
significance appears with the coefficient of the discrete long-term interest rate 
beta 36 but accompanies a negative coefficient (supposed to be positive if hedging 
hypothesis holds) of the short-term interest rate beta in the regression (2.5c). 
Therefore, the results show that hedging the firm-specific asset interest rate risk 
estimator following Lehmann (1990) as well. 36 We doubt the potential reason is due to the relative magnitude of the debts or the outliers, since 
in the 
robustness check we found the same phenomenon on, and only on, the large size issues, when we 
divided the 
whole sample into two sub-groups by the relative sizes. 
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may not have been a primary objective of the firms. This finding does not support 
the hypothesis that firms are hedging the interest rate exposure when choosing the 
yield type and maturity of new debt. 
When looking at the market condition factors, it can be seen that all market 
condition factors are significantly correlated to the choices of debt yield type. The 
coefficients of both the inflation and term spread were significant at the 1% level. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of the coefficients imply an economic significance. 
Thus, firms are more likely to issue a fixed rate debt when the inflation and the 
short-term rate are low because they are expecting to lay off the risks of capital 
costs increases. Moreover, the term spread was positively related to the probability 
of floating rate debt instruments and negatively related to the firm's preference for 
fixed debt issues, suggesting that the firms were more likely to lock in their 
interest payments when there was only a small difference between the long and 
short-term interest rates than when the difference was large, because the steep 
yield spread curve implies a less likely economic recession than a flat one. 
Therefore firms can bear more interest rate risks by choosing a floating rate debt 
as the economy expands. 
The horizon of debt maturity (2.5c) is also determined by inflation and term spread 
of interest rates. The significantly positive coefficients suggest that, with high 
inflation and real short-term rate, the firms tended to lengthen the maturity of their 
new debt. As for term spread, firms would appear to issue long-term debt if the 
term spread was high and expected to decrease. This finding was robust when the 
dependent variable of debt maturity was specified as a dummy defined by a short 
and long-term debt discretely, except a weaker significance of real short-term rate 
which may potentially be subject to the manually separation of short-term and 
long-term debt. 
In terms of the control variables, the results show that the debt maturities were 
negatively related to firm size in both specifications of discrete and continuous 
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maturity, which implies that large firms issue more short-term debt than small 
firms. This result is counterintuitive at the first glance, as a number of studies 
suggest that large firms issue more long-term debt. However, the pecking order of 
a firm's financing decision may explain this result. If the costs of financing 
determine that internal funds are preferred to external funds, larger firms have a 
greater capability to finance themselves internally, unless the internal cash flows 
are not enough to support the investment project. In this case, large firms will raise 
short-term debt to temporarily fill the funding gaps. In contrast, small firms rely 
more heavily and chronically on external funds. This is in line with Guedes and 
Opler (1996), regarding the "clientele effect". They suggest that higher quality 
firms tend to borrow at both ends of the maturity spectrum, while larger firms with 
higher growth opportunities are more likely to issue short-term debt. The deeper 
implication of this finding is that more short-term debt is issued by large firms 
when the market conditions suggest a low cost of short-term debt. Therefore, large 
firms are more capable to react to the changes in debt market conditions, which is 
consistent with the findings in the survey of Graham and Harvey (2001). 
Collectively, the result is not surprising. However, there was no obvious evidence 
that firm size significantly affected yield type choice. 
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2.5.5. Robustness checks 
There are still other possible interpretations for the firms' choices of yield types 
and maturity. It is suspected that managers really do feel confident in timing the 
debt market regardless of the risk exposure. At least, thus far it cannot be 
confirmed whether or not the managers always successfully benefit the 
shareholders by timing the market. It is assumed that the larger the debt, the riskier 
it is to speculate. Firms may only respond to the market conditions when issuing 
debt that is small in comparison to the firm's market value. To test this possibility, 
the whole sample was divided based on the size of the issue relative to the firm's 
market value. If the size of a newly issued debt as a percentage of the firm size was 
smaller than the average, it was regarded as a small debt otherwise it was a large 
debt. The two sub-groups were examined separately by looking at both yield types 
and maturity following the procedure implemented with the determinants of the 
debt issues in the preceding section. The results in Table 2.7 show that both the 
large issues and the small issues exhibited a similar pattern regarding the 
firm-specific risk factors and the market condition factors, which is consistent with 
the general conclusion of Faulkender (2005) concerning the size effect. It can be 
seen that the coefficient significance of the market factors in the large-size sample 
was weaker than that of the small-size sample, while the coefficient of the 
long-term interest rate beta exhibited a weak significance and an expected sign of 
hedging. The explanation for this is that firms do indeed view market timing as an 
overly risky strategy. As a result, firms are more likely to make this decision in 
relation to small-size issues but are more cautious when issuing a large debt. 
It was also taken into consideration whether the credit rate would affect the choice 
of debt yield type and maturity, because the credit rate of a debt is the benchmark 
used to measure the risk level of the debt. Besides the firm's financial 
characteristics per se, the credit rate of a new debt depends on yield type and 
length of maturity. Therefore, firms may consider raising the credit rate 
by 
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designing the debt structure. If the firm attempts to lower the exposure of a newly 
issued debt and its overall risks, the credit rating of the new debt will reflect the 
firm's intention. As a result, the credit rate should influence the firm's choice of 
debt yield type and maturity. Otherwise it is possible that the firm has an objective 
other than hedging the interest rate exposure. Using the credit rates generated by 
the Security Data Corporation (SDC), the whole sample was separated using the 
S&P credit rating. That is, the corporate debt with a credit rate of A or above was 
regarded as high rating debt, otherwise low rating debt. A dummy variable of the 
credit rate was introduced to examine the relationship between the credit rates and 
debt structure. It took the value of one for the high rating debt and zero for the low 
rating debt. An examination was made of both debt yield type and maturity and 
implemented as in the preceding tests. Table 2.8 presents the results regarding the 
relationship between the debt credit rates and the debt structures of the new issues. 
However, no convincing evidence was found that the credit rates affected the firms' 
debt structures of new issues. The coefficient of the credit rate dummy variable 
was not significant in any of specifications. Moreover, little change occurred in the 
magnitudes or significances of the other variables, which is consistent with the 
preceding main results. Therefore, the firms were not trying to raise the credit rate 
and lower the interest rate risk exposure by effectively designing a debt structure 
regarding the yield types and maturities for their new debt. 
An examination was also made of the effects on the corporate debt issues caused 
by differing preferences and features across different industries, which might 
potentially distort the results regarding the determinants of the firms' debt issues. 
Using the industrial categories and definitions of the SDC, the whole sample 
covers the debt issues of firms from nine industries 
37 
. Eight 
dummy variables were 
introduced to control for the industrial effects on the corporate debt issues, with the 
base of High Technology industry, i. e. when all dummy variables are taken value 
on zero. In Table 2.8 the results show that, except for the Consumer Staples and 
37 The industry categories include Materials, Energy & Power, Consumer Staples, 
Retail, Media & 
Entertainment, Industrials, Healthcare, Consumer Products & Services, and High Technology. 
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Healthcare industries, the majority exhibited different preferences when choosing 
specific yield types or debt maturities for new issues. They consistently responded 
to the changes in the debt market conditions regardless of their own interest rate 
exposure. The fact that there was little variety in the magnitude and significance of 
the coefficients of any other factors supports the preceding indication that the debt 
market condition factors rather than the firm-specific interest rate exposure 
determine the choice of debt issue. On the other hand, the industrial effect on 
corporate debt issue choice also suggests that, to some extent, the industrial 
features and economic conditions do affect the firm's debt issue policies. 
In summary, this chapter shows that the choices of yield type and debt maturity are 
significantly correlated to the market condition factors rather than firm-specific 
interest rate exposure under all of the specifications. The results, taken as a whole, 
are most naturally explained by the notion that the firm's choices of debt issues 
concerning the yield types and the lengths of maturity were determined by the debt 
market conditions with the intention of lowering the costs of capital. Therefore, the 
primary purposes of selecting interest rates and deciding on debt maturity is to time 
the interest rate market in order to manage market-wide risk, rather than hedging 
firm-specific interest rate exposure. 
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Table 2.7 Size Effect on the Debt Issue Structure 
This table shows the results of the regressions on the sub-samples categorized by the relative debt issue size. The sample covers all 579 firm-issue observations with the short-terrn and long-term interest rates exposure, 
, 6ý,, j, and BIj in Table 2.3. The whole sample is divided into two sub-samples, small size debt and large size debt, defined by the ratios of the debt principal over the firm's market value. Out of the whole sample, the newly issued debts with a ratio larger than the average are sorted into the group of the large size debt, (153 observations), otherwise small size debt (426 observations). Other notations in the regressions are the same as those in Table 2.6. 
Small Size issuance (N=426) 
- 
Large Size Issuance (N=153) 
Df Drn Maturity Df Drn Maturity 
Interest rate exposure 
Long-term interest rate beta 0.012 -0.019 0.637 0.090 -0.074 0.689 [1,29] [-1.49] [0.985] [1.25] [-0.999] [1.52] 
Short-term interest rate beta 0.008 -0.020 0.030 -0.190 0.192 0.146 
[1,18] [-1.461 [0.1151 [-1.35] [1.3 1] [0.734] 
Market timing 
Inflation 0.064 -0.047 1.140 0.023 -0.062 0.071 
[3.37]*** [-2,17]** [1.95]** [1.86]* [-2.18]** [1.83]* 
Real short-term rate 0,017 -0.012 1.933 0.007 -0.012 1.038 
[2.10]* * ý[- 1.631 (2.5]** [1.58] [-2,62]** [1.93]* 
Yield Spread 0.064 -0.068 0.532 0.080 -0.029 0.473 
[2.78]*** [-2.411** [2.07]** [1.66]* [-2.3 1]** [2,14] 
Control variables 
Market value (LgMV) -0.012 0.082 -1.527 -0.001 0.089 -1.515 
[-0.555] [1,99]** [-1.76]* [-0.252] [1.63] [-2.54]** 
Market-to-book-value ratio -0.001 0.000 -0.116 0.001 0.006 -0.009 
[-0.448] [0.0112] [-1.13] [1.07] [0.98] [-0.92] 
Constant 0.222 -0.807 16.090 0.517 -0,052 -0.362 
[0.993] [-1.88]* [1.8]* [3.97]*** [-0.38] [-1.961** 
Pseudo R- squared 0.091 0.131 0.172 0.046 0.187 0.389 
*, **, and *** correspond to the coefficients being significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The t-values of 
beta coefficients have been adjusted by the Shanken's correction (see footnote 35). 
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Table 2.8 Credit Rates and the Industrial Effects 
This table shows the results of regressions which involve the credit rate of new debt and 8 dummy variables for 
the industrial factors. The sample covers all 579 firm-issue observations with the short-term and long-term 
interest rates exposure, B,,,, and B1, j in Table 2.3. The credit rate dummy takes the value of one if the credit rate 
of the debt is A or above (199 debt issues) according to the Standard & Poor's debt rating, and takes a value of 
zero otherwise (380 debt issues). The industries in the whole sample include Materials, Energy & Power, 
Consumer Staples, Retail, Media & Entertainment, Industrials, Healthcare, Consumer Products & Services, 
and High Technology. Eight industry dummy (with the base of High Technology industry, i. e. when all dummy 
variables are taken value on zero) variables are introduced to the regression to reveal the industrial 
characteristics. Other notations in the regressions are the same as those in Table 2.6. 
Df Dm Maturity Df Dm Maturity 
Interest rate exposure 
Long-term interest rate beta 0.009 -0,014 0.864 0.011 -0.009 0.824 
[1.271 [-1.111[1.07] [1.58] [-0.6751 [1.55] 
Short-term interest rate beta 0,007 -0.019 0.123 0.007 -0.018 0.136 
[1.42] [-1.22] [0,597] [1.59] [-1.21] [0.657] 
Credit Rating -0.001 0.257 0.245 
[-0.0165] [0,961 [0.115] 
Market titning 
Inflation 0.055 -0.042 1.483 0.057 -0.034 1.383 
[3.41 ]* ** [-2.18]** [2.09]** [3,5 1 ]*** [-1.67]* [1.93]* 
Real short-term rate 0.018 -0.014 1.524 0.016 -0.017 
1.510 
[2.121** [-1,731* [2.151 ** [2.021** [-1,54] (2.12]" 
Yield Spread 0.052 -0.064 0.956 0.051 -0.054 
0.806 
[2.771*** [-2.42]** [2.171** [2,75]*** [-2.19]** [1.98]** 
Control variables 
Market value (LgMV) -0.017 0.070 -2.492 -0.022 
0.082 -2.464 
[-1.07] [2.42]** t-3.501*** [-1.441 [3.05]*** [-3.651*** 
Market-to-book-value ratio 0.001 -0.005 -0.102 0.001 
0.000 -0.119 
[0.423] [-1.10] [-0.976] [0.565] [-0.0526] [-1.121 
DI -0.279 -0.419 -6.568 
[-2.21]** f-1.88]* [-2.17]** 
D2 -0.339 -0.637 -2.759 
[-2.78]*** [-2.981*** [-1.651* 
170 -0 -0.063 -7.307 D3 . 
[-1.37] [42891 [-1.331 
-0.341 -0.236 -5.862 D4 
[-2.70]*** [-1.06] [-1.051 
-0.295 -0.575 -2.864 D5 
[-2,36]** [-2.62]*** [-2.561** 
-0,367 -0.708 -4.155 D6 
[-2.92]*** [-3.21]*** [-2.741** 
-0.123 -0.451 -7.337 D7 
[-0.758] [-1.58] [-1.02] 
-0.362 -0.576 -12.339 D8 
[-2.27]** [-2.061 ** [-1.751* 
153 0 -0 918 24.562 
0.570 -0.508 2U70 Constant . 
[1,62]* 
, 
[-3.371*** 3.65]*** [3.001*** [-1.521 
[3.53]*** 
Pseudo R- squared 0.095 
0.068 0.088 0.077 0.124 
0.100 
icant at 10%, d to the coefficients being signif *** 
5%, and 1% respectively. The t-values of 
correspon and 
the Shanken's correction (see djusted b footnote 35). beta coefficients have been a y 
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2.6. Conclusion 
Early works on corporate risk management have assumed that firms use derivatives 
only for hedging purposes. An implicit assumption of this is that firms not using 
derivatives are not hedging. However, theory tells us that fin-ns can manage their 
risk exposure by means other than derivatives. For instance, corporate bonds per se 
can be employed as an effective instrument for interest rate risk management. By 
correctly choosing the interest rate sensitivities of their equities 'and liabilities, 
firms can hedge their interest rate exposures by issuing debt. Following this logic, 
an examination was made of whether firms make full use of debt issuances for 
hedging purposes or whether they have other considerations. 
Corporate debt issues essentially change the firm's interest rate exposure. By 
matching the interest rate exposure of new debt to the initial asset interest rate 
exposure, the firm can eliminate or reduce the asset sensitivity to interest rate 
volatility and then hedge the interest rate exposure. Setting the hypotheses that 
firms are trying to hedge the interest rate exposure by issuing debt and/or firms are 
timing the market for the purpose of reducing the capital costs, the primary 
objective of issuing the corporate debt was examined. However, it was found that 
the firms seemed to pay no attention to hedging interest rate risks when issuing 
their debt. On the contrary, their choices of debt yield types and maturity were 
primarily driven by the debt market conditions in an effort to reduce the costs of 
capital. 
The fact that the firm's interest rate exposure, as regards assets, significantly 
changes after issuing new debt was verified. The firms' asset interest rate 
exposures were estimated by the stock price sensitivity to both the long and 
short-term interest rates prior to and after the debt issue events. Although the iiiitial 
risk exposure varied across firms, being either positively or negatively correlated to 
the interest rates, the two-sample t-test shows that the after-event interest rate 
exposure was, on average, negative and significantly larger than the pre-event risk 
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exposure with very little change in the standard deviation in the sample as a whole. 
This is unlikely to be the result of firms' designed hedging strategies. Thereforel 
debt issues enlarge the firm's interest rate exposure rather than lowering it, as 
would be the result in the case where the firm was attempting to hedge risk 
exposure. 
It was found that at the market level, both the interest rate choices and the maturity 
lengths of the debt issues were closely connected to the debt market conditions, 
specifically, the inflation, the real short-term interest rate and the term spread. 
When the inflation, real short-term interest rate and term spread were high, both 
the deal numbers and the levels of floating rate and long-term debt were 
significantly higher than those of the fixed rate and short-term debt. Interestingly, 
these relationships were pronounced in both the contemporaneous and one-lag tests. 
This suggests that firms tend to issue floating rate and long-term debt as these 
economic indicators suggest the costs of capital are predictably low. This 
implication can be explained by the market timing theory, which is simply that 
firms switch between fixed and floating rates and decide the length of debt 
maturity for their debt issues in an attempt to time the debt market. Market timing 
theory implies that firms experience a risk-return trade off between bearing interest 
rate volatility and taking the risk premium as the economic indicators vary. 
Inflation, the real short-term interest rate and the term spread play the roles of 
economic indicators for the likelihood of expected economic recession, which are 
also the proxies for the time-varying cost of interest rate risk. High economic 
indicators imply a low likelihood of an economic recession suggesting low 
expected financial distress costs. Therefore, firms can bear interest rate volatility 
during economic expansion times more than in economic recession periods, and 
then seek higher risk premiums. This explains the results that, at the market level, 
the firms issued more floating rate and long-term debt when the market condition 
factors suggested a good economic environment. Conversely, the firms were more 
likely to lock in their interest rate payments as regards debt or shorten the debt 
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maturity in order to reduce the potential costs resulting from volatile interest rates 
during an economic downturn. 
If the significant relationship between the market variables and firms' choices of 
debt yield types and maturity suggests that firms are timing the debt market5 the 
evidence that debt issues are dependent on the preceding market tendencies 
corresponding to given types of debt implies the effect of the aggregate 
information on the firm's decision regarding its debt issues. It was found that all 
types of debt, categorized by interest rate choices and lengths of maturity, were 
auto-correlated. Firms refer to the choices of other debt issuers in the current 
market to decide whether the new debt is adapted to the floating rate or the fixed 
rate as well as the long or short-term. Firms may believe that the current debt 
market already contains all available information regarding the expected market 
movements and the optimal debt choices. Therefore, the fact that exogenous debt 
market factors determine firms' decision regarding debt issues suggests that firms 
try to time the debt market using publicly available market conditions as a guide to 
their selection of interest rate and maturity length for their debt issues. 
If the aggregate market-wide data ignores the cross-sectional difference in 
behaviour due to variations in firms' characteristics, the firm-level data is better 
able to examine the hypotheses regarding the underlying purpose of debt issue 
decisions. By involving both the firm-specific interest rate exposures before the 
debt issues and the debt market variables at the time the debt was issued, the 
dominant factors of the firms' debt issue choices were explored. The results show 
that the initial interest rate exposure provided no prediction power as regards either 
interest rate choices or the length of debt maturity, even when alternative 
specifications were employed to measure the interest rate exposure. By contrast, 
evidence was found that debt market factors determined the firms' 
decisions 
regarding their newly issued debt. The firms tended to issue long-term and 
floating 
rate debt when the debt market factors suggested that the expected capital costs 
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were predictably low. 
Firm size is a strong determinant of debt maturity. Smaller firms have a greater 
incentive to issue long-term debt than do larger firms. An interpretation of this 
result is that large firms have a greater capacity for financing themselves using 
internal cash flows which are less costly than external funds, while smaller firms 
rely more on external funds chronically. 
In conclusion, it was found that the firms' choices of debt issues were primarily 
driven by the debt market conditions and were employed in an effort to lower the 
costs of capital rather than to manage firm-specific interest rate exposures. The 
evidence suggests that market timing rather than hedging was the primary 
motivation behind the corporate debt issues. Thus, the findings have added 
evidence to the growing field of behavioural corporate finance that sees managerial 
decisions as being primarily driven by market conditions and managers' desires to 
time the market. However, the evidence of debt market timing raises further 
questions. Are there debt market inefficiencies and frictions that can be caught by 
firms' strategies of risk management with the objective of generating risk premium? 
Does the market timing evidence provide proof that firms switch among various 
types of debt according the market condition variations successfully? Do managers 
possess informational advantages regarding their prediction of market movements? 
If not, how do they make choices about debt issuance? These questions are 
examined in the following chapter. 
83 
Chapter 3: Debt market timing: Successful prediction or passive 
reaction? 
3.1. Introduction 
1.1. The opinion divergence of market timing 
Market timing refers to managers' actions of capitalizing on temporary mispricing, 
specifically, issuing overvalued securities and repurchasing undervalued securities. 
However, this notion contains a multitude of implications. It is crucial to first 
clarify the meaning of managerial market timing. The view in the literature with 
respect to managerial market timing actually mixes two different concepts. First, 
"timing" means that managers use current and historical information to 
successfully forecast future price changes or market movements. Second, 
managerial market timing implies only that managers try to predict future price 
changes, but may or may not fare any better than other market participants. There 
is an important difference between managers trying to lower their cost of capital, 
and managers successfully lowering their cost of capital through such timing 
efforts. It is provocative to think that corporate managers may have better access to 
internal information than outside investors do. However, this does not mean they 
have greater access to market level information. Conceivably, timing the market 
can increase shareholders' value if it enables managers to exploit market 
inefficiencies thus reducing a firm's capital costs. However, if overconfidence 
leads managers to believe that they have superior information or ability relative to 
other market participants when they do not, managers acting on their market views 
may in fact destroy firm values. Although Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) 
examined the maturity timing decisions of debt issues that had been highlighted in 
some survey studies and suggested that managers are trying to time the debt market, 
they admitted that "it is difficult to tell whether managers succeed in reducing the 
overall cost of capital (p. 289)", and so this remains open to question. 
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The market timing hypothesis indeed challenges the efficient market hypothesis. 
The efficient market hypothesis implies that all available information is reflected in 
the asset prices so that corporate managers cannot, on average, successfully predict 
future market returns. In other words, even if managers try to anticipate future 
market movements, they cannot systematically succeed in timing the market. In the 
case of weak market efficiency, there may be narrow windows of arbitrary 
opportunities for the market participants who have informational advantages over 
others before the information is fully communicated. Managerial market timing 
implies that corporate managers make use of market imperfections with their 
informational advantages on security prices to add value to firms or lower the costs 
of capital. However, if they do not possess informational advantages, but base their 
timing only on public and historical information, or simply react to market 
variations, there is no reason why they should succeed. 
A number of survey studies (e. g. Graham and Harvey (2001), and Bancel and 
Mittoo (2004)) have discovered that managers attempt to time the debt markets 
when making their debt issuance decisions by issuing debt when interest rates are 
particularly low. There have also been empirical studies that have examined the 
ability of firms to time the debt markets (e. g. Baker et al. (2003), Faulkender 
(2005)). However, the underlying implications are not as straightforward as the 
conclusions seemingly indicate, while the evidence of managers' market timing 
shown in the empirical studies is mixed 
38 
.A very 
important reason for this is that, 
as suggested by Butler et al. (2006), some of these results are forward-looking, 
i. e. 
they involve decisions that are based on the prediction of future market variations, 
while others can be defined as backward-looking, which implies they are reactions 
to past and current market conditions. The mixture of these 
different definitions, to 
38 The majority of supportive evidence comes from the identification of 
the relationship between the firm's 
debt issue decisions and debt market condition factors. such as term structure. 
Among others, these studies 
include Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and 
Opler (1996), Datta et al (2000) and 
Baker et al. (2003). The studies are mostly based on the efficient market 
hypothesis, such as Schultz (2003), 
Butler et al. (2005,2006) and Barry et al. (2006), Brown et al. 
(2003) and Adam and Fernando (2005) 
documented that managers' timing behaviour does not add value to 
firms, which directly implies unsuccessful 
timing, 
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a large extent, explains why there is an argument among the empirical studies 
about managerial market timing. Therefore, it is important to empirically clarify 
the different implications of the managers' ability to predict future variations in the 
market environment and their responses to changes in market conditions. 
Meanwhile, this notion bridges the gap between managerial timing behaviour and 
the coincidence of market information. 
3.1.2. Forward-looking and backward-looking market timing 
With the above in mind, this chapter examines managerial market timing and 
corporate debt issues from two aspects. It investigates whether managers adopt 
speculative strategies for their debt issue policies which involve betting under 
certain market conditions,, or whether they simply respond to the variability of the 
current market conditions as compared to the past. In other words, does forward or 
backward-looking market timing dominate firms' debt issue decisions? Another 
question is to what extent does managerial market timing lead to persistent success 
in a variety of market environments? Clearly, there is a great deal of difference 
between trying to time the market and actually succeeding in doing so. If managers 
do not have informational advantages over other market participants, they cannot 
successfully lower the costs of capital simply by timing the market. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine whether firms systematically outperform in timing the debt 
market, or are they are simply betting in a fair gamble. 
Prior to investigating the above questions, the starting point is the argument 
concerning the empirical evidence presented by Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler 
(2003), which revealed a relationship between managerial decisions and market 
condition variables. Although most of the existing studies on market timing 
have 
examined equity issues, Baker et al. (2003) found evidence that managers time 
the 
debt's maturity. They found that, at the aggregate market 
level, the share of 
long-term debt is significantly driven by debt market condition 
factors including 
inflation, real short-term rates and term structure. Butler et al. 
(2006) argued that 
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these results are surprising because debt issuance is a two-sided proposition based 
on market-level information. It seems doubtful that managers possess an advantage 
over investors in fixed income securities regarding information on interest rate 
variability, as most of such investors are professional institutes such as banks, trust 
funds and insurance companies. Inspired by the notion of psuedo market timing in 
Schultz (2003), Butler et al. (2006) argued that there is a structural break during the 
sample. period of Baker et al. (2003), although, in response, Baker et al. (2006) 
contended that the psuedo market timing bias has only a minimal influence on the 
ability of aggregate debt maturity structures to explain excess bond returns. 
Starting from this argument, the present chapter first examined the empirical works 
of Baker et al. (2003) using firm-level debt issue data rather than aggregate 
macroeconomic data. One important part of the evidence in Baker et al. (2003) is 
that the negative relationship between the long-term share of debt and the debt 
market variables implies that firms issue more long-term debt when the market 
suggests a low cost of raising debt. However, this contemporary relationship 
suggests only that firms are trying to time the debt market or are simply reacting to 
the variations of market conditions. An examination was made of the relationship 
between the corporate debt issues and the debt market condition factors with the 
additional controls of economic indicators and time trends. More importantly, the 
investigation of the contemporary relationship between debt maturity structure and 
debt market condition factors was extended to the lead-lag relationship. This 
method directly examined the debt maturities and proceeds with the lagged market 
condition variables to see whether the debt issues were coincident with the 
hypothesis of market timing. Put differently, this tells us whether the 
firms' 
decisions were made before or after the changes in the market environment. 
Next, an investigation was made into the different forms of market timing, 
i. e. 
forward and backward-looking timing. As suggested by Graham and 
Harvey's 
survey, "managers attempt to time interest rates by issuing 
debt when they feel that 
market interest rates are particularly low" (P. 223). This 
finding could imply that 
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managers issue debt when current rates are relatively low compared to recent 
historical levels, or it could mean that managers attempt to issue debt when they 
believe that interest rates will rise in the future. Put differently, firms may be only 
responding to the debt market conditions or are successfully anticipating future 
interest rates in order to reduce the costs of capital, Therefore, this stage involved 
two separate investigations based on the different forms of debt timing implied in 
the surveys. Since both Baker et al. (2003) and Butler et al. (2006) employed 
annual macroeconomic data that does not permit the examination of bond 
characteristics, such as debt maturity, call and put features, and values of debt 
issued, the more detailed firm-level data used here will allow the disclosure of 
these factors that may be important in reflecting the underlying determinants of 
debt issuance. On the one hand, the levels of debt issuance across the different 
conditions of interest rates relative to their historical levels, i. e. backward-looking 
timing, were examined directly. A relatively low interest rate implies good timing 
in issuing a new debt unless managers believe the interest rates will tend to decline 
continuously in the future. The effects of the relative interest rate levels on the debt 
features such as maturity and embedded call and put options were also examined. 
In addition, the influences of economic growth and the equity market volatility 
were considered in the tests. On the other hand, an examination was made of the 
firms' ability to forecast future interest rates, i. e. forward timing. Provided that the 
firms had correctly anticipated the debt market variations, it would be expected 
that more debt would be issued before an interest rate increase and more long-term 
debt to be issued before a term spread increase. Therefore, the changes in interest 
rates and spreads were weighted by maturity and/or issue amounts. A significantly 
larger value-weighted interest rate change than average would suggest successful 
forward-looking timing of the debt market. Term spread, risk spread and excess 
bond returns were employed in the tests as alternative measures of the 
debt market 
conditions. 
Finally, it is certain that firms will adjust the maturity structure of a 
debt to reduce 
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the costs of capital based on the market conditions. High excess bond returns imply 
that the outperformance of long-term bonds over the short-term debt and therefore 
the high costs of long-term debt issuers. If most of the managers correctly 
anticipated the variations in the debt market, it would be expected that more of the 
firms would shift their debt maturity structure from the long to the short-term (i. e. 
the percentage of long-term debt issuers would increase) followed by an increase 
of excess bond returns, and vice versa. Therefore, the annual portfolios of the net 
issuers of long and short-term debt were constructed based on the entire database 
of Compustat to demonstrate whether there were overall shifts between the long 
and short-term debt across the years corresponding to the variation in capital costs 
measured by the proxy of excess bond returns 39 . An examination was made of the 
percentage of firms that correctly made decisions regarding debt maturity choices 
by anticipating future bond returns in any given year. In addition, an investigation 
of the persistent ability of successful anticipation helps to judge whether the 
managers that made correct decisions were better able to systematically time the 
market than others, or had they simply and luckily guessed correctly? 
3.1.3. Responses or predictions 
In general, the main findings from the above empirical strategies are as follows. 
Firstly, qualitatively similar results were obtained when a re-examination was 
made of the contemporary relationship between the debt issues and the market 
condition variables. However, the negative relationship between the debt issues and 
the lagged debt market variables suggests that the firms' decisions concerning 
maturity choices and issue timings were not the right ones as regards successful 
market timing. These results suggest that the fin-ns issued more 
debt and more 
long-term debt before the interest rates declined. Therefore, the market timing 
hypothesis holds as regards the relationship between debt 
issues and either 
39 Excess bond returns comprehensively reflect the market expectations of 
the variation of interest rates. Baker 
et al. (2003) also used the excess bond returns as a proxy 
for the costs of debt issuance to measure the timing 
attempts of debt issuers. We calculated the excess bond returns using 
the annual returns of the corporate bond 
index over the returns of the 90-day Treasury bill. 
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contemporary or previous debt market condition variables, but fails to explain the 
correlation between debt issues and post-issue market variables. Secondly, when 
examining the firms' debt issuances based on two different directions of the market 
condition variables, no supportive evidence was found to show that the firms were 
successful in predicting the future debt markets. The changes in interest 
rate-related variables weighted by debt features, such as maturity, effective 
maturity and issue volume, after a debt issuance were not significantly larger than 
the average changes of these interest rate variables, which suggests there was no 
obvious increase in long-term debt issues before the interest rates rise. However, it 
was found that more debt was issued when the current interest rate levels were 
relatively low compared to the historical levels. The numbers and volumes of 
issues declined as the percentile of the current interest rates in the recent levels had 
risen, even where the different states of the equity market and economic growth 
were controlled. This result is consistent with the preceding findings as well as the 
implications in the survey studies regarding backward market timing. Thirdly, it 
was found that firms cannot correctly predict future interest rates for their debt 
issue decisions systematically and persistently. No shifts of firms from long to 
short-term debt were found no matter whether the excess bond returns in the 
following year had risen or declined. In general, the net long-term debt issuers and 
the net short-term debt issuers were roughly equal across the high and the low 
return years. Moreover, those firms that made correct choices of debt maturity 
structure showed no persistent ability in the following years. In summary, the 
above results all imply that managers do not have informational advantages as 
regards the debt market. As a result, their efforts to time the future market when 
issuing debt is not generally successful, while the evidence suggests they simply 
respond to the market variations. 
This chapter extends the literature on debt issue market timing 
in several ways. 
Based on the recent hot debate regarding debt market timing 
for corporate debt 
issues, this chapter uses the direct time-variant method to 
identify the 
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cause-effective relationship between debt issues and market variations. It examines 
whether firms successfully time the market when deciding on debt maturity 
structure with identification of the market timing definition. Distinguishing 
forward and backward timing reveals whether managers possess informational 
advantages as regards timing the market. The evidence suggests that the firms were 
passively responding to past fluctuations in market conditions rather than 
successfully predicting the future variations of the debt market. This notion 
explains the mixed and plausible evidence in the debt market timing literature, and 
bridges the gap between the market timing hypothesis and the efficient market 
hypothesis. In addition, apart from the aggregate macroeconomic data, a very large 
firm-level sample consisting of more than 17,000 new corporate public debt issues 
covering the period from 1970 to 2006 offers a convincing basis from which to 
comprehensively examine debt market timing while accounting for important bond 
features and firm-specific financial characteristics. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the 
previous literature on market timing and debt issuance, especially the recent hot 
debates regarding whether firms successfully time the market. Section 3.3 
describes the data and the characteristics of the samples involved in this study. In 
section 3.4, the empirical investigations in Baker et al. (2003) are extended to 
examine the potential argument concerning managerial debt market timing. Section 
3.5 examines the different forms of market timing, i. e. forward-looking and 
backward- looking, followed in section 3.6 by an investigation of firms' persistent 
ability to time the market. Section 3.7 provides conclusions. 
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3.2. Market timing and corporate debt issuance: overview of the literature 
The question as to whether corporate managers can successfully time the debt 
market when issuing debt is a crucial issue in the ongoing debate between the 
efficient market hypothesis and behavioural finance. If corporate managers could 
make use of the arbitrary opportunities of asset mispricing to lower the costs of 
capital when raising funds, it may prove that the market fails to incorporate the 
information communicated by security issuances. However, although much of the 
literature has examined this issue both theoretically and empirically, the market 
timing hypothesis has continued to be an important topic of debate. This section 
reviews the literature regarding market timing in security issuance, starting with 
market timing and debt-equity choice. The second part focuses on debt market 
timing and the third part reviews the recent argument about the existing evidence 
that shows there to be a contemporary relationship between security issues and 
capital market returns. This is followed by a new explanation of market timing and 
corresponding evidence is presented regarding whether firms successfully time the 
market when making their security issuances. Finally, this section finishes with a 
brief summary. 
3.2.1. Market timing and debt-equity choices 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) indicated that, if the costs of different forms of 
capital do not vary independently in an efficient and integrated capital market, 
there is no gain to be had from switching between equity and debt. This raises the 
question as to why some firms raise new funds by issuing equity while others issue 
debt. Traditional capital structure theory has failed to give a universal answer to 
this question of firms' debt-equity choices. In general, there are two important 
explanations in the literature: (1) the trade-off theorY40, which states that firms set 
targets of debt levels that balance the tax advantages of additional debt against the 
costs of possible financial distress, and (2) the pecking order theory 
41 
, which states 
that firms will borrow, rather than issuing equity when internal cash 
flows are not 
sufficient to fund capital expenditures. Recently, the market timing 
hypothesis has 
40 See Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), and Titman and Wessels (1988). 41 Initialized by Donaldson (1961), there are several non-tax reasons explaining the pecking order theory of 
financing choices from management incentives, information asymmetry and stakeholder 
interests, see Miller 
(1977), Zweibel (1996), Myers and Maj luf (1984). 
92 
arisen in a number of theoretical and empirical research papers examining debt 
versus equity choices. It explains that corporate managers have the incentive to 
make decisions on the debt-equity choice to lower the cost of capital and thus 
benefit existing shareholders according to the historical, current and expected 
future market conditions at the time of security issuances, with the assumption that 
they believe it is possible to capture the market imperfections. 
In 1977, Taggart examined debt-equity choices and their relationship with target 
capital structures and debt capacity. He suggested that timing considerations might 
affect firms' capital structures but that this needed to be further examined. By 
examining corporate debt issues in the UK in the period 1959 - 1974, Marsh (1982) 
found evidence of firms choosing debt and equity according to the market 
conditions and recent security prices. He argued that managers are clearly "timing" 
the market at the time they issue securities. In recent years, a number of empirical 
and survey studies have found considerable evidence that supports the market 
timing theory in corporate security issues. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) 
found a strong relationship between stock prices and seasoned equity issuances. 
The hypothesis of their study regarding firms' debt-equity choices is based on the 
existence of a target leverage ratio, whereas, in the empirical tests, they found that 
the target ratio changed over time as the firms' stock prices changed. In another 
relevant study, Kaplin and Levy (2001) comprehensively examined corporate 
security issues, including both stocks and debt, and revealed that the ratio of 
aggregate short-term to aggregate long-term debt issues is highly correlated to 
macroeconomic conditions. This finding implies that firms' financing decisions are 
driven heavily by the market conditions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) explained the 
market timing theory by showing that capital structure is the cumulative outcome 
of past attempts to time the equity market. Empirical evidence was directly 
identified in the survey study by Graham and Harvey (2001), who investigated the 
CFOs of public corporations anonymously and revealed that two-thirds of the 
respondents stated that when issuing equity "the amount by which our stock 
is 
undervalued or overvalued was an important or very important consideration" 
(p. 216). Therefore, the evidence implies that finns' financing decisions may not 
be 
solely driven by firm-specific financial characteristics but also be related to market 
conditions. 
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The "new issues puzzle 425, , which reveals the phenomenon of the long-run 
post-issue underperformance of equity issuances, should not be ignored. This 
phenomenon is closely associated with equity market timing, which refers to the 
practice of issuing equity at high prices and repurchasing at low prices. Ritter 
(1991) showed initial public offerings' (IPOs) underperformance relative to indices 
and the matching stocks in the three to five years after going public. One reason for 
this post-issuance long-run underperformance is associated with high volume 
periods, which suggests that issuers successfully take advantage of "windows of 
opportunity" when timing new issues at high prices. Loughran and Ritter (1995) 
found that seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have a similar pattern of long-run 
underperformance as IPOs. However, they failed to find a reasonable explanation 
based on the traditional risk-return framework, and therefore left a puzzle 43 . At the 
aggregate level, Baker and Wurgler (2000) found a negative relationship between 
the equity share of the total security issuance and the average value-weighted 
market returns of the following year. Accordingly, equity issuance relative to total 
equity and debt issuance (equity share) predicts aggregate market returns. They 
argued that the market timing hypothesis, discussed as a behavioural element in 
these studies, provides a potential explanation for the "new issues puzzle". Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) explained the simple theoretical framework of market timing 
as that managers may reduce the overall cost of capital paid by their ongoing 
investors by issuing overpriced securities and re-purchasing under-priced securities. 
Although they indicated that the aggregate predictability results should probably 
not be interpreted as evidence that "managers can time the aggregate market", they 
argued that the average financing decision will contain information about the 
average mispricing, even if individual managers are responding only to their own 
firm's mispricing. In summary, "when viewed as a whole, the evidence indicates 
that market timing plays a nontrivial role in firms' choices of security issuance" 
(Baker et al. (2004), p23). 
However, the market timing theory is still arguable when considering both the 
42 Loughran and Ritter (1995) examined initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOS) 
during the period of 1970 to 1990. They find that, although the systematic risk measure. 
8, was slightly 
higher for issuing firms than non-issuers, firms issuing equity produced such low returns over the following 
five years. This is referred to as "the new issues puzzle". 
" However, among others, Brav, Geczy and Gomper (2000), Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000) and Gompers and 
Lerner (2003), found weak or no evidence for the "new issues puzzle". 
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empirical and theoretical studies. The above evidence shows only one side of the 
coin. Although there is evidence that stocks performing in either IPOs or seasoned 
SEOs generate low returns during the period of two to five years following the 
issue date, which challenges the efficient market hypothesis and motivates the 
development of behavioural corporate finance. Advocates of the efficient market 
hypothesis argue that the reason for the existence of the seasoned stock issuance 
and the low returns following IPOs and SEOs is that they are actually less risky 
rather than the mispricing of securities utilized by corporate managers with 
informational advantages or "sharp insight". For example, Eckbo, Masulis and 
Norli (2000) presented evidence from a large sample to show that the low 
post-issue returns pattern is subject to small growth stocks. Therefore, this "new 
issue puzzle" can be explained using the appropriate technique with a proper 
control for risk. They explained that, as equity issuers reduce the leverage ratio, 
their exposure to unexpected inflation and default risks decreases, thus decreasing 
their stock's expected returns relative to non-issuers. Eckbo and Norli, (2005) 
provided further evidence based on a risk-return framework to argue that abnormal 
returns, as the evidence of managers' market timing in equity issuance, are indeed a 
result of asset pricing model misspecification. Jung5 Kim and Stulz (1996) 
indicated that a theory of corporate security choice should answer the following 
three issues. Firstly, there is the question of why firms choose to issue a particular 
security. Secondly, how the market reacts to that choice and thirdly, what actions 
the firm takes after the issue. They investigated the ability of the pecking-order 
model, the agency model and the timing model to explain firms' decisions 
regarding whether to issue debt or equity, the stock price reaction to their decisions, 
and their actions afterward. They found support for the agency model and the 
pecking-order model but not the timing model. They concluded that market timing 
theory relies on the assumption that the market fails to incorporate all the 
information communicated by a security issue. As a matter of fact, this argument 
has not yet been theoretically explained by the market timing hypothesis. 
This 
brings us on to the underlying debate about the efficient market 
hypothesis and 
behavioural finance. 
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3.2.2. Market timing and debt issuance 
Needless to say, firms issue debt in order to raise capital. Many factors affect the 
decisions of companies to issue new debt and the features they select for the debt. 
Debt maturity choice has been an important factor noted in the literature. Brick and 
Ravid (1985) found that a decreasing term structure of interest rates renders 
short-term debt optimal due to the tax reason. In similar situations, an increasing 
term structure results in long-term debt being optimal. Barclay and Smith (1995) 
and Stohs and Mauer (1996) documented a similar relationship in that the maturity 
of a debt is negatively related to the term spread at the level of aggregate balance 
sheet data. Guedes and Opler (1996) examined debt maturity decisions using a 
sample of over 7,000 debt issues. They observed that higher quality firms tend to 
borrow at both ends of the maturity spectrum, while lower quality firms tend to 
borrow at middle maturities. However, they did not find that a firm's debt maturity 
choice is related to the firm's future equity market performance. Very importantly, 
they also found that debt maturity tends to be shorter when the term premium is 
higher, and similarly to the argument in Marsh (1982), they argued that such 
choices are inconsistent with an expectations theory of the term structure. These 
studies found a relationship between debt maturity and the term spread of interest 
rates, However, they did not address their findings to managers' attempts to time 
the markets. 
Recent empirical studies have begun to connect debt maturity choices to debt 
market timing. For example, Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2000) revealed that 
bond IPOs in the US have similar patterns of underperformance over the three and 
five-year post-offer periods. They found evidence that debt IPOs are timed to 
coincide with the market having the highest expectations concerning the firm's 
prospects. Moreover, the post-offer underperformance of debt IPOs is more 
pronounced for the longer maturity issues. Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) 
documented that, in the aggregate, managers are able to engage in the successful 
timing of fluctuations in the yield curve by the judicious choice of maturity 
structure for their firm's debt. Specifically, they found a negative correlation 
between future excess long-term bond returns and the ratio of long-term 
debt issues 
to total debt. This is explained as evidence of successful debt market timing 
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because it seems that managers tend to issue more long-term debt relative to 
short-term debt based on their prediction of the low excess returns of long-term 
debt in the future. The choices of debt yield types have also been documented in a 
number of studies. Faulkender (2005) examined whether firms were hedging or 
timing the market when selecting the interest rate exposure of their new debt 
issuances. In this study, Faulkender employed the measure of interest rate exposure 
by combining the initial exposure of newly issued debt with their use of interest 
rate swaps. He found that the final interest rate exposure was heavily driven by the 
slope of the yield curve at the time the debt was issued. This suggests that firms are 
motivated by market timing when choosing the yield types of debt issuances. Debt 
market timing and equity market timing differ in important respects. Most notably, 
equity market timing is typically connected to inside information, while debt 
market timing can only be driven by publicly available information. In other words, 
no firm has inside information about future interest rates. 44 Corporate managers 
could issue overvalued stocks and repurchase undervalued stocks because they 
have the advantage of internal information about the value of the firms' equity over 
outside investors. This can be explained by saying that managers are better 
informed about the idiosyncratic component of their own firms' stocks than outside 
investors. However, it is hard to explain why corporate managers should also 
possess informational advantages at the market level. If mispricing of the stock 
market and the informational advantage of corporate managers can explain equity 
market timing, it is another story for market timing in corporate debt issuance. In 
contrast to stock prices, the value changes of outstanding corporate debt depend 
solely on the term structure of the interest rates rather than the firms' operating or 
financial dimensions. As a fixed-income security, debt is seldom incorrectly priced. 
Therefore, it is odd to imagine that the purchasers of corporate debt, most of whom 
are professional investors, would make irrational decisions. In this setting, 
debt 
market timing per se is not possible. 
Theoretical explanations of debt market timing follow two lines. 
On the one hand, 
debt market timing is related to stock market performance. 
Equity overvaluation 
44 in an asymmetric information framework, where firm insiders are 
better informed than outside investors, 
Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe (1990) showed that long-term 
debt can potentially be more mispriced than 
short-term debt. Thus, firms with favourable private information 
issue short-term debt to reduce borrowing 
costs when favourable information materializes. 
By contrast, long-term debt will convey bad news to the 
market and outside investors, and extra issuing costs will 
have to be afforded. 
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releases and creates extra capability of debt. As a result, debt issuance is followed 
by low stock returns. Antoniou et al. (2006) examined the determinants of debt 
maturity structure in the UK, Germany and France. Apart from the firm-specific 
factors 45 , their results revealed that the impacts of market-specific factors, such as 
the market equity premium, term structure, share price performance and interest 
rate volatility, on debt maturity decisions are relevant in the UK. Very importantly, 
the evidence shows that changes in stock prices have a positive relationship with 
debt maturity. This positive relationship suggests that firms issue informationally 
disadvantaged security (e. g. long-term debt) after a rise in their share prices. In 
addition, as mentioned in the preceding section, Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 
(2001) examined firms' debt-equity choices based on the hypothesis of a target 
leverage ratio. In their empirical tests, they found that the target ratio changed over 
time as the firm's stock prices changed. This hypothesis indirectly explains how 
debt market timing is affected by the exogenous factors of stock markets. 
On the other hand, the endogenous reason for debt market timing may be 
interpreted as the irrationality of corporate managers. Ignoring rational moral 
hazard behaviour, the concern here is with the situation where managers believe 
they have a superior ability to maximize shareholders' value. However, the 
evidence does not support the existence of this ability. Butler et al. (2006) found 
that firms as a whole cannot adjust their debt maturity structure as a capital costs 
measure by excess bond returns, although the difference between the high return 
years and the low return years are significant. Moreover, even the firms that seem 
to succeed in timing the market do not exhibit a persistent ability in the following 
years. Brown et al. (2006) examined the gold mining industry in the North America 
regarding the influence of managers' market views on hedging. Firstly, they found 
that many firms actively adjusted their derivatives based on their view of the 
market. They found some evidence of firms successfully timing subsequent 
changes in gold prices. However, they found no evidence that the managers' timing 
of the market led to superior performance in a variety of operating or financial 
dimensions. Another relevant study by Adam and Fernando (2006) also 
documented the North America gold mining firms' market timing in using 
'5 These factors included firm size, market-to-book ratio, asset maturity, earning volatility, tax rates and 
liquidity. 
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derivatives or selective hedging strategies. Focusing on the hedging programmes of 
derivative usage based on the managers' view of the market, they found 
considerable excess volatility in the hedging ratios over time. They referred to 
market timing behaviour as a type of managerial speculation. Consistent with 
Brown et al. (2006), they concluded that the cash flow gains from managers timing 
the market were "small at best". Thus, evidence shows that firms can not realize 
economically significant benefits by trying to time the market. Therefore, 
managers do not show a significant informational advantage concerning the market 
volatility, and their market views fail to translate to shareholders' values. In this 
case, managerial market timing may actually destroy firm value, as indicated in 
Stulz (1996). 
No matter which explanation is followed, the empirical studies seem to point to the 
existence of debt market timing. Questions that need further consideration are how 
the market reacts to managerial market timing on choices of debt features, and the 
consequences of firms'timing strategies. 
3.2.3. Genuine market timing versus pseudo market timing 
There is hot debate in the recent literature about whether corporate managers 
accurately time the market when they issue new securities. Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) and Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler (2003) examined the issuance of equity 
and corporate debt maturity respectively and revealed evidence that managers can 
successfully time capital markets. In the equity market, the share of equity in total 
issues was strongly negatively correlated to future aggregate equity market returns. 
Moreover, this share increased immediately after a year of high equity market 
returns and just before years of low market returns. In the debt market, inflation, 
the real short-term interest rate and the term structure predict excess bond returns, 
while the long-term share in the aggregate total debt issues is negative to each of 
these market condition variables. As a result, the share of the long-term 
debt in 
total debt issues is negatively correlated with future aggregate excess bond returns. 
This evidence is interpreted as successful debt market timing 
because managers 
tend to issue more long-term debt relative to short-term debt when they 
believe the 
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future excess long-term bond returns will decline 46 . The reason that these fi indings 
are crucial is because they imply that markets are unable to allocate capital 
efficiently at the aggregate level. Baker et al. (2000) considered three explanations 
for market efficiency but found no support for any of them. They claimed that 
managerial timing of an inefficient market is the most credible explanation of the 
results. 
With a suspicion of the above evidence, Schultz (2003) raised a pseudo market 
timing hypothesis suggesting that, even though the market is efficient and 
managers had no superior timing ability, there could be the probability of 
observing long-run underperformance ex post. Since managers tend to issue equity 
when their stock prices have increased and issue debt when the interest rates have 
declined, the evidence of seeming managerial market timing is indeed the result of 
a spurious ex post relationship between security issuance and market returns. The 
implication of the notion of pseudo market timing is that the benefits received by 
the equity issuers at market peaks trigger further equity issuances. Accordingly, the 
more firms benefit from their security issues, the more likely they are to issue them. 
These peaks are observed ex Post, but are not predictable ex ante if markets are 
efficient. Pseudo market timing also explains the poor long-run performance 
following debt issues. So, it is surprising that managers issue debt instead, if they 
can time the market and issue stock when it is overpriced. Another important 
implication of the pseudo market timing explanation of the mixed evidence 
concerning market timing is the time measure. It demonstrates that if markets are 
ex ante efficient, abnormal returns are observed ex post in event time rather than 
calendar time. When returns are measured in calendar time, each month is 
weighted equally, in event time each issue is weighted equally. Some studies have 
found clues from the different time measures. For example, Loughran and Ritter 
(1995,2000) observed that excess returns following equity offerings were much 
lower when measured in event time than in calendar time. Gompers and 
Lemer 
(2003) determined that throughout the period 1935 - 1972, buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns were negative in event time following IPOs, but disappeared when 
calculated in calendar time. Therefore, weighting each month rather than each 
" They admitted that the favourite explanation is that managers are trying to time 
the debt market because it is 
hard to determine whether managers are reducing the overall cost of capital (p. 
263). 
C, 
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offering equally will understate the abnormal returns. Pseudo market timing only 
predicts that equity issuers will underperform. in event time rather than in calendar 
time. Therefore, an easyway to avoid this problem is to use calendar time returns 
rather than event time returns. However, few studies have hitherto examined this 
effect on debt issues. In short, the pseudo market timing suggests that the evidence 
of long-term post-offering underperformance can be measured ex post but is not 
predictable ex ante in an efficient market. 
Following the conclusions of Baker et al. (2000,2003), Butler et al. (2005,2006) 
proposed an efficient market explanation for market timing for equity and debt 
maturity respectively based on the pseudo market timing documented by Schultz 
(2003). They argued that structural breaks or "regime shifts" create the "seeming" 
evidence of successful market timing. They suggested that aggregate pseudo 
market timing is more likely to occur around unexpected large market shocks. The 
evidence from the equity market shows that the negative relationship between the 
equity share and future market returns, which is regarded as the evidence for 
managerial market timing, only appears surrounding the two identified structural 
breaks. Excluding these events causes the in-sample predictive ability of equity 
share to vanish. As regards the debt market, Butler et al. (2006) also identified that 
the existence of interest rate structural breaks during the sample period in Baker et 
al. (2003) caused a spurious correlation between the fraction of long-term debt in 
the total debt issues and future excess bond returns 47 . On removal of the 
impact of 
these structural breaks, the predicting power of debt maturity on excess bond 
retums disappears. 
Genuine market timing suggests the tendency of firms to issue security before low 
excess returns. By contrast, pseudo market timing implies the tendency of firms to 
issue security following high returns. This seems to be simply a technical question 
of time-series econometrics. However, in the setting of financial theory, the central 
issue is whether there exist predictable arbitrary opportunities. In other words, 
if it 
may be the case that in the equity market managers are able to time their equity 
issues to exploit not only the idiosyncratic component of their 
firms' returns but 
47 Although Baker et a] (2006) admitted the existence of a single structural shift 
in the time series of excess 
returns in the early 1980s, they claimed that the "pseudo market timing 
bias" is simply a different name for the 
small sample bias known to affect predictive regressions and is ignorable with 
the prior inferences about the 
ability of equity share and aggregate debt maturity structure to explain returns. 
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also the market component. In the debt market, corporate managers choose the 
maturity for new debt issues according to the debt market condition factors. It is 
unclear how corporate managers could possess informational advantages over the 
rest of the market participants, which would allow them to achieve such success in 
timing their security issuances, while other professional investors are unable to 
have a similar capability of beating the market48 , especially for debt issuance. 
Butler et al. (2006) examined the persistent performance of managers who appear 
to have correctly timed the market, but found no evidence to suggest that these 
managers have a persistent ability to forecast future market returns. Therefore, they 
argued that even if corporate managers seem to successfully time the market, it is 
just because they have been fortunate in guessing correctly. However, their 
attempts to time the market cannot result in any systematic success. 
The argument between genuine market timing and pseudo market timing can be 
explained as being that of whether there is an ability to actively predict the market 
or there are simply passive reactions to market variations. Based on the historical 
market information, firm managers make financing decisions corresponding to 
their prediction of future changes in the market environment. Barry et al (2005), 
therefore, first distinguished mark et timing as two types: forward-looking and 
backward-looking timing, to examine an alternative explanation for the mixture of 
evidence regarding corporate debt issue market timing. Forward timing suggests 
that managers implement timing strategies based on their prediction of future 
market movements, for instance, they issue more long-term debt if they expect the 
future interest rates to go up. While backward timing implies a passive response to 
past market variations, for example, managers issue more debt when the current 
interest rates are low relative to the historic level. Consistent with other survey 
studies, they found strong evidence of backward debt timing. However, they 
found 
no evidence that firm managers are successful in forward timing. On the one 
hand, 
this interprets the existing empirical evidence of contemporary movements of 
debt 
issues and debt market conditions. On the other hand, it supports the assumption 
that the market is efficient and that managers do not exhibit superior ability 
in 
predicting future market returns. Therefore, the evidence suggests that market 
18 Evidence suggests that even professional money managers are not able to consistentlý 
beat the market, e. g. 
Gruber (1996). 
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timing is indeed the corresponding reactions of managers to the changes in market 
con itions. 
3.2.4. Summary 
In summary, firms' debt-equity choices and capital structure theory have always 
been important issues in the field of financial economics. The market timing 
hypothesis provides a potential explanation involving the behavioural factor, but 
the empirical evidence is still mixed and arguable and the conclusions inconsistent. 
Underlying this debate is the regime of the efficient market hypothesis and 
behavioural finance. The gaps in the literature regarding debt market timing can be 
seen in several aspects. Firstly, in contrast to the literature on equity financing 
patterns, but related to the actual importance of debt financing, "the literature on 
debt financing patterns is surprisingly underdeveloped" (Baker et al. (2003), p. 262). 
Secondly, most of the empirical evidence regarding debt market timing comes from 
the co-variation of the corporate debt issuance and debt market condition factors 
(see section 2.2), while it is plausible that the evidence can identify whether 
managers successfully time the debt market, as shown in the recent argument about 
44genuine" or "pseudo" market timing (see details in section 2.3). In addition, 
whether firm managers possess superior abilities as regards timing the debt market 
when deciding their financing strategies remains open to question. In contrast to 
the equity market, the capital costs of debt issues depend more heavily on the 
public market information. Therefore, it is harder to capture the arbitrage 
opportunities in the debt market, while the determinants of firms' debt market 
timings are not clear. This chapter engages in bridging these gaps. 
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3.3. Data and sample characteristics 
3.3.1. Data and sources 
This chapter examines corporate debt issues concerning market timing in the US 
market. The data for new and non-convertible public corporate debt issues was 
obtained from the Thompson Financial SDC bond database covering the sample 
period January 1970 - March 2005. Data was obtained on the issue date, the 
identity and characteristics of the borrowers, and various characteristics of the 
bond issuances, such as proceeds in nominal dollars, maturity, yield to maturity at 
issuance, credit rating, yield types (fixed or floating rate), and embedded options 
such as callable or puttable 49 . The proceeds measured by constant dollars of March 
2005 50 we re calculated by the nominal proceeds adjusted by the monthly 
consumer price index (CPI) to eliminate the influence of inflation and economic 
growth in the long horizon of 37 years. The sample set excluded issues by non-US 
firms, issues outside of the US, issues by financial firms (with SIC codes 
6000-6999) and issues by non-profit organizations, such as the education sector 
and public medical service. These screens reduced the number of available issues 
to 17,404 from 3,040 firms. 
In contrast to commercial papers or other short-term bank loans, which are mainly 
used to temporarily adjust internal cash flows, the debt issues examined in this 
chapter were corporate bonds issued in the public debt markets which are heavily 
influenced by the assets allocation of the market mechanism and therefore have 
less informational asymmetry. Moreover, the long-term public bonds are usually 
large in issue values and have long maturities. Compared to the variability of 
commercial papers or other short-term debt, long-term debt require longer leading 
times for preparation of the issuance and more cautious considerations. Therefore, 
49 Thompson Financial SDC New Issues database does not introduce the callable and puttable data of 
corporate bonds before 1976. Therefore, all calculations involving these embedded options only cover the 
0 
period starting from 1976. 
( This date was chosen because the debt issuance sample actually ends in this month 
due to 2-year 
forward-looking in the empirical tests and the data availability till March 2007. 
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the specific features of long-term bonds such as timing, maturity, issue volumes 
and yield types reflect not only managerial concerns regarding the effects of the 
debt issues on the firms' financial characteristics but also the estimation of future 
market variations. For example, provided that managers believe that the market 
interest rates or term spreads will rise, they will be more likely to "lock in" the 
current lower rates or spreads by issuing long-term bonds rather than short-term 
bank debt. Thus, the sample of publicly issued bonds should be especially useful 
for examining whether the issuance decisions of corporate managers reflects their 
confidence in timing the debt markets. 
Screened by the availability of data regarding the debt issuers' financial 
characteristics in COMPUSTAT, 13,340 observations (out of the initial 17,404 
issues available in the SDC) were obtained from 2,029 debt issuers finally. The 
annual variations in the issuers' short-term debt and the levels of long-term debt 
were collected to measure the firms' capital structure choices. Meanwhile, the data 
regarding financial characteristics of the debt issuers, including market values, P/E 
ratios, market-to-book value ratios, leverage ratios, free cash flows and capital 
expenditures was also collected. 
In addition to the data on new debt issues, the debt market data, such as interest 
rates and inflation rates, was also collected. The time series of the monthly yields 
on Treasury bonds and corporate bonds with various maturities and inflation rates 
(measured using the Consumer Price Index) from the Saint Louis' FRED database 
of the Federal Reserve Bank were obtained. The interest rates included the 90-day 
Treasury bill rates (T901), the ten-year constant maturity Treasury rates (GIOI) and 
the Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield (Baaf)51 . 
The ten-year constant 
maturity Treasury rates and the 90-day Treasury bill rates were employed as 
proxies for the long-term interest rates and short-term interest rates respectively, 
and then the term spread (G]Ot-T90) was measured as the 
difference between the 
51 The Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yields were employed as the proxy 
for the commercial interest 
rates. The Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yields were also collected and used 
for robustness checks. 
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ten-year constant maturity Treasury rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate. The 
risk spread (Baat-GIOt) was measured as the difference between the Moody's 
Seasoned Baa rates and the ten-year constant maturity Treasury bond rates. The 
annualised inflation rates were measured in percentage terms for each monthly 
observation. The real short-term rates (T90t-Inft) were estimated as the annualised 
90-day Treasury bill rates minus the actual inflation rates. 
The series of monthly bond index returns were generated from the Morningstar 
SBBI Classic Yearbook 2006 52 . The index includes nearly all Aaa- and Aa-rated 
corporate bonds. The excess government bond returns were measured by the index 
of Treasury bonds over bills and the excess corporate bond returns were measured 
by the index of investment-grade corporate bonds over the index of Treasury bills. 
The annual excess corporate and government bond returns were measured as the 
compounded monthly return on the long-term corporate (government) bond index 
over 12 months divided by the compounded monthly return on the T-bill over 12 
months, minus one. The annualised three-year cumulative excess returns were 
measured as the third root of the compounded monthly returns on the T-bills over 
36 months, minus one. 
Finally, to investigate the underlying relationship between the debt market and 
stock market, data that characterizes the stock market, including the price-earning 
ratio and market-to-book value ratios of the S&P 500 index during the 
corresponding period, was also collected from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT. 
Moreover, the US Coincident Index (USCI)53 from the Economic Cycle Research 
Institute (ECRI) was introduced as the proxy for the business cycle indicator to 
52 The former Ibbotson Associates was combined with the Morningstar Inc. in 2006. As described 
in the 
Yearbook, the total returns on long-term government bonds are constructed with 
data from The Wall Street 
Journal, To the greatest degree possible, a bond portfolio with a term of approximately 
20 years and a 
reasonable current coupon was used in each year. The bond was "held" 
for the calendar year and returns \ý ere 
computed. The Corporate bond portfolio is presented by the Citigroup Long-term 
High-grade Corporate Bond 
Index (formerly Salomon Brothers). Before 1968, the total bond returns were calculated by summing the 
capital appreciation returns and the income returns. 
" It is a comprehensive summary measure of US economic conditions made up of coincident 
indicators of the 
US economy including measures of production, employment, 
income and sales, produced by the Economic 
Cycle Research Institute. Website: www. businesscycle. com 
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track the growth and variation in the US economy during the sample period. 
The firm-level debt issue sample set has more strength than the macroeconomic 
data used in some studies, e. g. Baker et al. (2003) and Butler et al. (2006). Firstly, 
it involves detailed information regarding maturity. As it is reasonable to ask 
whether a long-term debt is of five-year or 30-year maturity, this dataset is helpful 
when examining the variations of debt maturity quantitatively. Secondly, the data 
provides information regarding the call options and put options embedded in the 
debt issuances. These embedded options reduce the effective maturity of an issue 
and change the cost characteristics accordingly. Moreover, the proportion of call or 
put usage varies across different maturities and over time. As will be discussed in 
the analysis, ignorance of this feature may cause results to be unconvincing. 
Thirdly, the firm-level data gives equal weight to each individual debt issue to 
make it easier to examine the preferences and cross-sectional variations of the 
managers' decisions on debt issues than with the aggregate macroeconomic data. 
Although the data has limitations of its own in that it cannot be guaranteed that the 
database covers all debt issues with no omissions, especially in the early period, it 
succeeds in addressing the major limitations of other datasets. 
3.3.2. Sample description 
Table 3.1 shows the description of the above corporate debt issuance data by year. 
Two measures of issuance activity were examined: the dollars of debt issues in the 
constant March 2005 dollars, and the deal numbers of issues. The results obtained 
for dollar amounts issued were qualitatively identical to those obtained for the 
number of issues. Therefore only the former is reported. The total amount issued in 
the sample was $3.57 trillion in the constant dollar of March 2005. The largest 
three debt issue volumes in a single year were 212 billion in 1993,190 billion in 
1998, and 172 billion in 1986. Figure 3.1 provides a straightforward overview of 
the relationship between the interest rates and issue volumes based on the monthly 
data. It shows graphically the general tendency for the debt issuances to 
follow the 
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rate declines. It can be seen that there was a tendency for the debt issuances to be 
higher in times of low rates. It can also be seen that all three peaks of debt issuance 
measured by both issue number and issue dollars during the sample period very 
obviously happened at neaps of interest rates compared to the preceding levels. 
Conversely, the smallest issue volumes occurred in 1982 and 1983 following the 
highest levels of Baa rates and GSIO in 1982 and T90 in 1981. This corresponds 
with the structural change in the early 1980s identified by Butler et al. (2006). 
Meanwhile, Figure 3.1 shows that the debt issue waves graphically followed the 
term-spread variability. The implicit correlation is empirically examined in 
subsequent sections. 
Table 3.1 also shows the maturity and other characteristics of the debt issues on an 
annual basis and provides the annual average (median) 90-day and ten-year 
Treasury yields in the US. The annual average maturity was 16.16 years and the 
median of the sample was 13.76 years. A noticeable trend toward shorter maturities 
was found across the sample. For the period 1970-1983, it was very common for 
the average maturity to exceed 18 years. After 1983 when the interest rates reached 
the historical peak of the sample period, the average maturities apparently fell. The 
median maturity exhibited a similar pattern. After 1986, the median maturity was 
about ten years during each year except for the period 1999 - 2000, when it fell 
sharply. The effective maturity, which was measured by the time horizon from the 
issue date to the earliest callable (puttable) date, exhibited a different pattern. Table 
3.1 shows the percentage of callable issues (available from 1976) over the total 
issues. The longer the initial maturity of the issue was, the more likely the issuers 
were to adapt the embedded callable. In the overall sample, about one quarter of 
the issues were callable, while about 3% of the issues included put provisions. 
Before 1993, for almost all years the percentage of callables was more than 30% 
(the highest was 60.9% in 1990), while after 1993, the percentages fell sharply and 
varied at around 15%. After adjusting for the embedded options, the effective 
maturity with a mean of II years and median of 8.77 years showed no obvious 
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trend of falling or rising over the whole sample period. 
Table 3.2 exhibits the basic data statistics in Panel A and the correlations of the 
debt issue characteristics with the interest rates and spreads in Panel B, based on 
the monthly data. It can be seen that the monthly issue numbers and issue amounts 
were negatively correlated to the interest rates but positively correlated to the term 
spreads and risk spreads. Conversely, both the median maturity and effective 
maturity were positively correlated to the interest rates but negatively correlated to 
the term spreads. It can also be seen that there was a pronounced tendency for 
firms to adjust the stated maturity of their debt with the usage of call or put 
provisions during the high interest rate periods, as implied by the high correlations 
between the interest rates and percentages of callable and puttable options over the 
total issues. 
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Table 3.2 Sample Statistics and Correlations 
This table presents the basic sample statistics based on the monthly data. Monthly issue amounts are measured in millions of dollars (constant in March 2005). Maturity and effective maturity are taken as the median value 
of each month. Effective maturity is measured by the horizons from the issuing date to the earliest call (put) date, available from 1976 in the SDC bond issue database. Baa is the Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond 
Yield. T90 is the 90-day Treasury bill rate and G 10 is the 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond rate. Term 
spread is the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond rates (GIO) and the 90-day Treasury bill rates J90). Risk spread is the difference between the Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield s and the 10-year Treasury bond rates, Real short-term rates (T90t-lnft) were estimated as the annualised 90-day Treasury bill rates J90) minus the actual inflation rates (Inflation). The US Coincident Index (USCI) 
introduced as the proxy for the business cycle indicator in the US economy is generated from the Economic 
Cycle Research Institute (ECRI). Excess bond returns are defined as the annualised three-year cumulative 
excess returns, measured as the third root of the compounded monthly corporate bond returns on the T-bills 
over 36 months, minus one. 
Panel A Monthly statistics 
Mean Median SID 
Monthly issue numbers 39.2 32.0 24.3 
Monthly issue amounts ($Mil) 7,959 7,019 4,830 
Maturity (year) 14.2 10.2 TO 
Effective maturity (year) 11.0 10.0 6.7 
Fraction of puttable 0,03 0.00 0.04 
Fraction of callable 0.24 0.21 0.18 
Baa 9.62 9.00 2.52 
GIO 7.58 7.30 2,49 
T90 5,97 5.48 2.88 
Term spread 1.62 1.71 1.30 
Risk spread (%) 2.04 1.94 0.57 
Paneal B Correlations of debt issue characteristics with interest rates and spreads 
Baa GIO T90 
Term 
spread 
Risk 
spread 
Number of issues -0.311 -0.354 -0.384 0.171 0.177 
Monthly issue amounts -0.358 -0.416 -0.417 0.127 0.242 
Maturity 0,078 0.135 0.208 -0.202 -0.250 
Effective maturity 0.167 0.223 0.278 -0.196 -0.263 
Fraction of puttable 0,223 0.217 0.158 0.066 0.032 
Fraction of callable 0.376 0.389 0.248 0.195 -0.040 
Panel C Correlations between market condition variables 
Term Spread Risk Spread Inflation USCI Real short rate 
Term Spread I 
Risk Spread 0.285 1 
Inflation -0.178 -0.152 1 
USCI 0.060 -0,216 -0.261 1 
Real short rate 0.033 -0.027 -0.224 0.262 1 
Excess Bond returns 0.195 0.415 -0.234 -0.313 0.437 
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3.4. Debt market conditions and corporate debt issues 
In this section an examination is made of the evidence of debt market timing in 
previous empirical studies that the features of corporate debt issuance including 
maturity and issue volume are determined by fluctuations in the debt market 
conditions. Based on the recent debate about whether firms can successfully time 
the debt market, the starting point is the empirical work of Baker et al. (2003) 
regarding contemporary variations between market conditions and the maturity of 
debt issues. However, the focus of the present section is to question the arguably 
casual link of the contemporary variations. Therefore, the lead-lag relationship is 
then examined and the plausible cause-effective links between firms' debt issue 
decisions and market conditions are discussed. This will reveal whether debt issue 
decisions are based on the previous market condition fluctuations or expected 
future market variations. This is a prerequisite to understanding the relationship 
between debt issues and debt market timing. The implications arising in this 
section are examined in the subsequent section, by analysing the debt issue 
variation under current and ex post future market conditions in the backward and 
forward directions. 
3.4.1. Co-variations between debt market conditions and debt issues 
An important finding in Baker et al. (2003) is that market conditions explain a 
large fraction of the time series variations in debt maturity. The share of long-term 
debt over total debt issued is negatively related to inflation, the real short-term rate 
and the term spread. The interpretation is that firms tend to issue long-term debt 
when the debt market variables suggest a lower cost of long-term debt, and vice 
versa. Meanwhile, the debt maturity has an identical relationship with the expected 
excess bond returns estimated from the same variation of market condition 
factors. 
As a result, the aggregate average maturity of debt issues itself 
is verified as being 
able to predict future excess bond returns. 
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These results cast suspicion over whether the appearance of a significant 
relationship is simply an objectively existing phenomenon or whether it reflects a 
causal link between the maturity of debt issues and the market conditions, in other 
words, the ability of firms to time their decisions regarding debt maturity on the 
expected market conditions. As argued by Butler et al. (2006), if an exogenous 
factor were influencing each of two uncorrelated random variables, one would 
expect the two series to exhibit a significant correlation, even if this correlation 
does not mean there is a causal link between these two random variables. With the 
control of the structural shifts during the sample period, the correlation between the 
long-term share and future excess returns disappears. Therefore, this "seeming" 
relationship is possibly spurious. In terms of this argument, there is no reason to 
assume that corporate debt maturity is entirely uncorrelated to debt market 
conditions, as it would be surprising if managers executed strategies for their debt 
issues regardless of the debt market environment. On the other hand, we suspect 
that debt maturity could predict future debt market variability or returns, or put 
differently, managers are able to successfully time the debt market. Instead of 
identifying the effects of exogenous structural breaks on interest rates as in Butler 
et al. (2006), the present section directly examines the relationship between debt 
maturity and market condition factors. 
When managers make decisions regarding debt maturity, they will inevitably look 
at the current interest rates. However, this is not enough for them to understand the 
market variability. Both the absolute magnitude and the relative level of interest 
rates affect the choice. The contemporary relationship between debt maturity and 
the debt market variables does not show that managers successfully predict the 
market variability. Instead, firms may only be reacting to (as opposed to accurately 
forecasting) the variation in relation to the cost of long-term debt. The problem still 
remains as to whether current interest rates can predict 
future bond returns because 
of the usual difficulties of testing market efficiency. 
Since bond returns are 
determined by the instantaneous variation of debt market condition variables such 
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as interest rates or term structures, and both bond returns and the debt market 
condition variables can proxy the costs of debt issues, it is possible to examine how 
the current aggregate level of debt maturity is related to the future market 
conditions that are directly related to the future returns ex post. If the current 
aggregate level of debt maturity accurately predicts the future market conditions 
with the assumption that firms time the market to lower the costs of capital, an 
increase in interest rates and a steep slope in the term structures after debt issues 
would be expected. Otherwise, it can only be proved that managers are trying to 
time the debt market based on the contemporary co-variation between debt 
maturity and market variables. Therefore, an examination is made of whether the 
lagged market condition variables determine the debt maturity. 
Debt market timing can be explained as firms issue more debt before interest rates 
rise and issue more long-term debt when the market suggests the costs of long-term 
debt will be relatively higher compared to the short-term debt. It is necessary to 
examine both the debt maturity and the aggregate debt issue amounts. Baker et al. 
(2003) employed the annual aggregate long-term share of debt issues (the annual 
percentage of the long-term debt in the total debt issues) to measure the level of 
debt issues and isolate the maturity decision. One potential problem with this 
variable is that, as it measures the variation of market-wide aggregate long-term 
debt issues related to the total debt issues, it is potentially biased to measure the 
preference of issuers' maturity decisions by some particular large-size issues that 
may not represent the overall market-wide tendency of debt issues. Also, as they 
admit, this variable does not include details of maturity, and whether most changes 
happen between short and long maturities or intermediate and long maturities. In 
the present chapter the equal-weighted average maturity of all the debt issues 
for 
each month has been used to measure the maturity decisions. As each 
issue 
decision has an equal weight, it more accurately measures the preference 
for 
long-tenn debt and the details of maturity variations. In addition, the issue amounts 
were also examined to test the timing choices of the debt issues. 
The debt issue 
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amounts were cumulated for each month. As there may be similar shortcomings as 
regards the issue size effect, the monthly issue numbers were examined as a 
robustness check. In order to examine the contemporary relationship between the 
debt issues and market conditions the following regression was run. 
M, =a+ MME, + cInflation, + dRiskSpread, + eTermSpread, +f Re alRates, + gUSCI, + u, (3.1) 
The issue amounts and the average maturity of all issued debt were calculated for 
each month. These two variables were employed as the alternative dependent 
variables detached from the long-term share of debt issues. This specification 
included four variableS54 representing the debt market conditions: the actual 
inflation (Inflationt), the real short-term rate (Realratet), the term spread 
(TermSpreadt), and the risk spread (RiskSpreadt), following the framework of 
Baker et al. (2003). In addition, the time trend (Time, ) was controlled. The US 
Coincident Index (USC1055 was introduced as the indicator of the macro-economy 
to control for the business cycles during the sample period covering 37 years. 
Following Baker et al. (2003), the second specification was set up by using the 
excess bond returns (Return, ) accumulated in the following three years to explain 
the variations in the debt issues. This regression shows more directly that the 
maturity and amount of debt issues was sensitive to variations in capital costs. The 
time trend is still involved. 
MI =a+ MME, +h Return, + u, (3.2) 
Next, the causal link was investigated using the lagged market condition variables. 
The horizons were one or two years backward, and one, two or three years forward 
from the time of the debt issues. This specification identifies what information 
determined the firms' decisions regarding debt issues, i. e. the past or the expected 
future. 
M, =a+b TIME, + cInflatioti+, + dRiskSpreait+i +e TermSpreai, +, +f 
Re alRates, +, + gUSCI,, + u, 
( 3.3) 
54 See the definitions of variables in the subsequent sub-section 3.4.2. 
" See details of USCI in footnote 53. 
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where i=- 12, -24,12,24 and 36 months. When i is negative, representing the past 
debt market conditions, negative coefficients of the debt market variables would be 
expected if the firms were detecting that the current costs of debt were low and 
issuing more debt accordingly. When i is positive, representing the future expected 
market conditions, a positive relationship would be expected between the debt 
market variables and the debt issue variables, provided that the firms were 
accurately predicting the future market variations and adopting strategies to lower 
the costs. 
In contrast to the annual time series of aggregate market data from the Federal 
Reserve Flow of Funds in Baker et al (2003), firm-level corporate debt issue data 
from the Thompson Finance SDC new issue database was used in the present 
chapter, which is better able to measure firms' timing ability due to the equal 
weight of each debt issue. Since the debt issue data in the SDC56 starts from 1970, 
the sample covers the post-1970 period in contrast to the period 1953-2000 in 
Baker et al. (2003). The sample set contained 17,404 observations screened by the 
search criteria. Then, 444 monthly portfolios of corporate debt issues were 
constructed, as this is better able to reflect instantaneous variations in the debt 
market environment. The average monthly mean maturity was 16.2 years (with a 
standard deviation of 5.2 yearS)57, while the average monthly issue volume and 
issue number were 7,959 million dollars (with a standard deviation of 4,829.6 mil$) 
and 39 issues (witha standard deviation of 24.3). 
The actual inflation was the annual percentage change of the consumer price index 
in each monthly observation. The real short-term rate was estimated as the 90-day 
Treasury bill rates minus actual inflation. The term spread was the difference 
between the I 0-year constant maturity Treasury bond rates and the 90-day Treasury 
bill rates. The risk spread was estimated as the 10-year constant maturity 
Treasury 
56 In addition, the data collection may be potentially incomplete in the first 
few years, although this does not 
affect our results. These may be a potential limitation of the data. However, compared to 
the shortcomings of 
the aggregate market-level data as mentioned above, our sample has the unique strength of the 
issue details as 
regards maturity and amounts. 
57 In the interests of brevity, the details are not reported here. 
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bond rates minus the Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield. Excess bond 
returns were measured by an index of investment-grade corporate bonds over an 
index of Treasury bills, generated from Ibbotson Associates. The annualised 
three-year cumulative excess returns were calculated as the third root of the 
compounded monthly returns of the corporate bond index over the compounded 
monthly returns of Treasury bills during the assumed holding period of 36 months, 
minus one. 
3.4.2. Empirical results and implications 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the contemporary relationship between the debt 
issues and the market condition variables, following Baker et al. (2003). The 
average maturity was negatively related to inflation, the real short-term rate, risk 
spread and term spread. The pattern of the coefficients exactly corresponds to the 
pattern in Baker et al. (2003) despite the use of a different dataset. Baker et al. 
(2003) verified that the maturity of debt issues responds to the same variation in 
market conditions that governs the relative cost of long-term debt by using the 
expected excess returns predicted from these market condition variables. The 
consistent results were also found showing that even the realized excess returns 
have explanatory power regarding aggregate maturity variations. The monthly 
issue numbers and volumes with the control of the economic growth indicator were 
negatively correlated with the debt market conditions as expected. In line with 
Baker et al. (2003), the evidence seems to suggest that the market conditions 
explain a large fraction of the time series variation in maturity. 
Provided that managers can anticipate the future market conditions and change the 
timing and maturity of their debt issues accordingly, it would be expected that there 
would be increasing costs of capital suggested by the market conditions 
following 
debt issuances. On the other hand, if managers suspend their debt issuances on 
purpose and the market environment changes as they predict, the costs of 
debt 
issuance should be lower compared to the previous 
level. To examine the 
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rationality of the implication drawn from the above evidence, the lead-lag 
relationship between the debt issue variables and debt market conditions was tested. 
The horizons of two/three years backwards and forwards were examined. The 
results reported in Table 4 show that a negative relationship between the debt 
issues and market conditions uniformly existed for all the specifications. The 
negative coefficients of the market variables prior to the debt issues can be 
explained by the timing hypothesis, which suggests that the firms issued less (more) 
debt or short-term (long-term) debt when the pre-issue market conditions implied 
high (low) costs of debt issues. However, the pattern of relationship between the 
debt maturity/volume and subsequent debt market conditions was not consistent. 
The firms did not issue more long-term debt before an interest rate rise. No debt 
maturity was found and the variations in the issue volumes were positively related 
to the lagged market condition variables, which suggests that the firms failed to 
increase their debt issuances and extend debt maturity before the increasing costs, 
and therefore their attempts at timing the future debt market were at least 
unsuccessful. 
The consistently negative relationship between the debt issues and market 
conditions existed but cannot be explained by the successful market timing of the 
debt issuers. Lagged behind the market variations, the firms' decisions were 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis based on the historical information of 
pre-issue market conditions, but against the hypothesis when associated with ex 
post future market variations. Therefore, the significant relationship between the 
debt maturity and market condition factors is more likely to favour the "pseudo 
market timing" hypothesis suggested by Schultz (2003). This chapter avoids the 
debate concerning whether there is a genuine or pseudo relationship between debt 
maturity and debt market variables. Rather, in the subsequent sections the 
variations in debt maturity and issue volumes are directly examined following the 
above findings. 
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3.5. Forward-looking and backward-looking market timing 
As described in the preceding section, the implications of the timing hypothesis as 
regards the contemporary relationship between corporate debt issues and market 
condition variables cannot explain the lead-lag relationship. It has not been seen 
that debt maturity and issue volume are positively correlated with the future market 
condition variables. Therefore, debt issues do not increase before interest rate rises 
and debt maturity does not tend to be longer before the costs of long-term debt 
increase. Hence, the question is what managers consider regarding their debt 
maturity structure at the time they issue their debt. The survey of Graham and 
Harvey (2001) indicated that managers "attempt to time interest rates by issuing 
debt when they feel that market interest rates are particularly low" (p. 223). The 
"particularly low" interest rates can be understood as managers believing the 
interest rates are expected to increase in the future, which is a form of forward 
market timing, or that the current interest rates are relatively low compared to the 
historical level, referred to as backward market timing. As a matter of fact, some 
results in the survey study could be explained as forward-looking market timing, 
i. e. making debt issue decisions based on the prediction of future market conditions, 
while other results could be explained as backward-looking timing, i. e. responses 
to the current market fluctuation compared to past information. This is the key 
reason for the argument about firms' timing abilities for debt issuance. On the one 
hand, supportive evidence only arguably shows a significant correlation between 
debt issues and market variations. On the other hand, contradictory views 
emphasize the extent to which firms' financing policies depend on the prediction of 
future markets. This viewpoint has not hitherto been clarified or examined 
empirically. In this section, the efforts of managers to time the interest rates in the 
sense of forward and backward directions are examined. 
3.5.1. Debt issues and subsequent changes in interest rates 
One reason for timing future debt markets is that managers 
believe they possess 
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information not reflected in the market prices of debt. Successful forward-looking 
market timing means making accurate predictions of the future market conditions 
and appropriately implementing financing policies accordingly. If interest rate 
timing is successful, it would be expected that large levels of long-term debt 
issuances would be followed by an increase in interest rates, an increase in the 
spreads or negative excess bond returns. Instead of the conventional method of 
regression, the interest rate-related factors subsequent to the debt issues are 
examined directly. 
Firstly, the changes of interest rate during a given horizon after each month were 
measured. The changes of interest rate may be positive or negative. If managers 
can accurately predict the changes of future interest rates, they will choose to time 
their debt issues before a positive interest rate change. Conversely, less debt will be 
issued before a negative interest rate change. An example is now given to explain 
the empirical strategy. From the I" month to the 6'h month, the interest rate 
increases by 100 basis points, while it decreases by 100 basis points if measured 
from the 2 nd month to the 7 th month. The average interest rate changes in the 
subsequent 6 months for the I't month and the 2 nd month will be zero. If in each of 
the I st and 2 nd months there are one million dollars of debt issued, and the 6-month 
forward interest rate changes of each of these months is weighted by the issue 
volumes, the value-weighted interest rate changes in the two months will be 
exactly zero. However, assuming that firms issue more debt before interest rate 
increases and less debt before it decreases, for example, 2 million dollars of debt in 
the I't month and zero in the 2 nd month, the value-weighted interest rate changes in 
the two months will be equal to 200 basis points. Put this into the aggregate 
market-level debt issues and there would be an expectation of significantly larger 
average value-weighted interest rate changes than the unconditional average 
interest rate changes, provided that the firms have successfullY timed the market. 
Conversely, no significantly positive difference between the value-weighted 
average interest rate changes and the unconditional average interest rate changes 
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would be expected if the firms have failed to predict the variation in future interest 
rates. This is the strategy followed in the tests here. 
The debt issues sample was still sorted by calendar months. The average debt 
maturity and the issue volume were obtained for each month. Taking into 
consideration that in most cases managers make decisions regarding debt issues 
three to six months before the actual issue dates, the average future interest rate 
changes during the period starting from three months before the issue month and 
covering the given horizons which were tested at 6,12ý 18,24 and 36 months were 
calculated. 
We used the annual rates of the Moody's Seasoned Baa 58 corporate bond (Baa) 
and the 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond (GIO) as the proxies for the 
market interest rates. The average yields of the Baa and GIO were 9.62% (with a 
standard error of 2.52%) and 7.58% (with a standard error of 2.49%), respectively, 
during the period January 1970 - December 2006. The term spreads and risk 
spreads 59 were also examined to measure the possibility that the managers had the 
ability to time the slope of the yield curve. The average term spread between the 
G10 and the 90-day Treasury bill was 1.61% (with a standard error of 1.31%) 
during the period January 1970 - December 2006, while the average risk spread 
measured by the Baa yield and GIO was 2.04% (with a standard error of 0.56%) 
during the same period. 
Table 3.5 presents the results of the above analysis. Panel A shows the differences 
between the unconditional mean yield changes and the value-weighted mean yield 
changes based on the Baa, debt and the ten-year Treasury bond. The unconditional 
mean of the yield changes shows that the average variations over 
6,12,18,24 and 
36 months across the whole sample period were uniformly negative 
but not 
statistically significant. It would be expected that the value-weighted mean yield 
58 Aaa rate corporate bond yields were also examined as the alternative measure of 
interest rate. The results 
are qualitatively similar, but not reported here. 
The measures of spreads are the same as they defined 
in the preceding section. 
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changes would be significantly larger than the unconditional mean yield changes if 
the managers were succeeding in timing the market and implementing the correct 
strategy of debt issuance to lower the costs. The first set of results show the 
difference between the proceeds-weighted mean yield changes and the 
unconditional yield changes for the various horizons. For example, on average the 
proceeds-weighted mean of the Baa yield changes in six months was 3.2% less 
than the unconditional mean yield changes, which is statistically insignificantly 
different from zero. The results for the other horizons measured by the Baa yield 
exhibited a similar pattern (negative and insignificant) with the exception of the 36 
month horizon (significant but negative), while for the GIO yield there was no 
significant difference between the average yield changes and the 
proceeds-weighted yield changes for all the horizons from 6 months to 36 months. 
However, the negative differential mean yield changes of the Baa in 36 months 
suggest a failure of market timing. For all the tested horizons, the results suggest 
that there was not less debt issued before the subsequent interest rate decline. 
Rather, in some circumstances, more debt was issued before the interest rate 
declined, as the negative differential yield changes suggest that heavy weight (issue 
volume) was given to the months when the subsequent interest rate changes were 
negative. 
The second set of results in Panel A show the maturity-weighted differences in the 
subsequent interest rates. The same method was used to calculate the subsequent 
yield changes in each month and they were weighted by the average stated 
maturity of the debt issued. The differences between the maturity-weighted yield 
changes and the unconditional yield changes were recorded for the 
6,12,18,24 
and 36 month horizons. Very interestingly, the results clearly support the 
findings 
of Baker et al. (2003) that managers can time the debt maturity. 
The maturities 
tended to correctly anticipate the future changes in 
both the Baa and Treasury 
yields across all the horizons. The significance was more obvious 
for the horizons 
of longer than 6 months and was greatest for the 36 month 
horizon. However, it is 
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not yet known whether this result can be attributed to accumulative pseudo market 
timing as stated in Butler et al. (2006). The above investigations were extended by 
introducing other debt features in subsequent tests. 
If firms issue only a very little long-term debt or the average maturity is relatively 
short prior to an increased interest rate, this does not suggest an ability to time the 
market. Therefore, the present study examined both simultaneously. The third set 
of results shows the differential yield changes weighted by both issue amounts and 
maturity. It still indicates a significant timing ability when measured by the 
Treasury yield changes (GlO) for the long horizons. Very interestingly, however, 
the differential yield changes measured by the Baa yield, which is more indicative 
of the cost of corporate debt issuance than are government bonds, were greatly 
weakened and insignificant in the proceeds and maturity-weighted results. In other 
words, both the economic magnitude and statistical significance declined in 
contrast to the timing ability implied by the maturity-weighted results. 
In addition, the effective maturity was introduced, measured by the horizons 
between the debt issue dates and the earliest call or put dates, if applicable. The 
embedded call or put options in debt issues are used to hedge the unpredictable 
variability of the debt market. For example, firms can execute call options to pay 
the debt prior to the maturity date in the case where the market interest rate is too 
low compared to the bond yield. A put option embedded in a debt issue gives 
investors the right to require the issuer to refinance if the interest rate rises. 
Effective maturity is more indicative of the expected maturity which is coincident 
to the situation at the time when the debt is issued, because it is surprising that 
firms issue debt with a long maturity to hedge the risk of interest rate increases 
but 
pay the extra costs to withdraw the debt earlier. Although the extra costs 
in the case 
of option execution do not occur at the time of the issue ex ante, the term of 
the 
option in the debt issuance itself implies the concerns of the managers about 
the 
future interest rate volatility. For these reasons the effective maturity was examined 
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as the alternative measure of the stated maturity. 
The results of the differential yield changes weighted by effective maturity were 
also reported. It was found that the timing ability regarding debt maturity 
disappeared entirely. In contrast to the results of the maturity-weighted mean yield 
changes, the differences were economically small and statistically insignificant. 
There was no obvious tendency of firms issuing long-term debt measured by the 
effective maturity before the long-term rates increased. If effective maturity 
reflects the confidence in managers' decision regarding debt maturity at the time of 
the debt issue, the evidence does not support the notion that managers can 
successfully forward time interest rates. 
Panel B in Table 3.5 shows the results based on the analysis of the spread changes 
using the same method. As indicated in the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), 
firms tend to issue long-term debt when the market suggests a relatively low cost. 
It would therefore be expected that debt maturity would tend to be long if the 
future yield curve is expected to become steep. Compared to interest rates, term 
spread and risk spread should be more correlated to debt maturity. If managers can 
time the term spread, they should issue more long-term debt before the spread 
increases. The results in Table 3.5 show that there is no supportive evidence that 
firms issue more debt or that debt maturity is obviously longer before the spread 
rises, regardless of whether issue volume or maturity are taken into account. 
Therefore, firms do not successfully time the future interest rates or spreads. 
Rather than examining interest rates and spreads, Baker et al. (2003) indirectly 
examined debt market timing by using annual excess bond returns. Their results 
suggested that the long-term share of debt issues can be used to predict future bond 
returns, and a greater quantity of long-term debt predicts a low excess return. 
Therefore, the present section directly examined whether the managers could 
predict future bond returns by replicating the preceding method, with the 
assumption that firms issue more long-term debt if the expected excess 
bond 
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returns are negative. The average excess bond returns were measured in 1,2 and 3 
years and the cumulative excess returns in 3 years subsequent to the debt issues. 
The returns were calculated by the compounded monthly Baa corporate bond 
returns over the Treasury bill rates. The results are reported in Table 6. The 
unconditional average excess returns over the whole sample period were 
significantly positive. When weighted by debt issue amounts, the differential 
excess returns were uniformly positive for 1,2,3 year and for the cumulative 3 
years, which is inconsistent with the timing hypothesis. The maturity-weighted 
excess returns appear to be significantly negative, consistent with Baker et al. 's 
finding, while the significance was clearly eliminated when weighted by both 
amounts and maturity, and completely vanished when weighted by effective 
maturity. These results exhibit a similar pattern to those shown in Table 3.6. 
In summary, the results show that managers are not able to time the future debt 
market with interest rate levels, spreads and bond returns. Although it was found 
that debt maturity seems to have a prediction power as regards future markets, it is 
eliminated or completely vanishes once other debt features are introduced. This 
analysis did not solely focus on the relationship between maturity and market 
conditions. The comprehensive factors that managers . may be concerned with in 
practice were also considered, including issue volume and embedded options. 
Therefore, managers cannot successfully forward time the debt market. 
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Table 3.5 Interest Rate Changes Subsequent to Debt Issuance 
This table shows the average interest rate changes i months subsequent to debt issuances, where i=6,12.18, 24 and 36. The unconditional means are the average interest rate changes of i months after the issuance for 
each monthly observation across the whole sample period from January 1970 to March 2005. The differential 
yield changes are defined as the differences between the unconditional means and the conditional means which 
are weighted by proceeds, maturity, proceeds- rn aturi ty and effective maturity respectively. For the effective 
maturity, the sample period starts from January 1976 due to the data availability. The table also presents the 
t-values for the null hypothesis that the differential yield changes are zero. In Panel A, the Moody's Seasoned 
Baa Corporate bond yield (Baa) and the 10-year Treasury bond yield (GIO) are examined. Panel B examines 
the term spread (the difference between the 10-year Treasury bond rate and the 90-day Treasury bill rate) and 
the risk spread (the difference between the Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate bond yield and the 10-year 
Treasury bond rate) using the same processes. 
PanelA 
Baa GIO 
Unconditional Means 
6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 36 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 36 months 
-0.041 -0.084 -0.111 -0.143 -0.201 -0.048 -0.085 -0.101 -0.123 -0.181 
[-1.091] [-1.372] [-1.409] [-1.556] [-1.7451 [-1.031] [-1.236] [-1.2361 [-1.353] [-1.732] 
Differential Yield Chan ges 
Proceeds Weighted Means 
-0.032 -0,028 -0.029 -0.084 -0.144 -0.015 0.025 0.041 0.014 -0.013 
[-0.896] [-0.521] [-0.439] [-1.223] [-1.9531 [-0.304] [0.433] [0.565] [0.242] [-0.143] 
Maturity Weighted Means 
0.064 0.143 0.214 0.274 0.384 0.068 0.144 0.203 0.257 0.342 
[1.476] [2.080] [2.348] [2.535] [2.736] [1.465] [2.169] [2.421] [2.643] [2.829] 
Proceeds-Maturity Weighted 
0.012 0.056 0.101 0.080 0.096 0,032 0.113 0.180 0.187 0.222 
[0.269] [1.022] [1.455] [1.135] [1.241] [0.721] [1.877] [2.4031 [2.643] [2.982] 
Effective-Maturity Weighted 
0.026 0.070 0.096 0.126 0.140 0.039 0.075 0.070 0.077 0.028 
[0.522] [0.908] [0.945] [1.018] [0.8611 [0.671] [0.904] [0.678] [0.635] [0.164] 
Panel B 
Te rm Spread Risk Spread 
Unconditional Means 
6 months 12 months 18 months 24 months 36 months 6 months 12 months 18 months 
24 months 36 months 
0.007 -0.006 
[0.078] [-0.145] 
-0.033 
[-0.431] 
-0.059 
[-0.7171 
-0.049 
[-0.4861 
0.007 
[0.1931 
0.001 
[-0.0791 
-0.010 
[-0.332] 
-0.020 
[-0.591] 
-0.020 
[-0.4861 
Differential Yield Chan ges 
Proceeds Weighted Means 
0,025 0.068 0.036 -0.065 -0.213 -0.017 -0.053 -0.070 -0.098 -0.131 
[0.436] [0.922] [0.4081 [-0.806] [-1.9331 [-0.791] [-1.803] [-2.043] [-2.588] 
[-2.725] 
Maturity Weighted Means 
-0.006 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
0.011 0.017 0.042 
[-0.159] [-0.251] [-0.095] [-0.128] [-0.0231 [-0.241] [-0.167] [0.173] 
[0.2851 [0.842] 
Proceeds-Maturity Weighted 
0.021 0.072 0.046 -0.063 -0.258 -0.020 -0.057 -0.079 -0.108 
-0.126 
[0.334] [1.0161 [0.5401 [-0.8311 [-2.500] [-0.917] [-1.912] 
[-2.272] [-2.866] [-2,6721 
Effective-Maturity Weighted 
-0.019 -0.063 -0.068 -0.079 -0,036 -0.013 -0.005 
0.026 0.049 0.111 
[-0,273] f-0.760] [-0.697] [-0.737] [-0.2011 [-0.417] [-0.0851 
[0.687] [1.202] 
_ 
[2.199] 
129 
Table 3.6 Excess Bond Returns Subsequent to Debt Issuance 
This table shows the average excess bond returns in i years subsequent to debt issuances, where i=1,2 and 3. 
and the cumulative excess bond returns in the 3 years subsequent to the debt issuances. The unconditional 
means are the excess bond returns in i years after the issuance for each monthly observation across the whole 
sample period from January 1970 to March 2005. The differential yield changes are defined as the differences between the unconditional means and the conditional means which are weighted by proceeds, maturity, 
proceeds-maturity and effective maturity. For the effective maturity, the sample period starts from January 
1976 due to the data availability. The table also presents the t-values for the null hypothesis that the differential 
yield changes are zero. Both the returns of the corporate bond index and the government bond index are 
examined, The bond return data was obtained from the Ibbotson Associate 2006 Yearbook. 
Excess Corp. Bond Returns Excess Govt. Bond Returns 
I year 2 years 3 years Cum 31 year 2 years 3 years Cum 3 
Unconditional Means 
0.036 0.035 0.034 0.030 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.028 
[7.190] [9.3881 [11.0621 [9.9081 [6ý6091 [8.889] [10.599] [9.439] 
Differential Yield Changes 
Proceeds Weighted Means 
0., 003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0,004 0.005 
[0.6581 [1.117] [1.393] [1.629] [0.849] [1.5031 [1.608] [1.798] 
Maturity Weighted Means 
-0.012 -0.012 -0.010 -0.011 -0,013 -0.012 4011 -0.011 
[-2.301] [-2,833] [-2.9881 [-3.063] [-2.398] [-3.031] [-3.145] [-3.189] 
Proceeds-Maturity Weighted Means 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
[-1.2751 [-1.829] [-2.2711 [-2.063] [-0.915] [-1.5811 [-2.020] [-1.900] 
Effective-Maturity Weighted Means 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0,006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 
[-0.8291 [-0.999] [-1.152] [-1.390] [-0.9551 [-1.2021 [-1.417] [-1.6131 
3.5.2. Debt issues and relative levels of interest rates 
The notion that managers issue debt when the interest rates are particularly low can 
be explained as their choosing a time when the current interest rates are relatively 
lower than their recent historical levels. It is easy to understand that managers refer 
to the available information when making decisions regarding debt issues. On the 
one hand, managers may believe it is good timing to issue debt when the current 
interest rate is low. On the other hand, they may postpone debt issues 
if the current 
interest rate is not low but is expected to decline in the near future. In 
both cases, a 
low interest rate level will be seen at the time of the debt issue compared to 
the 
previous level. This is referred to as the backward market timing of 
interest rates, 
in contrast to forward market timing. 
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Backward market timing is associated with the relative levels of interest rates as 
compared to historical levels rather than absolute values of interest rates. It cannot 
be judged Whether a current rate of 8% is high or low. Compared to experiencing a 
rate of around 12% in previous years, the investor sentiment will be different from 
having the previous rate of being 5%. Therefore, the relative interest rate level is 
the focus here. Both the annual yields of the Moody's Seasoned Baa corporate 
bond (Baa) and the ten-year constant maturity Treasury bond (G 10) for each month 
60 were used as the benchmark interest rates . The measure of the relative interest 
rates was constructed by calculating the percentile ranking of the interest rates at 
the time of the debt issues in the previous ten years 61. The percentile ranking was 
sorted by deciles. For example, the rates that ranked at the low end of the historical 
rate range to the I oth percentile belong to the decile 0. Decile 10 includes the 
current rates which are located between the loth percentile and 20th percentile of 
the historical interest rate range, and so forth. The issue volume and issue number 
were calculated for each monthly observation. The mean and median of the debt 
maturity, and the percentages of callable and puttable debt over the total issues in 
each month were also measured. All monthly observations were sorted by the 
decile rankings of the relative interest rates. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of the above processes. The first thing to notice is that 
most of the debt issues took place at the time when the relative interest rates 
belonged to the decile 0, i. e. the lowest ranking of the historical levels. Both the 
issue volumes and numbers tended to decline as the interest rate percentile 
rankings increased, although the issue values did not monotonically decrease. This 
tendency is particularly apparent when measured by the G 10. It can be clearly seen 
that the debt issue values in the months with low decile rates (lower than decile 30) 
were twice the value in the months with high decile rates (higher than decile 
70). 
60 Meanwhile, the Aaa rate corporate bond rates and the 90-day Treasury bill rates were also examined 
but not 
reported here. 
61 We chose 10 years as the measuring horizon in the common sense. In general, 
investors are more influenced 
by recent information than that from a long time ago. We also employed the comparing 
horizon of 5 years prior 
to the debt issues. The results are qualitatively similar, but not reported here. 
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This ratio is 2.5 for the numbers of issues. These results are consistent with the 
backward market timing hypothesis that more debt is issued when interest rates are 
relatively low compared to the historical level. 
The variations in maturity and effective maturity were examined with the relative 
interest rates. Very interestingly, both the mean and median of the maturities in the 
months with relative rates from the decile 0 to 50 were stable (about 13 years for 
the mean and 10 years for the median), while the maturities in the months with 
higher rates from the decile 60 to 90 sharply lengthened (about 20 years for both 
the mean and median). The expectation would be for firms to use call options to 
hedge the risk exposure of expected interest rate decreases when the current 
interest rates are relatively high, especially for debt with very long maturity. The 
investigations of the effective maturity certify this assumption. In contrast to the 
stated maturity, the variation in the effective maturity was flat across the different 
deciles, although it was still about 2 years higher for the high rate deciles than for 
the low rate deciles. While no apparent changes were found in the percentage of 
call and put option usage across the various rate deciles, they did smooth the sharp 
variation in the debt maturity. Hence, the effective maturity reflects the worries of 
managers regarding the uncertainty of the future debt market, especially when the 
relative interest rates are high. 
Some may argue that debt issue values and maturities are highly correlated to the 
economic growth underlying the interest rate itself. In fact, this can explain the 
reason why debt maturity tends to be long when the relative rates are high, because 
a relatively high interest rate is normally associated with a tight fiscal policy 
against the too fast growth of economy and potential crisis of high inflation. Firms 
then have more investment opportunities and an expectation of the growth being 
continuous and so raise long-term debt accordingly. Therefore, the US coincident 
index (USCI) was introduced as the economic indicators and the proxy 
for business 
cycles to re-examine the backward timing. In addition, the situation 
in the stock 
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market affects the flows of capital and in turn the corporate debt issues. Therefore, 
the effect of the stock market was also controlled by using the market-to-book 
value (MTBV) ratio of the S&P 500 index. 
The high, middle-high, middle-low and low economic growth periods were 
categorized by the quartiles of the USCI and the S&P 500 index MTBV ratio 
during the sample period. For each sub-period, the relative interest rates (Baa and 
GIO) were also sorted by quartiles. The Ist quartile included the months with the 
current rates located at the low end of the historical rate range of the 25 th percentile. 
The 2 nd quartile included the months with the current rates ranked between the 25 th 
and 5 Oth percentile of the historical interest rate range, and so forth. The debt issues 
across different relative rate quartiles and different levels of economic growth were 
then examined. 
The results shown in Table 3.8 exhibit similar patterns of debt issues to those in 
Table 3.7. For all the states of economic growth controlled by the levels of the 
USCI, the debt issue values declined as the relative rate quartile increased, as 
measured by both the Baa and G10. For example, when the USCI suggested high 
economic growth, the average monthly debt issue values were 10,535 million 
dollars during the months with a relative Baa rate ranked below the 25 th percentile 
of the historical rate levels, which is two and a half times of the values during the 
months with a high relative Baa rate ranking (4,290 million$ for the 4" quartile). 
The results controlled using the S&P 500 index MTBV ratio showed a similar 
pattern. Due to the correlation between the stock market and the debt market, no 
low relative rate occurred when the MTBV ratios were high. In general, the 
average monthly debt issue values tended to be high when the relative rate ranks 
were low and the economic growth indicators were high, despite the attractive 
environment of the equity market. 
In summary, it was found that there was an apparent tendency for corporate debt 
issues to be determined by the relative interest rate when compared to the historical 
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levels. There were significant differences in issue numbers and volumes across the 
various relative interest rate levels. More debt was issued at the time when the 
current interest rate was relatively low. This pattern is robust for the benchmark 
measures of the Baa and GIO rates even after controlling for the effects of 
economic growth and stock market condition factors. These results support the 
hypothesis of backward market timing, suggesting that firm managers base their 
debt issue decisions, to a large extent, on their responses to past market 
information. 
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Table 3.7 Debt Issuances and the Historical Levels of Interest Rates 
This table presents the corporate debt issues with different interest rate levels compared to the historical levels. 
The decile 0 includes rates from the lowest rates to rates just below the I Oth percentile in the 10 years prior to 
the issue, The decile 10 refers to rates from the I Oth percentile to just below the 20th percentile. and so on. We 
cumulated the debt issues during the months belonging to different historical yield deciles. Moody's Seasoned 
Baa Corporate bond yield and the 10-year Treasury bond yield were employed as the proxies for the interest 
rates. We presented the trends of the average issue amounts, average maturity, effective maturity and 
callable/puttable fractions across the different deciles. The statistics regarding the effective maturity only 
cover the period starting from January 1976 subject to the SDC data availability. An investigation of the 
historical yield deciles based on the 5 years prior to the debt issues was also conducted. The results are 
qualitatively similar but not reported here. 
Histori 
Cal 
Yield 
Decile 
Amount 
Issues Per 
Month 
Number 
ofIssues 
Per 
Month 
Stated 
Maturity 
(Mean) 
Stated 
Maturity 
(Median) 
Effective 
maturity 
(Mean) 
Effective 
maturity 
(Median) 
Fraction 
Callable 
Fraction 
Puttable 
Baa 
0 11,248 58 13.91 10.43 11.03 8.60 0.22 0.03 
10 8,935 44 13.53 10.39 10.89 8.06 0.23 0.03 
20 8,643 44 13.13 10.08 9.33 6.64 0.31 0.04 
30 10,049 44 12.91 9.55 8.89 6.58 0.34 0.05 
40 9,493 45 11.79 8.91 8.90 6.43 0.25 0.03 
50 7,708 36 12.10 9.42 9.04 6.48 0.25 0.05 
60 4,659 24 20.41 20.73 11.41 8.96 0.27 0.02 
70 3,870 22 20.78 20.14 12.59 10.42 0.27 0.02 
80 5,054 23 22.36 23.80 14.01 11.38 0.22 0.02 
90 6,817 31 19.55 19.26 12.61 9.81 0.15 0.01 
100 4,968 22 18.12 16.78 13.64 11.29 0.16 0.02 
GIO 
0 12,899 66 13.01 9.81 9.97 7.70 0.24 0.03 
10 9,227 45 13.63 10.44 10.41 7.97 0.24 0.03 
20 8,107 41 13.26 10.24 10.17 7.40 0.27 0.04 
30 8,046 35 12.60 8.76 9.65 6.40 0.27 0.04 
40 7,480 34 12.24 9.26 9.66 7.61 0.26 0.04 
50 6,824 28 14.07 11.16 10.54 7.49 0.26 0.01 
60 5,316 27 19.77 18.49 12.41 9.40 0.40 0.03 
70 4,438 24 20.71 20.32 12.00 9.72 0.24 0.03 
80 5,562 24 21.72 23.02 12.13 10.26 0.14 0.02 
90 5,709 27 19.64 18.97 13.01 10.65 0.20 
0.01 
100 3,841 19 20.46 20ý 15 15.04 12.13 0.26 
0.02 
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3.5.3. Summary 
In the section 3.4, it has been noted that contradictory patterns of debt issues 
emerge when they are examined with the past and the future debt market condition 
variables respectively, which fails to explain the hypothesis of successful market 
timing. Therefore it was necessary to test the different forms of market timing. An 
examination was made of whether managers base their decisions regarding debt 
issues and maturity structures on the successful anticipation of future variations in 
interest rates, or on their responses to current market conditions relative to recent 
historical levels, referred to as forward market timing and backward market timing 
respectively. 
When examining whether managers accurately predict the future debt market 
variations and adopt corresponding financing strategies for their debt issue 
decisions, it was found that managers were not successful in this form of forward 
timing. An examination was made of the differences between the interest rate 
changes and the conditional interest rate changes weighted by monthly issue 
volume, maturity and effective maturity respectively, and it was expected that it 
would be seen that more debt and/or long-term debt was issued before the interest 
rate rises. The evidence shows that there was no more debt issued prior to positive 
changes in the interest rate, when the interest rate changes were weighted by the 
aggregate monthly issue volumes. Although there was some evidence to show that 
the timing ability regarding debt issues was solely conditional on maturity, this 
was eliminated when both the issue values and maturities were involved 
simultaneously. Moreover, the supportive evidence completely disappeared when 
measured by the effective maturity as the call and put features were considered. 
These results concerning forward market timing are consistent with the findings 
in 
the preceding section, that is, managers are not successfully timing future 
interest 
rate variations. However, strong evidence was found that the debt 
issue amounts 
were negatively related to the relative interest rates compared to their 
historical 
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levels. The debt issue volume increased as the ranking of the current interest rates 
declined in contrast to the past. This evidence suggests that the managers of the 
debt issues were relying heavily on the historical information when making their 
debt issue decisions. This pattern was robust even when the macroeconomic 
factors were taken into account. 
In summary, the evidence shows that managers are indeed trying to time the debt 
market when issuing their debt, although they generally fail to show any ability to 
time the market in the forward sense. Their efforts on market timing are explained 
more convincingly as reactions to the current market variation. 
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3.6. Maturity structure adjustment and future bond returns 
in the previous section, it was seen that firms are generally not successful in 
timing the future debt market variability. Instead, their debt issue decisions are 
simply reactions to the current market variation as it relates to previous conditions. 
This analysis of managerial market timing is focused on long-term corporate debt 
issues generated from the SDC bond issue database. The market conditions 
affected not only decisions regarding long-term debt maturity and issue volumes, 
but also those regarding debt maturity structure, i. e. long or short-term. Baker et al. 
(2003) examined the variation in the long-term share of total debt issues at the 
aggregate market level, but the evidence did not reflect managers' timing ability at 
the firm level. It is of the best interest to examine whether the individual firm 
changes its debt maturity structure according to the exogenous market conditions. 
It would be expected that firms change the maturity of their newly issued debt to 
adjust their overall debt maturity structure, i. e. the percentages of long and 
short-term debt will change, according to changes in capital costs, if the debt 
market timing hypothesis holds. Therefore, in this section the changes in firms' 
debt maturity structures under certain market conditions are explored. 
3.6.1. Market timing onfuture bond returns 
The notion that firms time the debt market in order to lower the cbsts of capital 
implies there is an incentive to issue long-term debt when such debt is expected to 
underperform short-term debt, i. e. low excess bond returns, and vice versa. Baker 
et al. (2003) indicated that the proportion of long-term debt in the total debt issues 
predicts excess bond returns. If this conclusion holds, a shift would be expected 
between the long and short-term debt at the aggregate market level. Provided that 
the majority of firms successfully predict high excess bond returns, the 
level of 
long-term debt issues would be expected to decline, while the level of short-term 
debt issues will rise. Conversely, the long-term debt proportion should 
increase 
when followed by low excess bond returns. However, since the aggregate 
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market-level issue volume may be determined by some large-size issues, this 
analysis was conducted at the firm level by giving equal weight to each firm and 
treating each issue as an individual decision. The proportion of firms with a debt 
structure of increased long-term debt was employed as the proxy for the long-term 
share of the total debt issues. To examine whether the timing ability of firms was 
as assumed above, an investigation was made into the variations in firm numbers 
with a net increase in long-term debt, referred to as net long-term debt issuers, for 
each year. 
If a firm issued more long-term debt than short-term debt, i. e. the percentage of 
long-term debt in the total debt increases, it was defined as a net long-term debt 
issuer, otherwise they were short-term debt issuers. According to the definitions of 
the data items in Compustat and taking into consideration issues of refinancing, 
the net long-term issues were defined as the changes of long-term debt plus the 
debt due in one year, while the net short-term issues were defined as notes payable. 
The annual portfolios of the net long-term debt issuers and net short-term debt 
issuers were then constructed, based on all the firms available in Compustat for the 
period 1970 - 2005. The average number of firms available in Compustat was 
7,230 with a maximum of 10,165 in 1998 and a minimum of-33,762 in 1971. Since 
the total number of available firms varied over time, the focus was on the 
percentages of net issuers rather than the numbers. 
The costs of the debt issues were measured by the relative levels of excess bond 
returns. The sample period was then divided into two sub-periods of 17 years with 
below median excess bond returns and 17 years with above median excess 
bond 
returns. The average annual excess returns of these two sub-periods were positive 
12.18% and negative 5.4 1% respectively. A difference of more 
than 17% between 
the two groups is by any means economically 
large and statistically significant. If 
f1rMs accurately predict low future excess returns, the percentage 
of net long-term 
issuers should be seen to increase. 
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Table 3.9 shows the results of the above analysis. The average numbers of all the 
firms with debt issue data available in Compustat was 6,722 and 7,881 for the 
years with low bond returns and high returns in the subsequent year respectively. 
The average numbers of net long-term debt issuers with these two portfolios were 
3,028 and 3,521 respectively. Although the average of net long-term issuers during 
the whole sample period was 44.6%, lower than the average of net short-ten-n debt 
issuers, this percentage remained stable during both the two one-year-ahead 
portfolios of low excess return years and high excess return years. On average, 
44.7% of the firms were net long-term issuers one year ahead of the low excess 
return years and 44.4% for the years with high excess returns the following year 
(with a P-value of the difference between the two portfolios of 0.792, which is 
statistically insignificant). No obvious shift was found between the portfolios of 
the net long-term issuers and the net short-term issuers across the years with 
significantly different bond returns. Therefore, on average, the firms showed no 
ability to time the future debt returns on their debt maturity structure. 
It is important to know whether certain firms, such as large ones, with specific 
features exhibit a better ability as regards predicting future market conditions than 
others. Some studies, for example that of Graham and Harvey (2001), have 
indicated that managers of larger firms who are expected to be more 
"sophisticated" are more likely to time their debt issues 62 . Therefore,, a comparison 
was made of the timing ability of larger and smaller firms. Larger and smaller firm 
portfolios were constructed by classifying all the available firms into only those 
whose market value of equity was above or below the median for each year. 
Meanwhile, the book-to-market value ratios which were employed as the measure 
of growth were also examined. The portfolios of the high and low book-to-market 
ratio firms *were constructed by classifying all the firms into groups with a 
book-to-market ratio either above or below the median for each year. 
We then 
62 Guedes and Opler (1996) documented that firms with different sizes 
have different preferences regarding 
their debt maturity. This feature may also affect the debt maturity structure adjustment 
as the costs of the debt 
issuance change. 
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counted the numbers of net long-term debt issuers for each portfolio in the years 
with subsequent high and low returns. The statistics and comparisons of the firm 
numbers and percentages based on the above analysis are shown in Table 3.9. First 
of all, it was found that the average proportion of larger firms among all the net 
long-term issuers was slightly higher than that of smaller firms for each year of the 
sample period (52.4% vs. 47.6% for the low return years and 52.3% vs. 47.7% for 
the high return years). This only suggests that the larger firms issue more 
long-term debt than the smaller firms do. However, no apparent differences were 
found between the high and low return years for either the larger firm portfolio or 
the smaller firm portfolio. The average percentages of each portfolio were almost 
the same. The P-value of the two-tailed mean comparison tests with unequal 
variances suggested an insignificant difference (0.663 for both tests). Essentially, 
there was no shift of net long-term issuers from high return years to low return 
years for either larger firms or smaller firms. Therefore, the larger firms did not 
exhibit a greater ability to time the debt returns than the smaller firms did. The 
results of analysing the book-to-market ratio feature show a similar pattern with 
firm sizes. On average, 50.3% of the high book-to-market ratio firms issued 
long-term debt when the returns were low in the subsequent year, and this 
percentage was 50% when the returns were high in the subsequent year (p-value 
0.711). Not only were firms equally distributed between the net long-term issuer 
portfolio and the net short-term issuer portfolio across the years that had different 
levels of returns in the subsequent period, but they also showed no difference of 
percentage between the high and low book-to-market ratio portfolios. Therefore, 
there were always about a half of the total firms who made debt 
issue decisions 
consistent with the market timing hypothesis no matter what the 
future levels of 
bond returns. Besides, there was no relationship between a 
firm's ability to time 
future bond returns and the firm size or book-to-market ratio. 
In conclusion, it was 
not found that the firms were systematically successful in reducing their capital 
costs by timing the future debt markets. 
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Table 3.9 Distribution of Long-term Debt Issuers Corresponding to Subsequent Bond 
Returns 
This table shows the average numbers and proportions of net long-term debt issuers during years \N ith 
different levels of bond returns. The sample covers all firms available in Compustat during the period 1970 - 2005. The sample period was divided into two groups by the median of excess corporate bond returns, referred 
to as high excess return years and low excess return years. The annual excess corporate bond returns were 
measured as the compounded monthly return on the long-term corporate bond index over 12 months divided 
by the compounded monthly return on the T-bill over 12 months, minus one. The returns of corporate bond 
index are generated from Ibbotson Associates 2006 Yearbook. The corporate bond index is constructed with 
data from The Wall Street, as described in the Yearbook. 
The net long-term issuers were defined as firms issuing more long-term debt than short-term debt, excluding 
the part for refinancing. In turn, high market value long-term issuers are net long-term issuers with the market 
value larger than the median market value for each year. High book-to-market value ratio long-term issuers are 
net long-term issuers with the book-to-market value ratio higher than the median ratio for each year. The 
annual numbers of net long-term issuers were sorted by years into two portfolios with low returns in the 
subsequent year and high returns in the subsequent year. The table compares the average numbers and 
percentages for each of the two portfolios. The P-values report the differences of the two groups based on 
two-tailed mean-comparison tests with unequal variances. 
High excess returns Low excess returns p-value 
Years 17 17 
Excess bond returns (%) 12.18 -5.41 0.000 
Average annual firm number 6722 7881 
Net Long-term Issuers 3028 3521 
Percentage 44.7% 44.4% 0.792 
High MV Issuers 1592 1846 
Percentage 52.4% 52.3% 0.663 
Low MV Issuers 1436 1674 
Percentage 47.6% 47.7% 0.663 
High BTMV Issuers 1532 1776 
Percentage 50.3% 50.0% 0,711 
Low BTMV Issuers 1496 1745 
Percentage 49.7% 50.0% 
0.. 
- 
711 
3.6 2. Persistence of timing ability on future bond returns 
Continuing the above analysis, an examination was made of whether 
firms whose 
debt issues were correctly consistent with the market timing 
hypothesis were 
persistently successful in timing future bond returns. 
Still based on all the firms 
available in Compustat, portfolios were constructed by classifying 
firms with debt 
maturity structure adjustments corresponding to subsequent 
bond returns. 
143 
Assuming that firms are trying to time future bond markets and change their debt 
maturity structures accordingly, the firms with net long-term (or short-term) debt 
issues before the year with low (or high) excess bond returns were regarded as 
correct decision makers, otherwise they were considered as incorrect. There 
remained the question as to whether the firms in the portfolios of correct issuers 
did indeed have a superior timing ability as regards debt returns compared to the 
firms in the portfolios of incorrect issuers, or were they simply guessing correctly 
about return variations. Therefore, the performance of each portfolio defined as 
correct issuers and incorrect issuers were examined, in turn, for the subsequent 
year. 
Table 3.10 shows the statistics for the above classifications. Column (a) denotes 
the percentage of firms whose debt issues were correctly coincident to the future 
bond returns, while column (b) shows the percentage of firms belonging to the 
portfolios of incorrect issuers for each year. In general, the percentage of each 
portfolio in the total sample was around 50% across the years. On average, the 
percentages of correct issuers and incorrect issuers over the sample period of 34 
years were 50.2% and 49.8% respectively (with a P-value of 0.822). Columns (c) 
and (d) show the percentages of correct and incorrect decision makers in the 
subsequent year conditional on column (a), i. e. the correct issuers one year ahead. 
Columns (e) and (f) show the percentages of correct and incorrect decision makers 
in the subsequent year conditional on column (b), i. e. the incorrect issuers one year 
ahead. It was found that only about half of the correct issuers continued to be 
correct in their debt maturity structure choices in the subsequent year, while the 
rest were not correct. Similarly, about half of the incorrect issuers chose the correct 
debt maturity structure adjustment in the subsequent year. The P-values of the 
two-tailed mean-comparison tests with unequal variances (0.601 and 0.517) 
suggested insignificant differences between the pairs of portfolios in each test. 
Baker et al. (2003) claim that managers can time the future bond returns 
by 
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adjusting debt maturity structure of firms because the long-term share of debt 
issuance variations at the market aggregate level predict the future bond returns. 
The hypothesis can be explained as, if firms time the debt market to reduce the 
costs of capital, they tend to issue long-term (short-term) debt when the excess 
bond returns suggest that long-term debt will underperform (outperform) 
short-term debt. Based on the assumption that firms change their debt maturity 
structure according to their prediction of future excess bond returns, no supportive 
evidence was found in this section that the firms were successfully timing the debt 
market by adjusting their debt maturity structure. Weighted every debt issue 
equally, the results suggests that there is no convincing linkage between the 
variation of debt maturity and managers' ability on timing the debt market. The 
results are inconsistent with the conclusion in Baker et al (2003). Over the sample 
period of 34 years, there was no obvious shift between the net issuers of long-term 
debt and short-term debt across years with different levels of bond returns. 
Moreover, the proportions of correct issuers and incorrect issuers were equally 
distributed for all years on average. Furthermore, even the correct issuers did not 
exhibit a persistent ability to anticipate future bond returns. Only half of them 
continued to be correct when adjusting their debt maturity structure, as with the 
incorrect issuers. For individual firm or manager, decisions on debt maturity 
adjustment to reduce the capital costs corresponding to the future bond returns are 
actually fair gamble. Therefore, the firms were not systematically successful in 
timing the debt market. 
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Table 3.10 Persistence of Timing Ability on Future Bond Returns 
This table shows the persistence of timing ability on future bond returns based on all the firms available in 
Compustat during the period 1971 - 2004*. Assuming that firms are trying to time the future bond market on 
debt maturity, firms with net long-term (short-term) debt issues before the year with low, i. e. below median 
(high, i. e. above median) excess bond returns were regarded as correct decision makers, otherwise they are 
regarded as incorrect. Column (a) denotes the percentage of firms whose debt issues were correctly coincident 
to the future bond returns, while column (b) shows the percentage of the rest. Columns (c) and (d) show the 
percentages of correct decision makers and incorrect decision makers in the subsequent year conditional on 
column (a), i. e. the correct issuers one year ahead. Columns (e) and (f) show the percentages of correct 
decision makers and incorrect decision makers in the subsequent year conditional on column (b), i. e. the 
incorrect issuers one year ahead. The P-values report the differences of each pair based on the two-tailed 
mean-comparison tests with unequal variances. 
Correct in this 
year 
(a) 
Incorrect in 
this year 
(b) 
Correct in next 
year 
(C) 
Incorrect in 
next year 
(d) 
Correct in next Incorrect in next 
year year 
(e) (0 
1971 43.5% 56.5% 53.8% 46.2% 58.7% 41.3% 
1972 42.9% 57.1% 57.4% 42.6% 56.9% 411% 
1973 46.1% 53.9% 46.6% 53.4% 45.6% 54.4% 
1974 51.2% 48.8% 47.4% 52.6% 50.3% 49.7% 
1975 59.0% 41.0% 62.4% 37.6% 54.1% 45.9% 
1976 40.3% 59.7% 59.2% 40.8% 60A% 39.9% 
1977 44.5% 55.5% 60.4% 39.6% 51.6% 48.4% 
1978 45.6% 54.4% 57.2% 42.8% 52.0% 48.0% 
1979 42,7% 57.3% 55.7% 44.3% 58.4% 41.6% 
1980 42.8% 57.2% 47.0% 53.0% 39.6% 60.4% 
1981 58.6% 41.4% 60.4% 39.6% 56.0% 44.0% 
1982 44.8% 55.2% 49.8% 50.2% 40,7% 59.3% 
1983 57.8% 42.2% 38.6% 61.4% 47.2% 52.8% 
1984 56.8% 43.2% 39.3% 60.7% 48.3% 51.7% 
1985 56.3% 43.7% 59: 4% 40.6% 52.3% 
47.7% 
1986 43.3% 56.7% 49.9% 50.1% 61.8% 
38.2% 
1987 41.3% 58.7% 48.5% 51.5% 36.3% 
63.7% 
1988 58.2% 41.8% 63.4% 36.6% 51.0% 
49.0% 
1989 40.9% 59.1% 49.6% 50.4% 34.9% 
65.1% 
1990 58.9% 41.1% 34.8% 65.2% 50.2% 
49.8% 
1991 59.6% 40.4% 33.8% 66.2% 50,2% 
49.8% 
1992 57.3% 42.7% 62.0% 38.0% 
51.0% 49.0% 
1993 45.7% 54.3% 45.5% 54.5% 
45.8% 54.2% 
1994 52.6% 47.4% 48.9% 51.1% 
56.8% 43.2% 
1995 49.4% 50.6% 44.1% 55.9% 
54,7% 45.3% 
1996 52.7% 47.3% 51.7% 48.3% 
42.5% 57.5% 
1997 51.6% 48.4% 44.6% 55.4% 
59A% 40.9% 
1998 51.1% 48.9% 43.1% 56.9% 
59.4% 40.6% 
1999 50.3% 49.7% 52.2% 47.8% 
47.2% 52.8% 
2000 55.6% 44.4% 40.7% 59.3% 
49.1% 50.9% 
2001 56.3% 43.7% 58.5% 41.5% 
53.4% 46.6% 
2002 44.8% 55.2% 44.1% 55.9% 
45.4% 54.6% 
2003 3% 53 46.7% 57.0% 43.0% 
49.1% %9% 
2004 
. 
50.3% 49.7% 50.7% 49.3% 
48.6% 51.4% 
Average 50.2% 49.8% 50.5% 
49.5% 50.5% 49.5% 
p-value 0.822 
0.601 0517 
a-f 
the sample periou k17/0 and 
ITue to the analysis of one-year forw Td 
based on Table 3.9, the each end o 
2005) is cut off. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
Baker et al. (2003) found that, at the market aggregate level, the long-terrn 
proportion of corporate debt issues is determined by debt market conditions and 
can predict future excess bond returns. The evidence that corporate debt maturity is 
associated with debt market conditions extends the stylised facts about corporate 
finance 63 . This chapter has examined whether managers can successfully time the 
debt market or whether they are only trying to time the market. The question arises 
from the debate about whether the empirical evidence 64 that corporate debt issues 
are correlated to the debt market condition factors reveals the underlying market 
timing behaviour. The existence of a causal link between them was examined by 
distinguishing the predictions of the future market and the responses to past 
information. It was found that, in the sense of timing future market fluctuations, the 
firms were generally unsuccessful, while their debt issue decisions heavily 
depended on past information. 
Firstly the out-of-sample tests based on the methodology of Baker et al. (2003) 
were conducted by directly examining the relationship between the debt maturities 
and the market variables with the lagged variable in both the forward and 
backward direction, but it was found that this evidence only captured the 
contemporary co-variations between the debt issuances and the debt market 
conditions at the time of the issuance rather than revealing a causal link between 
these two aspects. The debt maturities and issue volumes were uniformly 
negatively related to the debt issue costs implied by both the previous and 
subsequent market conditions and this pattern suggests that the market conditions 
became desirable for the purpose of corporate debt issuance before the firms 
adjusted their financing strategies, while the firms' decisions regarding their debt 
issues were not consistent with the desirable subsequent market environment. Put 
differently, firms can only raise debt funds after the capital costs decline but they 
failed to issue their debt before the costs went up. The results appear to be 
attributable to the managers' reactions to the current variations in the debt market 
63 Many previous empirical studies (see section 2.2), for example, Brick and Ravid (1985), Barclay and 
Smith 
(1995), and Stohs and Mauer (1996), found a relationship between debt issues and market variables, which 
suggests there are managerial market timing behaviours. 64 The recent hot debate in the literature is between "genuine market timing", such as argued 
b, N Baker et a]. 
(2000,2002,2003,2006) and "pseudo market timing", such as argued by Schultz (2003), Butler et al. 
(2005, 
2006) and about the relationship between corporate debt issuance and debt market variations. 
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conditions rather than to accurate, predictions of future market movements. This 
evidence is consistent with "pseudo market timing" as suggested by Butler et al 
(2006). Thus, the co-variations between the time series of the debt issues and the 
market variables existed in the ex post tests but were not predictable ex ante, while 
the managers were not systematically successful in timing the debt market when 
making decisions regarding their debt issues. 
Furthermore, the debt issuances were examined with respect to the previous 
interest rate variations and future rate fluctuations separately which reflect the 
responses to past information and predictions of the future market, referred to as 
backward timing and forward timing respectively. On the one hand, an 
investigation was made into whether the interest rates or spreads tended to rise 
after the firms had issued their debt. On the other hand, an examination was made 
of whether the debt issuances were affected by the current level of interest rates at 
the time of issuance relative to the historical rates. The results revealed that the 
firms did not appear to issue more debt prior to the increasing interest rates nor did 
they issue more long maturity debt prior to the increased cost of long-term debt 
implied by the market conditions. However, it was found that the levels of 
aggregate debt issues pronouncedly increased with the decline of the relative 
interest rates compared to their recent historical levels. Therefore, the overall 
results of this study are consistent with the findings of the survey undertaken by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) that corporate managers tend to issue debt when 
interest rates are particularly low when compared to previous levels. However, the 
results do not support the assumption that managers accurately predict future 
interest rate changes and issue their debt accordingly, with the motivation of 
forward timing the market. These results question the underlying meaning of 
market timing, as previous studies have failed to clarify the definition. If "tirning" 
means that managers make use of available information to accurately predict 
future 
market movements and adopt correct financing policies accordingly, referred to as 
4ý successful market timing", the results do not support this notion. 
However, if 
"timing" implies that managers try to make choices regarding their debt 
issues in 
order to reduce the costs based on their responses to market variations, the 
findings 
are supportive. 
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Baker et al. (2003) found that, at the market aggregate level, the increased 
percentage of long-term debt over total debt issues predicts low future bond returns. 
However, this does not suggest that firms are successfully timing the debt market. 
The present chapter examined the firm-level debt maturity structure choices across 
different levels of capital costs measured by bond market returns. The difference 
here is that the debt maturity structure of each firm weighted equally was measured, 
rather than the aggregate debt volumes, to more reasonably examine the firms' 
decisions regarding debt maturity. However, it was found that the percentage of 
firms changing their debt structure by issuing long-term or short-term debt were 
very stable no matter with the levels of bond returns afterwards. Moreover, the 
proportion of firms that seemed to successfully predict the future market variations 
were not higher than the proportion of the rest. This pattern was robust even when 
all the firms were classified by firm size or book-to-market ratios. Furthermore, the 
firms that made correct choices regarding their debt maturity structure adjustment 
did not persistently exhibit a higher timing ability in the following period than the 
rest of the firms over the whole market. All in all, it was not found that the 
corporate managers possessed informational advantages or superior abilities as 
regards timing the debt market over the rest of the market participants. They had 
only a half chance to correctly bet the future debt market movements as suggested 
by the efficient market hypothesis. 
Market timing refers to managers' actions in capitalizing on temporary mispricing. 
More specifically, it is the issuing of overvalued securities and repurchasing of 
undervalued securities. Despite the usual challenges, financial economists as well 
as practitioners have never given up exploring mispricing using various techniques. 
The growing field of behavioural corporate finance suggests an increasing 
popularity in the stylised behaviour involved in managerial decisions. 
The 
theoretical framework of behavioural corporate finance separates the literature 
into 
two approaches: irrational investors (the inefficient market) or irrational managers. 
The irrational investor approach hypothesizes that securities can be temporarily 
more or less mispriced and then the security market is arbitrageable, while rational 
managers are assumed to capture the arbitrage opportunities 
in their financing 
decisions. Another approach regarding irrational managers assumes 
the 
behavioural bias of managers under efficient market conditions. 
Managers try to 
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time the security market but are generally unsuccessful because either the market is 
generally efficient or the managers are not rational in their belief in their "superior" 
ability, as compared to outside investors, to capture mispricing information. The 
empirical evidence does not support the assumption that managers perceive 
arbitrage opportunities of security mispricing. As corporate debt issuance is a 
two-sided proposition at the market level, it is inevitable that a game is played 
between the managers and outside investors regarding market information. There is 
no reason to assume that managers possess informational advantages at the market 
level, especially in the bond market which. is more transparent and less asymmetric 
in information. In general, there is still an issue as to whether investors or 
managers are fully rational, while the fundamental questions raised here are: (1) if 
firms benefit from managers' successful market timing, why? And alternatively, (2) 
if they do not, why does market timing play such an important role in the financial 
decisions of firms? These questions call for a fundamental improvement in the 
traditional financial theory framework. Before this can be done, it is necessary to 
examine the current financial theories by including the market timing issue as a 
behavioural factor. The following empirical chapter is dedicated to this objective. 
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Chapter 4: Corporate debt issuance in the hot market and its 
capital structure implications 
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. Financing decisions and market timing 
A firm's financing policy is one of the most important decisions facing the 
manager in need of capital for new investment opportunities. Which particular 
financing instrument is selected and how much new funding is raised are general 
questions to be considered. It has been shown empirically that firms' financing 
decisions do not simply follow any one traditional theory of capital structure 65 
66 
such as the trade-off theory, pecking order theory or free cash flow theory . 
In 
practice, market timing tends to be an important aspect of real corporate financing 
policy 67 . 
Referred to as the implementation of financing strategy based on capital 
market conditions, the market timing hypothesis offers a behavioural explanation 
for managers' incentives when issuing securities, as a supplementation and 
modification of traditional theories of capital structure. 
Although most existing studies have focused on equity market timing 68 , which 
refers to "the practice of issuing equity at high prices and repurchasing at low 
prices" (Baker and Wurgler (20.02), p. 1), debt market timing has drawn more 
attention in recent years (e. g. Baker et al. (2003), Faulkender (2005), Butler et al. 
(2006), Alti (2006)). The theory of debt market timing should answer three 
questions: (1) are firms timing the market for when they issue debt? (2) Are such 
timing activities effective? And (3) what are the motivations underlying debt 
market timing? Answers have been given to the first question by the evidence of at 
65 As indicated by Myers (2001), "there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice and no reason to 
expect one" (p. 81). 
66 Refer to the literature review in Section 3.2.1. For the reason of brevity, not be repeated 
here. 
67 Market timing hypothesis is developed from the evidence of market over- or undervaluation, and evolves an 
emerging theory of capital structure. For example, Jung Kim and Stulz (1996) 
indicate the motivation of 
market timing may determine firms' debt-equity choice, and compare 
it with the pecking-order model, the 
agency model, Baker and Wurgler (2002) indicate that capital structure 
is the cumulative outcome of firm's 
historical efforts of market timing, which is referred to as market timing theory of capital structure. 
They argue 
that traditional theories of capital structure are hard to explain the variation of capital structure 
\\rlth market 
valuations, 
68 For example, Taggat (1977), Marsh (1982), Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), Jung Kim and Stulz (1996) and 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) on seasoned equity issues, Ritter (1991), 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 
(1994), and Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988,1994) on initial public offerings. 
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least three different types of study about debt market timing. Firstly, the direct 
time-series analysis shows that, at the aggregate market level, a firm's debt issue 
activities are significantly correlated to variations in the debt market environment, 
although it is arguable as to whether this correlation is cause-effective or spurious 
(e. g. Baker and Wurgler (2003)). Secondly, empirical studies based on individual 
debt issue data indicate that the implementation of firms' debt issue decisions, such 
as maturity structures and yield types, are tied to the predictability of 
corresponding debt market factors (e. g. Faulkender (2005)). Thirdly, and perhaps 
more straightforwardly, some survey studies (for example, Graham and Harvey 
(2001)) have revealed that the majority of financial managers implement financing 
policies with the strong motivation of market timing. Managers admit they prefer 
short-term debt "when short-term interest rates are low compared to long-term 
rates" (p. 223). 
The above evidence is more suggestive of the interpretation that managers are 
trying to time the market for their debt issuances. Unfortunately, there is little 
evidence that firms successfully time their debt issuances. From the implication of 
assets pricing, there is a significant difference between debt market timing and 
equity market timing. Stock prices are determined by expected future cash flows 
and firm-specific rates of returns, so the asymmetric information leads to a 
divergence of opinions about variations in the individual stock or the overall equity 
market. There is rich literature that documents the tendency of firms to time the 
equity market by issuing shares when managers believe that their firm's stocks are 
overvalued 69 . 
Debt market timing is attributable to the incentive of reducing the 
costs of capital, if managers believe it is possible. However, compared to the over 
or under-valued equity market, debt is less likely to be mispriced as a two-sided 
proposition based on the market-level public information 
70 
. 
Although managers 
may believe the credit rates of their own firms are being misjudged and make use 
of the arbitrage opportunities before they are realized by the overall market, there 
is no reason to assume that they, on average, possess informational advantages 
regarding forecasting debt market condition variations over the other market 
6 9 Among others, lbbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988,1994) found evidence that the equity 
issue volumes var, 
accompanying the market price anomalies of 1POs. Baker and Wurgler 
(2000) documented that the share of 
equity over the total new issues predicts market returns. 
70 For this reason, Baker et al. (2003) admitted that debt market timing per se 
is impossible. 
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participants or their counterparts of corporate debt issuers, most of whom are 
professional institutes, such as commercial banks, insurance companies, and 
pension fund managers (Butler et al. (2006)). As opposed to equity market timing, 
which is mutually determined by both managers and investors, debt market timing 
is more likely to be determined by the unilateral actions of the firm. Therefore, the 
field of debt market timing offers a better chance to examine corporate behavioural 
finance. 
As debt market timing per se is less possible, a potential explanation of systematic 
debt market timing is the fluctuations in the equity market. Many studies regarding 
firms' debt-equity choices have found close links between the variations in equity 
and the debt markets (e. g. Speiss and Afflect-Gtaves (1999), Richardson and Sloan 
(2003), and Baker and Wurgler (2002)). The undervaluation of equity markets or 
individual stocks makes debt issues more desirable. However, another potential 
reason for market timing activities for corporate debt issues is more likely due to 
managers' irrationality or bounded rationality. Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004) 
categorized market timing into the two approaches of the irrational investor and the 
irrational manager who may mutually react to equity market timing. The irrational 
manager approach suggests that corporate managers may be overconfident 
regarding their timing ability shown as individual investors in the equity market. 
Their implementation of financial policies may be affected by the debt issue 
activities of other companies. As a result, this "follow-up" behaviour of debt 
issuing leads to the "hot market", which in turn stimulates firms to be bolder about 
their debt issues until the underlying high costs are realized by the majority of 
issuers. If such is the case, the timing activities of cost reduction are actually driven 
by the "herd effect", and therefore the "hot debt market" is not only the 
consequence but also the cause of debt market timing7l . 
That firms' market timing 
activities are determined by the extent to which the market is hot suggests the 
irrationality of managers' timing activities. This causal relationship cannot 
be 
explained by the time-invariant model which relates the debt issue variables to 
state factors of market conditions. To reveal the evidence of 
firms' market timing, 
it is necessary to explore their abnormal financing activities that correspond 
to 
71 Chapter 3 of the present thesis reveals that debt market timing is more likely to 
be the passive response of 
debt issuers to the current market variation rather than the consequence of successful predictions 
of future 
market conditions. 
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market anomalies. However, there is little literature examining the irrationality of 
managers when timing the market. 
4.1.2. The determinant of capital structure 
Regardless of the reasons for debt market timing, the mzkjority of the empirical 
evidence mentioned above is consistently supportive of the existence of timing 
attempts 72 . The concern here is with the corresponding question regarding the 
effects of firms' debt market timing on firm characteristics. Specifically, a firm's 
financing decisions will directly impact on its capital structure. Presuming that a 
firm issues more debt than is needed for investment opportunities because the 
manager considers the low costs of raising capital, the firm may pay more costs for 
the extra capital if the capital costs are not as low as the manager imagines, and 
then the overall rate of returns will decline. Meanwhile, the high debt ratio will 
result in high risks of financial distress and influence future capital issue strategies. 
Without enough investment opportunity, the firm will possess more free cash than 
needed. In all, a series of chain reactions will have caused harm to the health of the 
firm and the impact may be long-term or short-term depending on remedial 
implementations after the unsuccessful debt issuance. Alti (2006) found evidence 
that firms time the equity market by issuing extra stocks in hot markets and 
documented the effects of equity timing on firms' capital structures. However, 
whether debt market timing follows a similar pattern remains open to question. 
Furthermore, the concern has also to do with how firms deal with the impacts on 
their capital structure variations of excess debt issues in hot debt markets, if this is 
the case. Baker and Wurgler (2002) treated market timing as a new and 
independent theory of capital structure. They documented that capital structure is 
the aggregate outcome of the firm's historical attempts to time the market. 
However, most studies have regarded market timing as an additional factor based 
on the traditional framework of capital structure 73 . The 
key issue is whether firms 
72 However, Jung Kim and Stutz (1996) claimed that they failed to find support 
for the timing model 
explaining firms' decisions regarding debt-equity choices in comparison to the pecking-order model and 
the 
agency model. 73 Based on the trade-off hypothesis, Leary and Roberts (2005) argued that the persistent effect of market 
timing on capital structure is subject to transaction costs. Flannery and Rangan 
(2006) documented that firms 
YI typically close about one-third of the gap between the actual and target 
debt ratios every year. Alt' (2006) 
found that the firm's capital structure reverses in two years after the deviation caused 
bý equity market timing. 
On the other hand, Welch (2004) argued that firms do not intend to rebalance 
their capital structure despite 
active new issues, 
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have long-term leverage targets and, if so, how quickly do they adjust toward them 
after deviations in the capital structure. This is a crucial question, since it asks 
whether traditional capital structure theories are still explainable when the market 
timing effect is involved. Unfortunately, the literature is inconsistent as regards 
both theoretical hypotheses and conclusions. 
Market timing has matured to become an important theory of corporate finance in 
recent years. The market timing literature, covering most aspects of corporate 
finance, however, leaves a number of gaps. Firstly, the mechanism of debt market 
timing is not clear, in contrast to that of equity market timing. Various explanations 
of debt market timing are based on either corporate debt issues per se or the 
impacts of equity market fluctuations. Debt issues per se in turn contain the 
co-reactions of two counterparts, i. e. the market side (the investors) and the issuer 
side (the firm managers). However, debt market timing is more likely to reflect the 
biased behaviour of firm managers. Secondly, in the context of capital structure, 
debt financing obviously affects the firm's leverage in a reverse direction to that of 
equity financing. The question then is whether the pattern of debt market timing's 
influence on firms' performance follows that of equity market timing? Thirdly, and 
most importantly, is market timing simply a supplementary factor of traditional 
capital structure theories, or is it a new theory explaining financing and investing 
patterns that are difficult to reconcile with existing theories? 
4.1-3. Hot market effect on capital structure 
Focusing on the single financial eventý corporate debt issues, this chapter -follows 
the above guidelines and empirically examines the evidence and influences of 
market timing. It directly introduces the "hot market" to measure the issue waves 
of the debt market, which is simply characterized by debt issue volumes. 
Although 
the hot-cold market classification may not capture the full content of mark et timing, 
the clustering of debt issuance activities is more likely to 
be related to the 
systematic factors affecting firms' timing decisions. An assumption 
is that debt 
issuers regard hot markets as windows of opportunities with temporarily 
low costs 
Of capital, regardless of whether this is real or perceived. 
Intuitively, issuers will 
react to the hot market by issuing more debt than they would otherwise 
do at the 
155 
aggregate market level. Conversely, cold market debt issuers are more likely to 
keep their raised funds to a necessary minimum due to the less favourable market 
conditions. Therefore, whether the market is hot or cold captures the market timing 
behaviour, and reflects firms' desires and actual activities regarding debt issues. 
Among the studies that have examined debt market timing, the overwhelming 
majority have focused on debt maturity (e. g. Guedes and Opler (1996), Barclay 
and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996)), with a very small proportion 
investigating debt yields (e. g. Faulkender (2005)). However, debt issue volume has 
been hitherto ignored in the market timing literature. This study examines the 
hypothesis of excess debt issuance in the hot debt market and its corresponding 
influences, if any, on corporate financial characteristics, especially capital structure. 
Furthermore, it investigates how firms adjust their capital structure in the short and 
long-term when the debt ratios apparently deviate from normal levels due to 
market timing activities. Therefore, this study contributes new evidence of debt 
market timing in hot and cold markets from the aspect of debt issue volume. 
Moreover, it sheds some light on the implication of the market timing hypothesis 
for traditional capital structure theories. 
4.1.4. Results and implications 
In general, the main findings of this study are as follows. Firstly, hot markets 
capture the timing behaviour regarding corporate debt issuance. The hot market 
effect on corporate debt issue activities is substantial. The pre-issue leverage of hot 
market issuers, on average, is similar to that of cold market issuers. However, since 
the average percentage of debt issue value over total assets of "hot market" 
debt 
issuers is significantly higher than that of "cold market" debt issuers, the post-issue 
leverages of "hot market" issuers are significantly higher than those of 
"cold 
market" issuers. The results show that the higher debt issue ratios of 
hot market 
firms are induced by neither large debt capacity nor faster growth. 
On the contrary, 
hot market firms are not more profitable than cold market 
firms. Moreover, less 
retained earnings and more dividend payments suggest 
hot market firms do not 
have better or more investment opportunities, with more 
debt funds being raised. 
Furthermore, although no significant difference of cash was 
found between hot and 
cold market firms, the lower investment ratios of 
hot market firms suggest the 
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additional cash from the excess debt funds is cancelled out by the extra costs of the 
debt issues. Obviously, hot market issuers raise more debt funds than the minimum 
needs of investment opportunities. 
Secondly, in contradiction of the results in Alti (2006), which found quick reverses 
of capital structure after IPOs, this chapter found that the hot debt market effect has 
a long-term persistent influence on firms' capital structures. While leverage ratios 
increase substantially after the time of the debt issue for both hot and cold market 
firms, the increase is significantly larger for hot market issuers. Although hot 
market issuers raise more debt funds which in turn lead to higher leverage, they do 
not tend to reverse their capital structure by reducing their debt issues or increasing 
equity issues, and as a result, the hot market effect persistently lasts for longer than 
five years after the hot debt issues. Inconsistent with the trade-off theory of capital 
structure, the results suggest a market-oriented pecking order theory modified by a 
behavioural factor. Debt market timing plays an important role in shaping 
financing activity and results in a long-term deviation of the capital structure from 
the certain target. Therefore, the results are in line with the view of Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of historical 
market timing. 
Finally, the pattern of debt market timing where firms issue excess debt in hot 
markets is robust regardless of the hot market definition. It is also consistent across 
the structural break in the debt market. The hot market effect is persistent in the 
long term after considering various factors. However, the only exception is that it 
disappears quickly when the debt issues are small. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
previous research on market timing. Section 4.3 describes the 
data and the hot 
market definition. Section 4.4 empirically analyses the short-term 
impacts of debt 
market timing in the hot market and the underlying reasons 
for it. Section 4.5 
examines the long-term influence of the hot market effect on 
firms, capital 
structures. Section 4.6 reports the robustness checks, and 
Section 4.7 provides the 
conclusions. 
I -ý -, 
4.2. A review of literature 
Market timing plays an important role in firms' financing activities and in shaping 
their capital structures. Evidence for market timing comes from a variety of 
different sources. This section reviews previous literature regarding market timing 
in corporate financing policy from several aspects. Firstly, firms' decisions 
regarding raising capital in specific patterns are affected by the extent to which the 
capital market is hot. The internal and external determinants may include market 
overvaluation, manager or investor optimism, industrial innovations, concerns 
about cost reduction, and growth opportunities, etc. Evidence shows that the hot 
issue market abnormally affects the issuer's performance in various ways, 
including capital structure deviation, post-issue stock returns, cash flows, and 
capital issuances afterwards. However, the overwhelming majority of the literature 
focuses on the hot equity issue market. In contrast, hot issues in the debt market are 
far from being explored. Secondly, firms time the debt market from various aspects 
of debt issuance. A large body of literature has examined market timing on debt 
maturity structure. Firms' debt maturity structures or the maturities of new debt 
issues are documented as varying with debt market condition factors. Moreover, 
firms time the yield types of their newly issued debt as well in order to lower the 
cost of capital. Another interesting question is whether firms also time debt issue 
volumes when managers believe it is a good time to borrow in the debt market at 
low costs. However, the literature has left this question open. Thirdly, the market 
timing hypothesis has arisen as an emerging theory of capital structure. On the one 
hand, as outlined by Baker and Wurgler (2002), capital structure is the aggregate 
outcome of the firm's historical market timing. This hypothesis is more akin to the 
market-oriented pecking order theory that firms make financing decisions 
based on 
the cost of capital implied by the market conditions. 
On the other hand, 
contradictory evidence shows that market timing behaviour 
has only a short-term 
impact on firms' capital structures. Although financing choices 
based on capital 
market conditions at the time of issuing deviate 
firms' leverage ratios out of the 
optimal range (if existing), firms tend to rebalance their capital structure 
sooner or 
later to an appropriate level. In this sense, the market timing 
hypothesis is close to 
1 
the modified trade-off theory with a specific short-term factor involved. The 
market timing hypothesis addresses the innovative behavioural. factor in the 
traditional capital structure theories. However, the underlying implications of the 
market timing hypothesis are not consistent and there remains a gap in the 
literature regarding capital structure. 
4.2.1. The hot issue markets 
The literature regarding hot or cold issue markets has mainly focused on equity 
issues. The hot and cold issue markets were first documented by Ibbotson and 
Jaffrey (1975) who examined the IPO market during the period 1960-70. The 
notion of the "hot issue" usually refers to particular stock issues that have risen 
from their offering prices to higher than the average premia in the aftermarket. 
lbbotson et al. (1994) revealed that the stock prices of firms going public in hot 
issue markets underperformed for five years after the offerings. There is also 
evidence that the earnings per share of firms going public typically grows rapidly 
in the years prior to going public, but then actually declines in the first few years 
after the IPO. Furthermore, this long-, run underperformance was concentrated 
among firms that went public in the heavy volume years. In contrast, there was no 
evidence of long-run underperformance by those firms that went public in the light 
volume years. Other empirical studies have also revealed evidence that there is a 
strong relationship between equity issuance and indicators of equity market 
overvaluation. For example, Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) found that 11`0 
issue volumes are highly correlated to stock market valuations in major markets 
across the world. As regards individual markets, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 
(1998) found that private firms' IPO decisions in the Italian market were 
determined by the market-to-book ratio of the industries the firms belonged to. 
In 
the US, Hovalimian, Opler and Titman (2001) also found seasoned equity 
issuances were highly associated with stock prices. From a 
UK sample, Marsh 
(1982) documented that there was a similar pattern in that firms tended to 
issue 
equity with recent stock price appreciation. Apart from stock market overvaluation, 
hot equity markets have also been described as having an unusually 
high volume of 
offerings, severe underpricing, or frequent oversubscription of offerings. 
Ritter 
(1984) found that during the 15-month period starting in January 
1980ý hot issue 
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markets had average initial returns reaching an astonishing 48% of the IPO prices. 
He found that, for given specific industries, timing does matter as regards the 
degree of underperformance of firms going public. Following these hot periods, 
there tend to be periods of "heavy" volume accompanied by relatively low initial 
returns and "light" volume. For example, "in 1971 there were 391 offerings with 
relatively high average initial returns, followed by 562 offerings in 1972 with 
moderate returns, which in turn were followed by 105 offerings in 1973 with 
negative returns. In the mid-1970s, there were very few offerings. " (Ibbotson et al. 
(1988), p. 37) Hot issue markets exist because there, are periods when IPOs can be 
sold at relatively high price-eamings and market-to-book ratios. This induces a 
high volume of new issues, and the relatively strong willingness of issuers to sell 
stocks below the aftermarket prices. Rather than economic and business cycles, 
this large cycle in volume may represent the response of firms attempting to time 
the IPOs to take advantage of these swings in investor sentiment. If companies 
were taking advantage of misevaluations by investors, then poor subsequent 
performance following high volume periods would be expected. 
The IPO literature offers a variety of opinions about why and how hot and cold 
market firms might differ. These include theoretical models that focus on 
underpricing as a signalling mechanism, empirical studies on the long-term 
performance of IPOs, and models of decisions to go public or remain private. The 
signalling models characterize hot markets as periods when a greater number of 
high quality firms choose to go public (e. g. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989)). In these models, firms are drawn into hot 
markets because offer prices are less affected by adverse selection costs. In sharp 
contrast, the long-term performance literature argues that hot market 
firms are 
lower quality firms because they appear to have worse stock returns than 
IPOs 
from cold markets (e. g. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Field (1997)). This 
literature tends to view hot markets as the result of wild 
bullishness on the part of 
irrational investors, which provides a chance for managers to take advantage 
of a 
4ý window of opportunity" to implement an IPO. 
More recently, some models of the 
going public decision have focused on hot markets as 
being driven by the onset of 
a technological innovation or positive productivity shock 
(e. g. Stoughton, Wong 
and Zechner (2001), Benverniste, Busaba and Wilhelm 
(2002), and Maksimovic 
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and Pichler (2001)). In their view, hot markets are characterized by clusters of 
small, risky IPOs from Particular industries. These new businesses have 
tremendous growth potential, though they may turn out to be not highly profitable. 
Other models of the decision to go public are also agnostic about quality, including 
those that focus on the need for a dispersed shareholder base (e. g. Zingales (1995)). 
However, the literature is not entirely consistent with the conclusion of 
substantially distinguishing characteristics between hot and cold issuers. Helwege 
and Liang (2004) examined how IPOs from hot and cold markets differ and 
evaluated which of these alternative characterizations of the hot market appears to 
best fit the data. They found that IPOs in hot (high volume) markets are no more 
concentrated in particular industries than IPOs in cold markets. Moreover, hot and 
cold IPO firms do not differ notably in quality, such as profitability, size and sales 
growth, except that cold market IPOs have more capital expenditures. Furthermore, 
the poor long-run performance of IPOs is not a unique characteristic of hot market 
IPOs, but a common phenomenon of both hot and cold market offerings. Therefore, 
hot issue markets are not primarily driven by the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers, but attributable to greater investor optimism, which suggests that the 
more established an issuer is and hence the less investor uncertainty there is about 
the firm's real value, the lower the amount of underpricing. Leary and Roberts 
(2005) indicated that firms issue or repurchase debt and equity in clusters subject 
to external restrictions. On the one hand, the provisions of the SEC regulations 
restrict the timing and amount of share repurchases on any given day. On the other 
hand, seasonal factors such as Labor Day and Christmas vacations lead to fewer 
IPOs brought to market in September and January when they may actually be 
neutral. A review paper from Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004) summarizes the 
literature that has emphasized the opportunistic timing of new investors in equity 
issue clustering. This line of study argues that hot issue markets exist because of 
investor sentiment and external factors rather than the irrationality of managers 
74 
- 
Unfortunately, in contrast to the hot equity market, the 
literature remains silent 
regarding corporate debt issuance in hot or cold markets and 
its short and 
74 For example, Burch, Christie and Nanda (2004) explained the underperformance 
of hot equity issues as the 
result of the oppotunitistic timing of new investors. Eckbo, 
Masulis and Norli (2000) and Eckbo and Norli 
(2005) argued that the underperformance of IPOs and SEOs 
is due to them being less r1sky. Schultz (2003) 
indicated that "pseudo market timing" can result in underperformance. 
161 
long-term effects on debt issuers. As reviewed in the subsequent section. the 
majority of studies have focused on looking for evidence of debt market timing but 
ignored the consequences and underlying implications. Moreover, the data on 
individual debt issues and their subsequent returns does not approach the level of 
detail of the IPO or SEO data. In fact, debt issues play an equally important role in 
equity financing during the life of a firm. Moreover, the debt market engages less 
informational asymmetry in the sense of market efficiency. The abnormal pattern 
of debt issues in the hot market, if there is one, is better able to reflect finn 
managers' attempts to and underlying motivations in selecting capital resources 
rather than the mixture of both sides of the debt issuance. For this reason hot debt 
issuance should draw particular attention from the literature on market timing. 
4.2,2. Market timing on corporate debt issuance 
Although most of the existing studies have examined the ability of managers to 
time equity issues, recent evidence suggests that managers also time their debt 
issues (e. g. Baker et al (2003), Graham and Harvey (2001), Faulkender (2005)). In 
contrast to the relatively few executives that time the changes in their credit rating, 
about which they might reasonably have private information, managers 
surprisingly attempt to time the debt market regarding public information. Firms' 
decisions regarding debt issuance involve considerations of several aspects, such as 
maturity structures, yield types and issue volume. First of all, debt maturity choice 
has been an important aspect noted in the literature regarding market timing. 
Among others, Guedes and Opler (1996) examined the debt maturity decisions of a 
sample of over 7,000 debt issues. They found that debt maturities were strongly 
negatively related to the term spread, which was fluctuating considerably during 
this sample period. But they left the question open as to whether the inverse 
relation indicates that market participants naively attempt to "ride the yield curve" 
or are rationally responding to a market that sometimes systematically misprices 
bonds in part of the yield curve. Barclay and Smith (1995) 
documented a similar 
effect at the level of the aggregate balance sheet data rather than neNv 
issue data, 
that is, the average maturity of a firm's combined outstanding 
debt is negatiN'ely 
related to the term spread. Direct evidence from the Graham and 
Harvey (2001) 
survey study revealed that managers time their debt maturity choices 
based on the 
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level of the interest rates. Managers issue short-term debt when they feel that 
short-term rates are low relative to long-term rates. Baker, Greenwood and Wurgler 
(2003) found evidence that, in the aggregate data, managers were able to engage in 
the successful forward-looking timing of fluctuations in the yield curve by making 
judicious choices of the maturity structure of their firms' debt. More interestingly 
they found a negative correlation between future excess long-term bond returns 
and the ratio of long-term debt issues to total debt. This is interpreted as evidence 
that managers successfully predict future excess long-term bond returns and make 
corresponding choices regarding their debt issues so as to reduce their overall costs 
of debt. However, in their study testing the primary theories of debt maturity 
structure, including the agency cost hypothesis, the signalling and liquidity risk 
hypothesis, the maturity matching hypothesis, and the tax hypothesis, Stohs and 
Mauer (1996) comprehensively examined the determinants of corporate debt 
maturity structure. However, they found no evidence that firms time their debt 
maturity structures in response to the shape of the term spread. 
Firms' debt market timing also appears to influence their decisions on yield type 
choices when issuing new debt, although there have been few studies focusing on 
this issue. Based on a dataset of the chemical industry in the US, Faulkender (2005) 
investigated whether firms were hedging or timing the market when selecting the 
interest rate exposure of their new debt issuance. Inconsistent with the standard 
textbook prescription of interest rate risk management, or the matching hypothesis 
that firms should match the risk exposure of their debt to that of their assets, this 
study documented that the final interest rate exposure of newly issued debt was 
largely driven by the slope of the yield curve at the time the debt was issued. These 
results suggest that interest rate risk management practices are primarily 
driven by 
market timing rather than hedging considerations. Antoniou et 
A (2006) found 
similar evidence for the overall UK market. Their results show that 
both debt 
maturity and risk exposure are driven by the debt market conditions rather 
than 
firm-specific interest rate risk exposure. When the long-term rates are relatively 
1OW compared to the short-term rates, firms tend to issue 
fixed rate debt to lock in 
the interest rate risk exposure. If managers predict that 
long-term rates will decline 
in the future, floating rate debt is preferable. Therefore, not only 
debt maturity but 
also yield types are an important timing factor considered 
to lower the capital costs 
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when issuing new debt. 
It is reasonable to question whether managers also time debt issue volume. In other 
words, if managers believe the current costs are low at the time of the debt issues, 
do they borrow more than is necessary for their capital needs? Previous literature 
has paid little attention to market timing as regards issue volume with the 
exception of Alti (2006), which, however, identified the capital structure 
implication of market timing by focusing on IPOs. He found that firms issue 
substantially more equity when going public when the equity market is hot. 
Moreover, the additional equity hot-market firm's issue mainly adds to their cash 
balance rather than investment necessity. Accordingly, their investment ratio and 
profitability are significantly lower than those of firms who do not time the market 
and only raise capital at a necessary minimum. Unlike other studies (e. g. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002)) identifying market timers as those firms that have a history of 
raising capital at high market-to-book ratios, the measure of timing in Alti (2006) is 
based on the aggregate market IPO issue volume because it is not closely tied to 
other determinants of financing policy and therefore contemporaneous controls of 
firm characteristics will not be noisy proxies. Alti (2006) indicated that this 
measure of market timing can effectively avoid a spurious relationship between 
firm history and capital structure in analysing the long-term effects of market 
timing. This study focused on the IPO market since the author argued that going 
public is the most important single financing event in the life of a public firm. 
Therefore, the payoff from correctly timing the IPO, either real or perceived, is 
potentially quite high. Moreover, investors face more uncertainty and a higher 
degree of asymmetric information when valuing IPO firms than they face in the 
case of mature public companies. If the IPO sample is likely to be highly revealing 
of pure market timing motives, it is reasonable to think there may 
be interest in the 
timing motives of debt issues as well. However, in contrast to the studies 
examining equity financing patterns, the literature on debt 
financing patterns is 
underdeveloped. If firms tend to issue more equity than necessary 
in hot markets, it 
may be presumed that they would also do so when 
debt financing, where several 
factors may potentially influence managers' decisions. 
For example, a manager 
may reasonably have less inforinational advantage regarding 
the firm's debt 
performance and debt market variations when 
issuing debt than when issuing 
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equity. Moreover, equity issuance lowers the leverage ratio and therefore managers 
may worry little about financial distress risks caused by large debt issues. However. 
it remains an open question as to whether firms time their debt issue volume. 
Most studies have not focused on debt market timing independently but have 
linked it to the impact of equity markets. The potential explanations for debt 
market timing can be categorized as three strands. The first focuses on the 
interrelationship of valuation in the debt and equity markets. Equity overvaluation 
would be expected to lower the cost of debt directly, so the relationship with 
subsequent stock returns may reflect debt market timing. One intriguing pattern 
that has been uncovered is that debt issues are followed by low equity returns (e. g. 
Richardson and Sloan (2003)). Speiss and Affleck-Graves (1999) examined 392 
straight debt issues and 400 convertible issues during the period 1975 - 1989. The 
shares of the straight debt issuers underperformed a size and book-to-market 
benchmark by an insignificant 14% over five years, while the convertible issuers 
underperformed by a significant 37%. This suggests that if the equity did so poorly, 
the debt issues presumably did also. Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal (2006) 
documented that UK and German firms issued long-term debt when the equity 
premium was high, reflecting managers' attempts to minimise the cost of capital by 
making choices between the sources of funding. The second strand of study has 
examined debt market timing from the behavioural perspective. Managers may 
tend to be more optimistic when capital is cheap, and thus raise and invest as much 
as they can from any sources including debt funds. This theory combines the 
notions of investor and managerial irrationality, and suggests that managerial and 
investor sentiment is correlated. Debt market timing and equity market timing 
differ in important respects. Butler, Grullon and Weston (2006) indicated that debt 
pricing depends on the term structure of the interest rates and therefore is driven by 
publicly available information. it would be surprising if firm managers possessed 
an informational advantage regarding future interest rates over the purchasers of 
debt, most of whom are professional investors. Since debt is always correctly 
priced in this setting, debt market timing per se is not possible. 
Thereforeý debt 
market timing does in fact involves manager irrationality. Their evidence shows 
that managers cannot be systematically successful in debt market timing. 
The third 
strand of study explains timing from the perspective of the 
internal characteristics 
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of firms. As outlined in Baker and Wurgler (2003), equity overvaluation relaxes the 
binding leverage constraint, creating debt capacity that subsequently gets used up 
by managers in raising debt funds to benefit ongoing shareholders. In this case, 
debt market timing has nothing to do with debt market valuations per se, but is the 
outcome of equity market timing. 
In contrast to equity market timing, the question of debt market timing still remains 
open in many respects, including the co-reactions between market valuations 
(investor sentiments) and managerial behaviour, and the specific features of 
corporate debt issues. Additionally, most empirical works have focused on the 
aggregate market-level data that ignores the preference of issuers with a variety of 
firm-specific characteristics. This therefore points to a promising path for future 
work on market timing theory. 
4.2.3. Capital structure rebalancing 
The empirical literature provides conflicting assessments of how firms adjust their 
capital structure. Distinguishing among the three main hypotheses, the trade-off, 
pecking order and market timing, requires knowledge of whether firms have 
long-term leverage targets and, if so, how quickly they adjust toward them. It is 
necessary to explain firms' choices of financing decisions under the implications of 
different capital structure theories. The pecking order theory indicates that 
investments are financed first with internally generated funds, the firm will then 
issue safe debt if the internal funds prove insufficient, and equity is used only as a 
last resort. Under this setting, firms have no strong preferences regarding their 
leverage ratios and no strong inclination to reverse leverage changes caused by 
financing needs or earnings growth (e. g. Donaldson, 1961, Miller, 1977, Zweibel, 
1996, and Myers and Majluf, 1984). The trade-off theory suggests that firms tend 
to optimise their capital structure and find a balance between the tax shield benefits 
of debt and financial distress costs (e. g. Bradley et al., 1984, Long and Malitz, 
1985, Titman and Wessels, 1988, and RaJan and Zingales, 1995). Therefore, if their 
leverage ratios diverge from the optimal capital structure (relatively too high or too 
low), firms will rebalance the capital structure back to the target range. Fisher, 
Heinkel and Zechner (1989) developed a dynamic trade-off model as a function of 
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firm-specific characteristics. Due to the presence of recapitalization costs, a firm's 
optimal debt ratio can vary widely. In their dynamic model, firms can recapitalize 
at any point in time and the critical upper and lower financial leverage ratios at 
which transactions costs are incurred to rebalance the firm's financial structure. 
Fama and French (2002) tested these two competing models (the trade-off and 
pecking order) of financing decisions, by examining predictions about long-term 
leverage and the dividend payout with the main driving variables of profitability 
and investment opportunities. They identified one "scar" on the trade-off model 
(the negative relationship between leverage and profitability), one "deep wound" in 
the pecking order model (the large equity issues of small low-leverage growth 
firms", and one area of conflict (the mean reversion of leverage)75 . However, they 
did not conclude the results of the comparison between these two capital structure 
theories, and thus left room for further study. 
Market timing theory provides two conflicting versions regarding the implications 
for capital structure. The first version, as explained by Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
claims that firms issue relatively overvalued securities, which can be either debt or 
equity. Under this setting, firms do not have a special preference for debt-equity 
choices in general, but depend on the capital market valuations at the time of the 
issuance, while the security issue choice is not influenced by previous issue 
activities. Therefore, this study examined the question of whether market timing 
has a short or long-term impact on capital structure, and documented that the 
historical effects of time equity issuances with high market valuations have a 
persistent impact on corporate capital structures. As a result, capital structures are 
the cumulative outcome of historical market timing efforts, i. e. the raising of funds 
when the market valuations were high, rather than the result of a dynamic 
optimising strategy. In this sense, this version of the market timing hypothesis is 
more like a market-oriented pecking order theory, which implies that firms' 
financing choices depend on the costs of capital but show no special preferences. 
Some other studies have provided supportive evidence of persistent impacts of 
market timing on capital structure. Welch (2004) found that equity price shocks 
also have a long-lasting effect on corporate capital structures. Welch argued that 
75 Their evidence showed that the firms' debt ratios adjusted slowly toward their target (7-17% per year). That 
is, the firms appeared to take a long time to return their leverage to the long-run mean or optimal level. 
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despite fairly active net issuing activity, firms fail to rebalance their capital 
structures in response to shocks of the market value. He therefore concluded that 
stock returns are the primary determinant of capital structure changes -and that 
corporate motives for net issuing activity are "largely a mystery". These findings 
share the common theme that shocks to corporate capital structures have a 
persistent effect on leverage, which can be interpreted as evidence against the 
notion that firms rebalance their capital structures toward an optimum. 
The second version of market timing theory contradicts the above under the setting 
of capital structure rebalance. Flannery and Rangan (2006) developed a partial 
adjustment model of firm leverage and indicated that firms do have target capital 
structures. The evidence is equally strong across size classes and time periods, and 
target behaviour is evident in both the market-valued and book-valued leverage 
measures. Firms that under or overleveraged due to timing the capital markets soon 
adjusted their debt ratios to offset the observed gap. Firms typically closed about 
one-third of the gap between the actual and target debt ratios each year. Leary and 
Roberts (2005) argued that the persistence revealed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
and Welch (2004) is more likely to be due to ad ustment costs, rather than 
indifference toward capital structure. If the costs of such adjustments outweigh the 
benefits, firms will wait to recapitalize, which results in extended excursions away 
from their targets. However, the presence of adjustment costs does not determine 
the firm's capital structure in the long run. The empirical analyses show that even 
the effect on leverage of a large positive (negative) equity shock is erased within 
the two to four years subsequent to the shock of debt issuance (retirements). They 
found that the motivations behind the corporate financing decisions were consistent 
with a dynamic rebalancing of leverage. Specifically, firms are more likely to 
increase (decrease) their leverage if it is relatively low (high) due to past financing 
decisions. Alti (2006) found that, after timing the IPO by issuing excess equity in a 
hot market, the firms tended to reverse their low leverage ratios by issuing debt 
during the two to three years of the post-IPO periods until they reached a range of 
reasonable levels. All of the above evidence is consistent with the survey evidence 
of Graham and Harvey (2001), which shows that 71% of responses in their sample 
chose to have a target range for their leverage ratio and a further 10% indicated that 
they had a "strict" target debt ratio, as indicated in the modified trade-off theory, in 
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which market timing is only a dynamic factor with a short-term impact on capital 
structure - 
The evidence is mixed regarding the implications of the market timing hypothesis 
for capital structure theories. Moreover, debt market timing has a reverse impact on 
firms' capital structures in contrast to equity timing and therefore leads to more 
risks of financial distress, and as it is not yet known whether they follow similar 
patterns of implementation processes and corresponding consequences this creates 
a strong motivation for further study. 
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4.3. Data 
4.3.1. Data description and summary of statistics 
The initial sample consisted of all new, non-convertible, public bond issues for the 
period I't January 1970 -31 st December 2000 in the US market, generated from 
Thompson Financial SDC new issues database. The data contains information on 
the issue date, the identity and the characteristics of the borrowers, such as their 
industry and nationality, and various characteristics of the bond issue, such as the 
proceeds in nominal dollars. Issues implemented by non-US firms, those outside of 
the US, and financial firms (SIC code between 6000-6999) were excluded from the 
sample. If there was more than one debt issued by the same firm in a given month, 
they were consolidated into one issue, and then the proceeds were cumulated. The 
observations of debt issues with nominal proceeds in the US market of less than I 
million US dollars were also excluded. The initial sample contained 7,241 
observations of corporate debt issues. Furthermore, the sample was restricted to 
those firms for which COMPUSTAT accounting data was available for the last 
fiscal year before the debt issue. The accounting data ends with the fiscal year 2005. 
The firm-year observations that are outliers with regard to various firm 
characteristics were dropped, with the restrictions described below. Finally, after 
this screening 6,110 firm-year debt issue observations were retained. 
f The variables are defined as 0110WS76 . 
Book debt, D, is defined as the total 
liabilities (COMPUSTAT item 181) and preferred stock (Item 10, replaced by the 
redemption value of preferred stock (item 56) if missing) minus deferred taxed 
(Item 35) and convertible debt (Item 79). Book equity, E, refers to the total assets 
(Item 6) minus the book debt. Book leverage, DIA, is then defined as the book 
debt 
divided by the total assets. Firm-year observations where the book leverage 
exceeded 100% were dropped. Market-to-book ratio, AFB, is the book debt plus the 
market equity (common shares outstanding (Item 25) times share price at the end 
of the fiscal year (Item 199) divided by the total assets). Observations where the 
MIB exceeded 10.0 were dropped. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the firms' characteristics and financing decisions. 
All the 
76 These definitions follow those of Alti (2006), which examined the market timing of hot 1P0 
issues. 
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variables except SIZE are expressed in percentage terms. The analysis was 
conducted in the event time of the debt issues. The issue year refers to the fiscal 
year in which the corporate debt issue took place. The issue year +k is the kth 
fiscal year after the debt was issued. The net debt issues, d1A, are the changes in the 
book debt over total assets. The net equity issues, e1A, are the changes in the book 
equity minus the change in retained earnings (Item 36). REIA is defined as the 
percentage of the year-end retained earnings over total assets. The profitability is 
measured by EBITDAIA, which is the percentage of earnings before interest, taxes, 
and depreciation (Item 13) over total assets. Following Alti (2006), SIZE is the 
logarithm of net sales (Item 12) measured in millions of 2001 US dollars. Asset 
tangibility, PPEIA, is defined as net plant, property, and equipment (Item 8). 
R&DIA is research and development expense (Item 46, replaced by zero when 
missing). In the regression analyses below, a dummy variable RDD takes the value 
77 of one when Item 46 is missing , INVIA 
denotes capital expenditures (Item 128). 
DIVIE is the common dividends (Item 21) divided by the year-end book equity. 
CASHIA refers to cash and short-term investments (Item 1). The variables d1A, e1A, 
REIA, EBITDAIA, PPEIA, R&DIA, INVIA, and CASHIA are normalized by the 
fiscal year-end total assets and measured in percentage terms. The firm-year 
observations for which d1A, e1A, REIA, EBITDAIA, INVIA, or DIVIE exceeded 
100% in absolute value were dropped from the sample. 
The statistics of the financial characteristics variables in Table 4.1 display some 
patterns, despite an insignificant variation over time in general. The sample size 
declines from 6,110 to 5ý 153 year-issue observations during the 6 years from the 
debt issuance due to the probable bankruptcies or mergers and acquisitions of the 
issuers. It could be argued that the sample is, to some extent, subject to "survivor 
bias" because of the exclusion of the "dead" firms who disappeared from the 
sample over time due to debt issues and high leverage. However, only about 3% of 
the debt issuers disappeared from the sample per year after the hot debt issues, 
which is acceptable in a large sample analysis. The mean book-leverage ratios of 
" Since the data for the R&D expense was missing for a large proportion of the observations 
in Compustat, 
the dummy variable RDD can eliminate the influence of the bias for the sample without 
R&D data. Following 
the work of Alti (2006), the dummy took the value of one for missing value, and zero otherwise. 
In the case 
that R&D data is available, the dummy variable takes value of zero and does not appear 
in the regression. 
Alternatively when R&D data is missing, the dummy variable takes value of one and 
is employed as a control 
of R&D to consist the regression. 
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the total sample vary from 60-08% to 62.11% in the six-year period starting from 
the pre-issue year. The largest variation in book leverage took place in the debt 
issue year (1.7%) and remained stable at around 62% afterwards. Accordingly, the 
new issuance of debt and equity during this period is consistent with the pattern of 
changes in leverage. In the issue year, the percentage of new debt issuances was 
1.71% on average, which is identical to the change in the mean book leverage of 
the total sample. The new debt issuances in the following years declined sharply. 
However, they are apparently higher than the new equity issuances in the 
corresponding years. The retained earnings significantly declined in the debt issue 
year but remained relatively stable in the subsequent years at the level of 2%. It 
will be revealed in the following section that this may be attributable to the issuing 
costs and extra interest rate payments of new debt issues. Meanwhile, this is also 
associated with the reduction in profitability (EBITDA) after the debt issue year. 
The firm size somewhat increased with age, whereas the percentage of tangible 
assets declined during the period of the five years after the debt issues. No obvious 
variation in the R&D expenses was found. However, an interesting pattern 
emerged in that, after raising debt funds, which is supposed to be for the objective 
of meeting the demands of investment opportunities, the investment rate of the 
debt issuers continued to decrease from 8.83% to 7.16% in five years. By contrast, 
the increases in dividend payments (4.72% to 6.16%) and cash (3.38% to 3.92%) 
seem to suggest that the firms were facing the extra capital. The following analysis 
examines the implications of these findings. 
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4.3.2. Hot issue market definition 
Hot and cold markets are defined on the basis of the monthly debt issue volumes. 
Specifically, the initial SDC sample before the imposition of the COMPUSTAT 
data requirements was employed to determine the number and volume of debt 
issues for each month during the period January 1970 - December 2000. Following 
Helwege and Liang (2004), and Alti (2006), a three-month centered moving 
average was taken of the debt issue volume for each month in constant dollars 
measured as of Is' January 2001 to smooth out any seasonal variations. The 
advantage of a moving average is that it avoids seasonal reasons for debt issue 
waves. For example, little debt is typically sold to the market in January and 
September due to the vacations of Labor Day and Christmas. Using a three-month 
moving average of debt issue volume avoids categorizing such months as cold. 
Figure 4.1 plots the detrended monthly moving average corporate debt issue 
volume for the period 1970 - 2000. After counting the three-month moving average, 
the maximum monthly issue volume during the sample period was 21 billion 2001 
US dollars, and the minimum number was 1.5 billion 2001 US dollars. Hot (cold) 
months were then defined as those that ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all the 
months in the sample with respect to the distribution of the detrended monthly 
moving average debt issue volume. A dummy variable HOT took the value of one 
for an individual debt issued in a hot month, or zero if the debt was issued in a cold 
month. The hot-cold dummy is the main focus of this study in measuring firms' 
market timing attempts. 
The horizontal solid line represents the bottom 30 percentile ranked by monthly 
debt issue volume at 4,509 million 2001 dollars, while the horizontal dash line 
denotes the top 30 percentile at 8,688 million 2001 dollars. As the figure illustrates, 
the hot and cold months differed substantially in terms of the number of debt issues. 
Of the whole sample of 6,110 issues, 3,082 occurred in hot months (50.4% of the 
sample), and 889 issues (14.5% of the whole sample) took place. in cold months. 
Some studies have used the alternative measure of hot and cold markets by 
monthly deal numbers of debt issues, and this is also plotted in Figure 4.1 as a 
comparison. Basically, these two measures very closely match each other 
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numerically (3,227 issues in hot months and 845 in cold months) and graphically 
(Figure 4.1). Therefore, the hot and cold market is measured as the detrended 
three-month moving average debt issue volume thereafter in the subsequent 
analysis. An obvious pattern of corporate debt issues is shown in Figure 4.1 where 
the issue clusters are denser in the period post-1986 than in the period ex-1986. 
Therefore, to clarify the dependence of the conclusions on the sample period, two 
sub-periods split at 1986 were examined separately in the robustness checks. 
Figure 4.1 Time Series of the Detrended Monthly Debt Issue Volume 
Figure 4.1 plots the accumulated monthly corporate debt issue volumes and deal numbers for the period 
January 1970 - December 2000 in constant dollars measured as of Ist January 2001. The monthly debt issue 
volumes and deal numbers are adjusted by a 3-month de-trended moving average to smooth out seasonal 
variations. The horizontal dash line denotes the top 30% of monthly debt issue volume in constant dollars 
measured as of Ist January 2001 across the sample period, and the horizontal solid line denotes the bottom 
30% of de-trended monthly issue volume in constant dollars measured as of Ist January 2001 across the 
sample period, which are defined as the hot and cold debt market respectively. 
Detrended Month17 Debt Issue Number Detyended month17 moving average Debt Issue Volume 
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4.4. Hot market effect on firms' financing decisions and capital structures 
4.4.1. Market timing measurement by the hot market 
The hot and cold issue markets were first documented by Ibbotson and Jaffrey 
(1975) for the IPO market clusters during the 1960-70 period, with the notion that 
the initial returns of IPOs between the offering prices and aftermarket prices are 
unusually higher than the average premia. Hot IPO markets usually come with 
some related phenomenon, such as an unusually high volume of offerings, severe 
underpricing, or frequent oversubscription of offerings. Ibbotson et al. (1988) 
revealed that in hot markets the average high initial returns of new issues are 
followed by heavy issue volume. Therefore, many studies have measured hot 
markets directly by characterizing an unusually high issue volume (e. g. Loughran, 
Ritter and Rydqvist (1994), Leary and Roberts (2005), Alti (2006)). Although there 
is little difference between hot IPO market definitions of either high initial returns 
or high issue volume, measuring the hot debt market is more straightforward. Since 
debt is always correctly priced, the debt market conditions are usually measured by 
interest rate variables. However, the debt market conditions do not perfectly match 
78 
the practical implementations of firms' debt financing decisions. Rather, debt 
issue volume is better able to reflect timing attempts and the willingness of debt 
issuers. 
The implications of high debt issue volume are twofold, both of which reflect 
corporate debt market timing. Firstly, more firms issue debt during specific periods 
when debt issue numbers are unusually high. The debt issues cluster and the 
overall issue volume attains peaks of issuing fluctuations accordingly. Secondly, 
firms issue more debt during specific periods when the individual debt issue 
volume is higher than it is supposed to be. As a result, the aggregate market-level 
debt issue volume is higher than that in the cold market. The hot market effect may 
result from either one of the above reasons or from the joint effects of both. The 
hot (cold) market measures in this study are defined as the months when the 
aggregate debt issue volume is ranked within the top (bottom) 30 percentile during 
78 In the previous empirical chapter, the evidence shows that firms appear to passively react to the variations 
in 
the debt market. Therefore, although debt market condition factors are significantly related to 
firms' debt issue 
implementations, the more precise measure of firms' practical timing decisions is the actual 
debt issuance. 
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the overall sample period January 1970 - December 2000. Some empirical studies 
have measured the hot issue market by using monthly issuing numbers (e. g. Leary 
and Roberts (2005), and Alti (2006)), which are constructed on the basis of the first 
implication. Critically, the hot market measured by issue volume contains mutual 
influences of both market timing implications. Moreover, Figure 4.1 shows there is 
little qualitative and quantitative deviation between these two measures. The first 
implication of debt market timing is straightforward in measurement, while the 
subsequent analysis peels off and examines the existence of the second level of 
market timing - 
4.4.2. Hot market ýeffect onfinancing decisions 
All the debt issue observations were grouped and labelled by hot or cold market 
issues corresponding to the issuing months belonging to the hot or cold months. A 
dummy variable of Hot-cold took the value of one if the debt was a hot market 
issue, and zero otherwise. First of all, direct comparisons were conducted between 
hot market issuers and cold market issuers with respect to various financial 
characteristics prior to the debt issues, with the aim of determining the firms' 
financing decisions and also to identify the quality of hot and cold issuers as 
argued by previous studies. 
Table 4.2 The Comparisons of Financial Characteristics of Hot and Cold Market Firms 
This table compares the mean values of financial characteristics of hot and cold market firms at the end of the 
year before debt issues. Hot (cold) firms are those firms which issue debt in hot (cold) months defined as 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all the months in the sample with respect to the distribution of the detrended 
monthly moving average debt issue volume, shown in Figure 4. I. The variables of financial characteristics 
include the leverage ratio (DIA), market-to-book ratio (MIB), retained earnings (REIA), size (SIZE), tangible 
assets (PPEIA), R&D expense (R&DIA), capital expenditure (INVIA), dividend payouts (DIVIE), and free cash 
(CASHIA). The variables are standardized by firm assets (except of size, market-to-book ratio and dividend). 
T-values present the differences of one-tail mean comparison tests with unequal variance. 
014 t -I ldl&-i REIA t -1 EBITOAIA t-I 
SIM-I 
Hot market firms 61.10 130.20 2.41 14.49 
7.74 
Cold market firms 58.81 95.66 2.81 
13.75 6.57 
t-value (difference) [3,401 [16.291 [-1.951 [3.131 
[18.21 
PPEIA t-j RMIA t -I INVIA t -1 
DIVIEt-I CA SHIA t -1 
Hot market firms 53.85 0.97 8.36 
4.26 3.41 
Cold market firms 65.62 0.62 10.16 
5.34 3.17 
_j-value 
(difference) E-11.711 [4.801 [-6.271 
[-0.811 '-0.331 
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pp- 
Table 4.2 shows the mean values of these characteristics prior to debt issuance, 
including the leverage ratio (DIA), market-to-book ratio (MB), retained earnings 
(REIA), size (SIZE), tangible assets (PPEIA), R&D expense (R&DIA), capital 
expenditure (INVIA), dividend payouts (DIVIE), and free cash (CASHIA). The 
variables are standardized by firm assets (except of size, market-to-book ratio and 
dividend). The t-values of the differences based on one-tail mean comparison tests 
with unequal variance are also shown. The results are mixed as regards the quality 
of the debt issuers 79 , and suggest that hot and cold market debt issuers differ 
significantly in many of their financial features. Hot market issuers appear to be 
larger in size and have higher profitability than cold market issuers. In line with the 
work of Stoughton et al. (2001) and Benverniste et al. (2002), they also show 
higher growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio and R&D expenses). However, 
the tangible assets, retained earnings and investment rates of hot issue firms are 
relatively lower, whereas they show no obvious differences as regards dividend 
payouts and cash balances. 
The most interesting feature of debt issuers is leverage. Hot issuers, on average, 
have a 2.31% (61.10% minus 58.81%) higher book debt ratio than cold issuers 
with statistical significance. The concern here is whether hot issuers borrow more 
than cold issuers, despite higher pre-issue book debt ratios. The variable used to 
measure the amount of debt issue is ProceedslAt, the percentage of newly issued 
debt over total assets at the end of the fiscal year when the debt was issued, or 
alternatively ProceedslAt-1, the level of debt issues compared to the pre-issue assets. 
A comparison of ProceedslAt or ProceedslAt-I, between hot and cold market issues 
reveals whether the second implication of debt market timing holds, that is, 
whether firms issue more debt in hot markets than in cold markets. Panel A of 
Table 4.3 shows the average percentages of debt issue proceeds over the total 
assets at the beginning and end of the fiscal year when the debt was 
issued. As 
expected, both measures show that, in the hot markets, the 
firms issued 
significantly more debt than in the cold markets. The average percentage of 
hot 
debt issues over total pre-issue assets was almost 2% (0.6% measured 
by post-issue 
" The literature on hot market issuers focuses on the IPO market, and 
is not coincident NN ith the qual ity of hot 
market issuers On the one hand, hot markets are characterized as periods when more 
high quafity firms raise 
funds (e. g. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and 
Welch (1989)). On the other hand, 
Poor long-term performance implies a low quality of hot issuers 
(e. g. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Field 
(1997)). 
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assets) higher than that of cold issues. The t-value of the two sample test with 
unequal variances shows that the differences of mean were statistically significant 
(2.4 and 3.81 respectively). Thus, the hot market debt issuers raised more debt 
funds than the cold market issuers, although their pre-issue leverages were 
significantly higher than those of the cold market issuers. 
it could be argued that these differences are economically small and may be due to 
some firm-specific characteristics of the hot and cold market issuers. To address 
this issue, the following regression was run to examine the hot market effect on the 
debt issue amount with controlling various financial characteristics. 
YI ý CO + CIHD + C2M1B1-1 + C3REIAW + C4EBITDAIAI-1 + C5SIZEt-l + c6PPEIA, -, + c7R&DIA, -, 
c8RDDIAI-1 + c91NVIAI-1 + coDIVIE, -, + CliCaShlAI-l+ C]2DIA, -i +rt (4.1) 
The dependent variables were ProceedslA, or ProceedslAI, which represent the 
debt issue volume compared to total assets at the beginning or end of the fiscal 
year when the debt was issued. The effects of the hot market and firm 
characteristics on the changes in the debt ratio, d1A, I were also examined. 
The 
dummy variable HD took the value of one for the hot market issuers and zero for 
the cold market issuers. As regards characterizing the hot market effect, the 
coefficients of HD show the differences between the dependent variables of the hot 
and cold debt issuers. Although the hot effect dummy is the main focus of this 
analysis, many other firm-specific characteristics may also potentially determine 
the financing decisions of firms. Therefore, the control variables include the 
market-to-book ratio (MIB), retained earnings (REIA), profitability (EBITDAIA), 
size (SIZE), tangible assets (PPEIA), R&D expense (R&DIA), the dummy variable 
of R&D (RDDIA), capital expenditure (INVIA), dividend (DIVIE), cash (CASHIA), 
and book leverage ratio (DIA). All these control variables took the pre-issue values 
and were standardized by the issuers' total assets. Firstly, the pre-issue debt ratio 
affects subsequent financing decisions by several means. If the trade-off hypothesis 
holds, in other words, if firms have a target leverage ratio, the pre-issue 
debt ratio 
would be expected to be negatively related to the new debt 
issuance. Otherwise, 
the level of newly issued debt should not correlate to the current 
debt ratio, or will 
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positively correlate if the firms believe that debt is the best source of new capita180. 
Secondly, the market-to-book ratio reflects the market expectation to the firm, 
while capital expenditures represent the firm's investment in the long run. These 
variables determine the firm's potential growth prospects (Fama and French, 1998) 
and are expected to positively affect firm's capital demands, i. e. the level of debt 
issuance. Consistent with the stakeholder theory, firms that have high R&D 
expenditures tend to include little debt in their capital structures (Opler and Titman 
1996). Thirdly, retained earnings, revenue, dividend payouts and the level of cash 
balances reflect the requirement the firm has for new capital (e. g Woolridge and 
Ghosh, 1985)81. When a firm has good investment opportunities, it is expected to 
have more retained earnings, fewer dividend payments and higher profitability. 
Fourthly, firms appear to differ in their financing preferences according to their 
size. As suggested by the pecking order of financing choices, firms prefer to 
finance investments with retained earning rather than external source of funds 
(Donaldson, 1961). Empirically, small firms rely more heavily on external capital, 
whereas larger firms with high profitability are more capable to raise funds from 
internal cash flows. If this is the case, firm size should negatively relate to debt 
issuance. In addition, tangible assets (PPE) vary significantly across industries. 
This variable was employed as a proxy for the industry control factor. 
Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the results of the regressions. The first thing noticed is 
that the coefficient of the hot market dummy was significantly positive in each 
specification. In other words, the regression analysis confirms the pattern of hot 
market firms issuing more debt than cold market issuers. The coefficients of the 
hot market dummy were 2.73 and 6.81 in the two specifications respectively and 
were statistically significant, which suggests that the hot market 
firms issued 
2.73% and 6.81% more debt than the cold market issuers when measured 
by 
ProceedslAj and ProceedslAt-I respectively, although the average pre-issue 
leverage 
was higher for the hot market firms as shown in the preceding mean comparison. 
In contrast to the direct comparison of mean values in panel 
A, the hot market 
effect is remained significant even after controlling the 
firms' characteristics. 
80 See literature review in Section 3.2.1 and section 4.2.3 
for details. 
ith an increases retained 81 Among many others, Woolridge and Ghosh (1985) reveal 
that dividend cut w, 
earning convey a signal that the firm has a desire to conserve cash 
to fund good investment opportunities. 
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In addition to the hot market effect, other control variables displayed the significant 
influence of the firms' features on the level of their debt iSSUeS82 . First of all, 
inconsistent with the trade-off hypothesis, a high pre-issue debt ratio did not 
prevent the firrns from deciding to issue further debt. Secondly, as expected, the 
firms tended to issue more debt when high growth opportunities were suggested by 
high market-to-book ratios and investment rates. However, the R, &D did not 
positively influence the level of subsequent debt issuance, which may be due to its 
longer-run prospect. Thirdly, the retained earnings, dividends and profitability were 
correlated to the debt issuance in a way that is in line with the assumption of 
investment chances. In addition, the negative coefficient of firm size suggests that 
the small firms raised relatively higher level of debt from external sources than 
large firms. 
82 Although the influences of a firm's financial characteristics on debt 
issuance are not the main concern in 
this study, it is helpful when following the analysis to explore the underlYing 
reasons for debt market timing in 
hot markets. 
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Table 4.3 Hot Market Effects on Debt Issue Levels 
This table shows the differences between hot and cold market firms of debt issue proceeds over firms' total 
assets. Part A presents the mean values comparisons between hot and cold issuers in respect of Proceedsm, 
and ProceedslAI-1. The t-statistics report the differences of each pair based on one-tailed mean comparison tests 
with unequal variances. Part B presents the regression analysis of the following specification 
Y, = c0 + c, HD+ C2M1 BI-1 + C3REIA, -, +c 4EBITDAIA, -, +c5SIZE, -, +c6PPEIA, -, +c 7R 
& DI. 4, 
-I 
+c, RDD, -, +c91NVIA, -, 
+cl()DIVIA, 
-, 
+cCashIA, 
-, 
+ C12D1A1-1 +el 
The dependent variable Y, represents the total debt issue proceeds over the total assets at the end and beginning 
of the fiscal year of the debt issue respectively (ProceedslA,, and ProceedslAj ). The dummy variable Hot-cold 
(HD) takes the value of one when the debt issue takes place during a hot market period, and zero otherwise. 
The control variables include book leverage ratio (DIA), market-to-book ratio (MIB), retained earnings (REIA), 
profitability (EBITDAIA), size (SIZE), tangible assets (PPEIA), R&D expense (R&DIA), the dummy variable of 
R&D (kDDIA), capital expenditure (INVIA), dividend (DIVIE), and cash (CASHIA). The dummy variable RDD 
takes the value of one when the research and development expense inforination is missing in COMPUSTAT. 
Apart from the dummy variables and SIZE, all other variables are expressed in percentage terms. 
ProceedslAt ProceedslAt-i 
Panel A Mean Values 
Hot 7.31 10.46 
Cold 6.68 8.49 
t-value (difference) [2.41 [3.811 
Panel B Regression 
Hot-cold 2.73 [8.131 6.81 [5.941 
DIA t-1 0.109 [151 0.190 [7.661 
MlEt-I 0.004 [2. Oil 0.035 [4.941 
REIA t-1 0.004 [0.221 -0.002 
[-0.031 
EBJT TDAIA t-j 0.199 [8.151 0.041 
[0.521 
SIZEt-i -3.822 E-44.41 -7.923 
[-271 
PPEIA t-1 -0.090 E-13.61 -0.118 
[-5.261 
R&DIA t-j -0.181 E-2.161 -0.519 
[-1.811 
RDDt-j -0.335 E-0.801 -2.659 
[-1.861 
INVIA t-1 0.078 [3.811 0.382 
[5.531 
D, T VIEt -j -0.007 
[-2.681 0.001 [0. ill 
CASHIA t -1 0.188 
[6.741 0.485 [5.081 
R -2 0.421 0.205 
N 3923 3968 
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4.4.3. Determinants of market timing in the hot market 
There are reasons other than hot market debt for why issuers raise more debt funds 
than cold market issuers. Firstly, the hot market issuer may have a larger debt 
capacity than a cold market firm. If this is the case, hot market firms are more 
active in taking advantage of low debt ratios and then raise more debt funds to 
optimise their capital structure as the market is hot. Therefore, an investigation was 
carried out into the pre-issue book leverage of the hot and cold market issuers with 
the same control variables of firm characteristics as shown in the regression (4.1). 
The first column of Table 4.4 displays the results of this analysis. Although the 
mean value comparison of the book leverage prior to the debt issues shows that the 
hot issuers had higher debt ratios than cold issuers (6 1.1% and 5 8.8 1% respectively 
in panel A), very interestingly it can be seen that in the regression analysis (panel B) 
the hot market firms did not have a larger debt capacity than the cold market firms, 
after controlling the various firm characteristics. The insignificant coefficient of the 
hot market dummy (t-value of -0.17) suggests that the two groups of debt issuers 
did not differ in their pre-issue debt ratios. 83 Thus, the evidence indicates that debt 
capacity or capital structure optimisation is not the primary reason for hot market 
firms to issue excess debt. 
Another potential reason for hot market firms to issue more debt may be their 
faster growth. Firms with high growth opportunities will be expected to have more 
capital requirements currently or in the near future. Accordingly, this concern will 
give them the incentive to issue more capital in preparation for future investment 
opportunities. By replicating the same specification as model (4.1), an examination 
was carried out into whether the investment rates of the debt issuers were 
influenced by the hot market effect and other firm features. The results are reported 
in column (2) - (7) of Table 4.4. As opposed to the above assumption, 
the average 
investment rates were lower for the hot market issuers than the cold market 
issuers 
for the entire period of six years. The differences were statistically significant and 
did not disappear even five years after the debt issues occurred 
(keeping more than 
20% in difference). The regression analysis shows that, during the 
first two years 
" Other control variables exhibited significant correlations with the pre-issue 
debt ratios. Since the main focus 
is to examine the difference between the debt ratios of hot and cold market 
issuers, the investigation was not 
extended to the more general question of corporate debt issue determinants 
implied by the control variables, 
for reasons of brevity. 
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subsequent to the hot issues, the investment rates of the hot market firms were 
significantly lower than those of the cold market firms after controlling for firin 
characteristics. During the following years, the differences were not significant 
until the fourth year after the hot market issues occurred. Below the surface of the 
results, the hot market firms may well still have more investment opportunities. 
However, this part of the investments will have been offset by more extra debt 
issuance, and is not exhibited in the high investment rates over a relatively long 
period. Therefore, there is no supportive evidence found here that hot market firms 
exhibit higher investment rates after issuing more debt 
The potential explanation that hot market firms raise more debt funds because they 
have high-return investment projects and would like to add more investment was 
also considered. In this case, it would be expected that the higher profitability of 
hot market firms would be seen. Therefore, the EBITDA was examined as the 
proxy for profitability between the hot and cold market firms for the five years 
subsequent to the hot debt issues by replicating the above analysis. However, the 
results show that, although the hot debt issuers exhibited a slightly better 
performance as regards profitability (1-1.5% higher), this difference is more likely 
to have been due to other differing financial characteristics of the two groups rather 
than to debt market timing. After controlling for firm characteristics, the 
coefficients of the hot market dummy in the regressions were found to be either 
negative or insignificantly positive over five years. In particular, in the first year 
after the debt was issued, the EBITDA of the hot market issuers was significantly 
lower than that of the cold market issuers (0.614% with -3.48- of t-value). Therefore, 
there is no convincing evidence that hot market issuers are more profitable. 
Moreover, the dividend payments show no difference between the hot and cold 
market firms. Therefore, it can be deduced that more debt funds issued by hot 
market firms do not bring higher returns of assets or more benefits (dividend 
payments) to the shareholders if these debt funds are raised for new investment 
opportunities. 
In all, by introducing a hot market dummy variable, it can be seen that, to a large 
extent, the hot market effect reflects firms' debt market timing behaviour. 
Firstly, 
the debt issuers in the hot markets issued significantly more debt than the cold 
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market. debt issuers, because the percentage of the hot debt issues over the total 
assets was significantly higher that of the cold debt issues. Moreover, the higher 
debt issue level of the hot market firms was not due to low pre-issue leverage or 
large debt capacity. On the contrary, their pre-issue debt ratios were even higher 
than those of the cold market firms on average. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that the hot market firms grew faster than the cold market issuers. The mean 
comparison and the regression analysis show that the investment rates did indeed 
remain lower for the hot market issuers even during the five post-issue years. 
Additionally, the hot and cold market firms did not differ significantly as regards 
profitability. All the above evidence suggests that firms tend to time the market by 
issuing more debt when they believe the market conditions are desirable, while this 
financing activity is not driven by capital requirements. 
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4.4.4. Hot market effect on capital structure 
The preceding section compared hot and cold market debt issuers regarding 
various firm characteristics. It shows that the hot market effect defined by total 
debt issue volume captures market timing behaviour shown as the phenomenon 
that firms issue more debt in hot markets than in cold markets. Moreover. this 
effect is not primarily driven by internal capital structure rebalancing or real 
investment needs. This section examines the impact of debt market timing 
behaviour on the financing and capital structure decisions of finns. 
Hot market issuers do not differ from cold market issuers in their pre-issue 
leverage ratios, although they do issue significantly more debt than cold market 
issuer$. However, the leverage of hot market firms may rise substantially. Since 
firms may finance several times and in various ways within one year, they may 
adjust the influence of debt market timing accordingly. Therefore, an examination 
was made on the leverage changes of the debt issuers in the debt issue year (DIA, - 
DIAt-1) with the market timing effect by conducting the specification of model (4.1) 
in the preceding section. Apart from the replacement of the dependent variables 
with the changes of leverage ratio in the debt issue year, the notations of the control 
variables follow model (4.1) exactly. If the firms were trying to eliminate the hot 
market effect, the coefficient of the HD dummy would not be significant. 
The first column of Table 4.5 shows the results. First of all, the changes in the book 
leverages were positive for both types of issuers. However, the mean leverage 
changes of the hot and cold market issuers were significantly different. As expected, 
the hot market firms increased their debt ratio by 1.77%, this being more than three 
times that of the cold market firms (0.52%). The regression analysis confirms that 
the difference of leverage changes between the hot and cold market 
issuers was 
significant even after controlling for firm characteristics. Moreover, this 
difference 
was mainly driven by the hot market effect, as the coefficient of the 
hot market 
dummy (1.50) was almost identical to the difference in the mean values of 
the 
leverage changes. 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) deconstructed the changes in leverage 
by equity issues, 
retained earnings and the residual change in leverage that 
depends on the total 
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growth in assets from the combination of equity issues, debt issues and ne\vly 
retained earnings. The change in leverage was deconstructed in the following form. 
DIA, - DIA, -, = -eIA, -A 
REIA, + E, 
-, 
(IIA, -IIA, -1) 
= -elA, -A REIA, + (EIA) t-I (A Cash +A Other Assets)1A, (4.2) 
The second to fourth column of Table 4.5 replicates the analysis of the first column 
by replacing the dependent variables of the deconstructed terms on the right hand 
side of equation (4.2). These reveal the firms' dynamic adjustments of capital 
structure and financing policies. Not surprisingly, the net equity issues in the debt 
issue year were significantly lower for the hot market debt issuers. The coefficient 
of the hot market dummy (-2.19 percentage points) was identical to the difference 
in the mean net equity issues of the hot and cold market firms (0.33 versus 2.64 
percentage points), which suggests that debt market timing essentially determines 
corresponding equity issuance. This result is consistent with previous findings, 
since in the case where hot market firms raise more debt funds than their actual 
capital needs, they are less likely to issue equity than cold market firms. In contrast, 
the change in cash suggests that the hot market firms in general had smaller cash 
balances than the cold market firms. Meanwhile, the evidence also shows that the 
retained earnings of the hot market firms declined significantly more than those of 
the cold market firms. On integrating the above results, the following fact emerges. 
The hot market firms issued more debt funds and their debt ratios increased more 
than the cold market firms. However, their retained earnings, which are the better 
sources for capital investments, declined significantly more than those of the cold 
market firms. In turn, if hot market firms do not have enough investment 
opportunities, as shown in preceding section, they should have surplus cash 
balances from excess debt issuance. In contradiction of this assumption, the cash 
balances of the hot market firms were lower than those of the cold market 
firms. 
Therefore, the logical explanation is that they had more cash outflows due to extra 
debt issues. In other words, hot market firms pay more costs for their 
high ratio of 
debtissues. 
Finally, an examination was made of the post-issue leverage at the end of 
the debt 
issue year with respect to the hot market effect. The mean 
debt ratio was 3.46% 
higher (62.83% vs. 59.37%) for the hot market firms than for the cold market 
firms, 
189 
with a t-value of 5.81 in difference. In line with the direct comparison of the mean 
debt ratios, the regression replicating model (4.1), by involving hot market dummy 
and control variables, shows that the hot market effect significantly influenced the 
post-issue capital structure of the debt issuers due to the changes in debt ratios in 
the debt issue year. This confirms that the pre-issue debt ratio was higher for the 
hot market firms than for the cold market firms. If the hot market firms had been 
trying to maintain their capital structure at a target level, the coefficients of the hot 
market dummy in determining the leverage changes and the post-issue debt ratios 
should be zero, or negative for the reversal of leverage (it is assumed that hot and 
cold market firms do not in general differ in their target capital structure). However, 
these results suggest that the hot market effect had driven the hot issuers' capital 
structures to deviate from their initial levels and enlarge the difference between the 
debt ratios of the hot and cold issuers. Moreover, it can be seen that the difference 
between the post-issue debt ratios of the hot and cold market firms (1.30%) was 
almost identical to the differences in their pre-issue debt ratios (-0.128% in first 
column of Table 4.4) plus the changes in leverage ratios in the debt issue year 
(1.50%). Therefore, the hot market effect captures the impact of market timing on 
the firm's financing policy, and more importantly, is entirely orthogonal to other 
control variables in determining the firm's capital structure. 
In summary, the above analysis goes some way in explaining how the hot market 
effect influences firms' financing decisions and in turn their capital structure. Debt 
issue markets fluctuate over time. The variations in debt market conditions and 
managers' predictions form hot and cold markets characterized by substantially 
different levels of aggregate debt issue volumes. The empirical evidence 
indicates 
that firms tend to issue more debt, compared to their total assets, in hot markets 
than in cold markets. The evidence shows that, on the one 
hand, a higher volume of 
debt funds neither creates higher incomes nor becomes absorbed 
by higher 
investment rates. On the other hand, since hot and cold market 
firms do not differ 
in their pre-issue capital structures, the excess debt 
issues of hot market firms 
essentially lead to higher post-issue debt ratios. Thus, a 
higher level of debt issue 
volume reflects the firm's debt market timing effect rather 
than the issuers' real 
capital needs for investment opportunities or the 
incentive of capital structure 
optimisation. As a result, debt market timing behaviour 
in hot markets drives firms' 
190 
capital structures away from their pre-issue level. Meanwhile, the comparisons of 
profitabilitY, cash and retained earnings suggest that hot market issuers pay extra 
costs for their excess debt issuance. 
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4.5. Long-term effect of market timing on capital structure 
The preceding section revealed the pattern of capital structure variations under the 
hot market effect. Firstly, hot market firms do not differ in their book leverage from 
cold market firms prior to debt issues. Secondly, hot market firms issue 
significantly more debt than cold market firms do, and as a result raise their debt 
ratio to a greater extent. Thirdly, the post-issue leverage is higher for hot market 
firms than cold market firms at the end of the debt issue year. The above pattern 
indicates that debt market timing in the hot market pushes the issuer's capital 
structure to deviate away from the pre-issue level. This results in the leverage of 
hot market issuers being generally higher than cold market firms in the short term. 
A question then arises as to whether this effect is persistent in the long term or 
vanishes quickly. 
It is clear that market timing determines a firm's financing decisions and shapes its 
capital structure. However, as an emerging theory of capital structure, the market 
timing hypothesis gives no clear indication as regards firms' debt-equity choices. 
One idea, raised by Baker and Wurgler (2002), indicates that the firm's capital 
structure is the "aggregate outcome of the firm's historical market timing 
behaviour". In other words, market timing determines the firm's capital structure in 
the long run. Firms may issue equity as the overall stock market or their own 
shares are overvalued, or issue debt when most firms believe the debt market 
conditions to be desirable. If this is the case, firms will not be seen to fix their 
capital structures within a target range or at an optimal level. Rather, firms will 
choose the security with the lowest costs of capital which depends on market 
conditions, and have no special preferences regarding security selections ex anti. 
This version of the market timing hypothesis on capital structure is more like a 
market-oriented pecking order theory. Another version which is more 
comprehensively accepted indicates that market timing only impacts on the firm's 
capital structure in the short run. As with the above idea, firms choose securities 
according to capital market conditions and based on the incentive of reducing 
capital costs. Firms will then tend to dynamically adjust their capital structure 
deviation and keep it within a target range by rebalancing the cost reduction and 
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risk exposure caused". Therefore, this idea is based on the modified trade-off 
theory, in which market timing is involved as a short-term factor. To identify the 
impact of market timing on capital structure from these two different points of view. 
the key issue is whether the market timing effect has a persistent impact on capital 
structure in the long run, or whether firms tend to reverse their capital structure 
deviation after timing the capital market. These questions are discussed in the 
following section, 
4.5.1. Long-term persistence of the hot market effect 
Recalling the empirical results in the previous section it can be seen that, with 
similar pre-issue leverages, the change in the leverage of the hot market firms in 
hot issue years was positive and significantly higher than that of the cold market 
firms. Accordingly, debt issues implemented in hot markets lead to higher 
post-issue leverage ratios at the end of the year. How long the debt market timing 
effect on firms' capital structures persists is the question here. Provided that market 
timing has a permanent influence on capital structure, the difference in leverage 
between hot and cold market firms should continue to exist in the cumulative 
changes in leverage after hot debt issues. Assuming that firms continually time the 
debt market, the cumulative changes in the leverage will become greater rather 
than declining or vanishing. Therefore, to measure the long-term persistence of the 
hot market effect, it was first necessary to examine the cumulative changes in the 
leverage during the period starting from the year before the debt issue. The 
regression is specified as follows. 
DIA, - DIAprc, -issue -- co 
+ c1HD + c2MB, -i 
+ C3REIAI-1 + C4EBITDAIAI-1 + C5SIZE 1-1 + C6PPEIAI-1 
c7R&DIAt-I + c8P-DD1Ai-j + cgjNVIA, -, 
+ cloDIVIE, -, 
+ cl, CashIA, -, 
C12DIAI-I + ý'/ (4.3) 
where t is the t-th year after the debt issues. DIAt - 
DlApre-issue measures the 
cumulative changes in the debt ratios during the period from the year-end 
before 
84 On the one hand, firms tend to issue debt to realize the benefit of a tax shield 
if equity market timing lowers 
the leverage ratio and then creates more debt capacity. Conversley, they will reduce 
debt issues or sell more 
equity to lower the risk of financial distress or bankruptcy in the case of a 
high debt ratio caused b-.,, debt 
market timing. 
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the debt issues to the t-th year. The dummy variable HD took the value of one for 
the hot market issuers and zero for the cold market issuers. All control variables are 
defined as those in Model (4.1). Part I of Table 4.6 shows the results of this 
regression. Firstly, it can be seen that the mean values of the cumulative leverage 
changes of the hot and cold market firms were significantly different in the five 
years after the hot debt issues. The regression analyses, including controlling for 
firm characteristics, were consistent with the above results. Thus, in the year of the 
hot debt issues, the hot market effect on the change in leverage was 1.50% (Table 
4,5). In the first year after the hot debt issues, the hot market effect on the 
cumulative change in leverage was 1.28%, which does not show an essentially 
different decline compared to the hot issue year. In the second and third years after 
the hot issues, the coefficients of the hot market dummy, i. e. the hot market effect, 
were even larger (2.2% and 2.1% respectively). As presumed before, these results 
suggest that hot market firms continue to time the debt market one year after their 
hot debt issues. In the fourth and fifth years after the hot issues, the effect remained 
and exceeded the level of the first year (1.41% and 1.90% respectively). In all, the 
coefficients of the hot market dummy remained positive and statistically significant 
for each of the five post-issue years. Compared to the change in debt ratio in the 
hot issue year, the cumulative changes in the following several years did not 
decline markedly. Rather, they enlarged in the second and third years. 
Thus, the pre-issue debt ratios of the hot and cold market firms did not differ as 
identified in the analysis of the short-term hot market effect. Following the same 
logic, provided that the cumulative changes in the debt ratios are significantly 
different between the hot and cold markets, higher levels of debt ratio for the hot 
market issuers would be expected in the long run. Therefore an examination was 
made of the year-end leverages for each year after the hot issues occurred to 
identify the long-term cumulative changes in leverage. The analysis of regression 
(4.3) was replicated with the replacement of the dependent variable by the year-end 
book leverage ratios. Panel A of part 2, shows that the mean debt ratios of the 
hot 
market firms varied from 62.91 to 63.4, compared to those of the cold market 
firms 
which varied from 59.27 to 59.86 during the five years after the 
debt issues. In 
comparison to the mean debt ratios of the hot and cold market firms at the end of 
the debt issue year (62.83 vs. 59.37, Column 5, Table 4-5), the variations in the 
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debt ratios after the debt issues for both the hot and cold market firms were indeed 
very tiny. On the other hand, the differences in the mean leverage ratios of the hot 
and cold firms during the five years after the hot issues occurred remained very 
stable at more than 3% and significant. After controlling for firm characteristicsý 
the coefficient estimated from the regressions also identified that the leverage of 
the hot market firms was higher than that of the cold market firms even five years 
later. This pattern of leverage levels very closely matches the cumulative changes 
in leverage. Specifically, the differences of debt ratio levels between the hot and 
cold market issuers declined slightly in the first year but became more 
economically and statistically significant in the second and third years, and then 
returned to the levels of the issue year in the fourth and fifth years. 
In short, the empirical results for the long-term persistence of the hot market effect 
are consistent with the results for the short term persistence. After the hot market 
effect has caused a higher debt ratio increase of hot market issuers, it persists for 
even longer than 5 years. This is reflected in the cumulative changes and year-end 
levels of the book debt ratios in the five post-issue years. These results are in line 
with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) that market timing has highly 
persistent effects on firms' capital structures. One explanation of the persistent hot 
market effect is the hypothesis of ad ustment of costs or "adverse selection cost". A 
number of studies have examined the adverse selection costs of rebalancing the 
deviation of capital structures across firms and time (e. g. Lucus and McDonald 
(1990), Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993)). If the costs of deviating a capital 
structure from the optimal level, including the financial distress costs and agency 
costs, are small by contrast to the adverse selection costs, a long-lasting effect of 
capital structure deviation should be observed. Therefore, the persistent 
deviations 
of capital structure resulting from the hot market effect may 
be due to the 
cc glutinosity" of adjustment costs despite active rebalancing. 
Leary and Roberts 
(2005) documented that the existence of adjustment costs extends the process of 
Capital structure rebalancing over two to four years. 
However, the evidence 
presented here shows that this process lasts for longer than 
five years. More 
importantly, whereas adjustment cost is an essential 
determinant in the financing 
decisions of firms, it implicitly assumes that firms 
follow a dynamic rebalancing 
strategy and make active changes to reverse the capital structure 
deviation. In fact, 
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p- 
it is not yet known in which direction the adjustment costs prevent changes in 
capital structure. There is still a possibility that firms are not attempting to 
eliminate the deviation of their capital structure but rather they are recapitalizing 
new issues in forward market timing instead, as suggested by Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) when they argued that capital structure is the aggregate outcome of the 
firm's continuous market timing behaviour. Therefore, to further reveal the 
underlying pattern of post-timing financing implementations it is necessary to 
examine the debt and equity issuances that occur subsequent to hot market issues. 
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4.5.2. Capital structure rebalancing 
Assuming that hot market firms tend to rebalance their capital structure when the 
leverage ratio is high due to debt market timing, they would be expected to reduce 
the amount of new debt issues and raise more equity afterwards to catch up with 
the leverage targets. These activities reflect the active implementation of capital 
structure strategy and are more effective than other supplementary means such as 
changes in retained earnings or short-term commercial papers. However, if hot 
market firms are not following the trade-off strategy, no obvious tendency of 
capital structure reversal will be seen and the deviations of capital structure caused 
by market timing will exist persistently. Another possibility is that firms may 
continue to time the market by recapitalizing new debt if they believe the debt 
market to be still desirable. In this case, the differences between the debt ratios of 
hot and cold market firms will tend to be enlarged. It has already been found that 
the differences in the cumulative debt ratio changes of hot and cold market issuers 
exist in the long run, but it is necessary to further identify whether this result is 
determined by their differing financing strategies. Therefore, the differences in debt 
ratios were divided into newly issued equity and debt which were examined 
respectively for the post-hot-issue period. Taking into consideration the potential 
influences of various firm characteristics on pushing the leverage target away from 
the pre-issue level, these factors were controlled as previously in the following new 
issue regressions for the five years after hot issues. 
e1A, (or d1Aj) ---" Co + CJHD 
+ C2AFBI-1 + C3REIAt-I + C4EBITDAIA" + C5SIZE j_/ + c6PPEIA, -j + 
c7R&D1A, _i + C8RDDIAt-I 
+ C9 INVIAt_, +CIODIVIEI-I+CIICaShlAt-I+Cl2DIAI-I+ 6'1 (4.4) 
The dependent variables dIA,, and elA,, are the newly issued debt and equity in the 
, 
D, follows the previous tth year after the hot debt issues. The dummy variable H 
notation and takes the value of one for hot market issues and zero 
for cold market 
issues. The signs of the HD coefficients measure the 
differences of the dependent 
variables, i. e. new debt and equity issues, between 
hot and cold market firms. and 
so reveal the underlying financing strategies subsequent 
to debt market timing. All 
control variables are defined as those in 
Model (4.1). The results shown in Table 
4.7 were compared with three hypotheses. 
i. e. reversal, unchangIngness or 
enlargement. First of all, it can be seen that the 
issuance of ne\V debt remained 
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positive on the mean values (panel A) of both the hot and cold market is firm for the 
five years with the exception only of the cold market issuers in the second year 
(-0.05% is very close to zero). There is no reduction (retirement) of debt for the hot 
market firms as a whole. Besides this, the average new debt issuance of the hot 
market firms was significantly higher in the second year and insignificantly 
different from the cold market firms for the other years. The regressions in panel B 
that controlled the effects of firm characteristics on the new debt issuances 
exhibited a similar pattern. There is no evidence that the hot market firms tended to 
reverse their capital structure by reducing their debt ratio. Rather, the positive 
coefficients of the hot market dummy suggest that the hot market firms issued 
more new debt in the five years than the cold market firms. Moreover, the 
difference was even significant in the second year (with a t-value of 3.76). Next 
was an examination of new equity issuances during the post-issue period. In the 
first three years, the hot market firms issued less equity on average, while the 
coefficients of the hot market dummy in the regressions were coincidently negative 
for all five years, suggesting that hot market firms appear to issue less equity 
during post-hot-issue periods. Moreover, consistent with the analysis of the new 
debt issues, the differences were especially significant in the two years after the hot 
debt issues. In general, these results reveal that hot market firms do not actively 
reverse the higher debt ratios caused by debt market timing. On the contrary, hot 
market firms appear to issue more debt and less equity after timing in hot debt 
markets, which is the main reason that the hot market effect lasts in the long run. 
This pattern was consistent when measuring both the mean values of the new debt 
and equity issuances and the regression analyses with the controls for firm 
85 characteristics 
4.5.3. Summary 
This section has investigated the long-term persistence of the hot market effect and 
then reveals the underlying pattern of capital structure variations under the 
hot 
85 Although they are not directly related to the hot market effect analysis, 
it is still necessar) to look at the 
connections between firms' characteristics and their financing decisions. When 
looking at the control variables, 
it is unsurprising to find that firms with low debt ratios issue more debt. 
However, the market-to-book ratio is a 
more important determinant of equity issuance than debt issuance. Put differently, 
firms with a high NI, B ratio 
are more likely to issue equity than debt. Moreover, it is found that equity 
issuers are more profitable than debt 
issuers., while generally firm size is negatively related to levels of both 
debt and equity issuance. Furthermore, 
debt issuers and equity issuers exhibit differences in their tangible asset ratios, and cash 
balances. 
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market effect. As a summary, Figure 4.2 directly plots the differences between the 
hot and cold market firms with respect to the long-terrn persistence of the hot 
market effect on their capital structure, and shows a complete picture. The differing 
cumulative changes in the debt ratios of the hot and cold market issuers remained 
positive, which implies that the hot market effect has a long-lasting influence. The 
book leverage ratios of the hot market issuers were consistently higher than those 
of the cold market issuers. Both variables tended to be enlarged in the second and 
third years. Capital structure theory points to two possible patterns that firms 
follow when implementing financing policies. The hypothesis followed in this 
thesis is that the high leverage ratio that exists after hot debt issues tends to vary 
according to one of the two following patterns: (1) hot market issuers follow an 
active strategy of rebalancing their capital structure to an optimal target, and then 
the hot market effect has only a short-term influence on the capital structure; or (2) 
the post-issue leverage does not reverse and the hot market effect is persistent in 
the long term due to firms' continually timing the market. The results shown in 
Figure 4.2 clearly support the latter. When separating the variations in capital 
structures by examining the new debt and equity issuances made during this period, 
it was found that the hot market firms, whose debt ratios were higher due to the hot 
market effect, issued more debt but less equity afterwards. No opposite changes in 
debt or equity were seen as suggested by the trade-off hypothesis. Timing the hot 
debt market causes an essential increase of debt ratio, while the long-tem 
persistence of the hot market effect is subject to firms' not intending to eliminate 
the effect and continuously timing attempts. Therefore, the evidence shows that a 
firm's timing behaviour is not a single event happening at a specific time. Rather, it 
is more likely to be a persistent strategy with respect to their financing policy. As a 
result, continual market timing drives the firm's capital away from the optimal 
target, if there is one, as the capital market conditions vary. Finally, the firm's 
capital structure is formulated as the outcome of aggregate historical market timing, 
as indicated by Baker and Wurgler (2002). 
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Figure 4.2 Long-term Effects of Hot Market Issues on Capital Structure 
This figure exhibits the long-term effect of the hot market issues on capital structure. It plots the differences 
between the hot and cold market issuers with respect to changes in leverage. The dash-point line shows the 
cumulative changes of debt ratio (d/A, -,,, 
) after the hot market issues. The wide dash line shows the levels of 
debt ratios (DIA, ) after the hot market issues. The point line shows annual the new equity issuances (e-IA, ) after 
the hot market issues. The solid line shows the annual new debt issuances (d/A, ) after the hot market issues. 
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4.6. Robustness 
The hot market effect measured by the Hot-cold dummy variable is the main focus 
of this study in examining firms' market timing attempts. In turn, the definition of 
the hot and cold market is a key issue in measuring the hot market effect. As a 
matter of fact, the hot market as defined here is a conditional concept depending on 
the horizon of the sample period and the benchmark of compartmentalization. To 
further document the findings regarding the hot market effect, the robustness of the 
empirical results was retested by adjusting the measure of the hot market and 
controlling for firm-specific factors. The results only report the coefficients of the 
hot-cold dummy variable in the regressions. For each test, the short-term impact of 
the hot market issues was examined by the pre-issue book leverage, hot issue 
proceeds over assets, and post-issue leverage. In terms of the long-term effect, the 
cumulative changes in debt ratios, levels of book leverage, and new debt and 
equity issuances in the five years after the hot market issues were examined. 
4.6.1. Alternative hot market measure 
The judgement of firm managers regarding debt market conditions is changeable 
and sometimes divergent. Therefore, it is hard to accurately categorize time periods 
as hot and cold, especially for months with a neutral level of debt issue volume. 
Empirical studies have employed different measures for hot and cold markets. For 
example, Helwege and Liang (2004) defined the hot market as months with issue 
volumes of more than the top quartile, while Alti (2006) categorized hot and cold 
markets by the median of the monthly debt issue volume. The measure of hot debt 
issue months by the top 30 percentile' aggregate issue volume is reasonable and 
acceptable, but relatively subjective. Therefore, it is crucial to examine whether the 
debt issues taking place in the months of the median 40 percentile ranked by issue 
volume had a determinant influence on the results. Therefore, following Alti (2006), 
the restriction of the hot market definition was eased by using the median of the 
monthly debt issuance instead of the top (bottom) 30 percent to categorize the 
market as hot or cold, and involved all the debt issues that occurred during the 
whole sample period, as shown in the figure below. 
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Figure 4.3 Hot Debt Market Defined by the Median Issue Volume 
Figure 4.3 plots the accumulated monthly corporate debt issue volumes and deal numbers for the period January 1970 - December 2000 in constant dollars measured as of Ist January 2001. The monthly debt issue 
volumes and deal numbers are adjusted by a 3-month de-trended moving average to smooth out seasonal 
variations. The horizontal line denotes the median de-trended monthly volume in constant dollars measured as 
of I st January 2001 across the sample period. It divides the sample into the sub-groups by the months with the 
upper 50% and the bottom 50% of de-trended monthly issue volume, which are defined as the hot and cold debt market respectively. 
Tssý 
1, - .. 
o 00 Ii 
all 11 
ý .0 
* The horizontal line is the median detrended monthly volume in constant dollars measured as of I" January 
2001. 
Following the methodology discussed in previous sections, the analysis of the hot 
market effect on capital structure in both the short and long term was replicated. 
Table 4.8 shows the key results of the hot market dummy. In contrast to the 
previous results, which contained about 3,000 observations, these results involved 
all 6,000 observations and are consistent qualitatively and quantitatively. In the 
short term, the pre-issue debt ratios did not differ between the hot and cold market 
firms. However, since the percentage of debt issues over total assets is significantly 
higher for the hot issues, the post-issue year-end debt ratios were significantly 
increased due to the hot debt issues. The investment rates and profitability 
exhibited similar patterns to those in the previous results (not reported here). The 
hot market issuers were not more profitable but their investment rates were 
essentially lower than those of the cold market issuers. Next an examination was 
made of the long-term effect. As expected, the coefficients of the hot-cold dummy 
were generally smaller than those in the previous results in absolute values, since 
the samples in the neutral months may be capable of being sorted into hot or cold 
months. However, most importantly, it was found that the patterns of capital 
structure variations were almost the same as in the previous results with respect to 
both the magnitude and significance of the coefficients. For example, the dummy 
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coefficients of the cumulative changes in the debt ratios were 1.151 1.695 1.71,1.2 1, 
and 1.1 respectively from one to five years, compared to the corresponding results 
of 1.28,2.2ý 2.12,1.41, and 1.9 in Table 4.6. The coefficients of the other 
dependent variables were also very similar to the previous results. 
In comparison to Figure 4.2, Figure 4.4 shows the pattern of capital structure 
variations under the hot market effect more straightforwardly. Firstly, this shows 
that the changes in debt ratios maintained positive and significant in the five years 
after the hot debt issues. Secondly, the leverage of the hot market firms was higher 
than that of the cold market firms within the same five years. Thirdly, their 
post-issue financing activities exhibited a similar tendency. More specifically, the 
hot market firms did not tend to increase their equity issues to reverse the high debt 
ratios resulting from their hot debt issues. On the contrary, they issued more debt 
and less equity during the post-hot-issue period. As a result, the hot market effect 
still persisted for five years after the involvement of samples belonging to the 
neutral periods. These results suggest that firms' timing behaviours are positively 
related to the extent to which the market is hot, regardless of the definition. 
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Table 4.8 Hot Market Effect on Capital Structure (whole sample) 
This table shows the short and long-term impacts of the hot market debt issues on the capital structure with the 
involvement of all samples. Only the coefficients of the hot-cold dummy are reported. The hot (cold) markets 
are defined as the months with a cumulative debt issue volume larger (smaller) than the median (instead of the 
top or bottom 30%) monthly issue volume over the sample period January 1970 - December 2000. The 
short-term effects are examined by the ratio of hot debt issues over total assets (ProceedslA, ), pre-issue debt 
ratio (DIAj), change in debt ratios (DIA, -DIA, I) and post-issue debt ratios (DIA, ). The long-term impacts are 
examined by the accumulative changes in the debt ratios (dlA(t-pre)), annual new debt issues (d1A), annual new 
equity issues (e1A), and the levels of the year-end book debt ratios (DIA) in the five years after the hot debt 
issues. 
Short-term effect Proceeds/Asset(t) D/A(t-1) D/A(t)-D/A(t-1) D/A(t) 
Hot-cold dummy 1.960 [8.11] 0.276 [0,545] 1.105 [4.15] 1.255 [2.5] 
N 6049 6110 6049 6049 
Long-term effeet 
t Issue year +1 Issue year +2 Issue year +3 Issue year +4 Issue year +5 
N 5860 5650 5479 5309 5153 
d1A (t-pre) 
Hot-cold dummy 1.152 [3.37] 1.691 [4.35] 1.707 [3.68] 1.213 [2.42] 1.107 [1.93] 
d1A (t) 
Hot-cold dummy 0,298 [1.27] 0.681 [2.99] 0.260 [0,91] -0.061 [421] 0.058 [0.16] 
e1A (t) 
Hot-cold dummy -0.857 [-2.89] -0.906 [-2.89] -0.360 [-1.11] -0.263 [-0.34] -0.124 [-0.15] 
DIA (t) 
Hot-cold dummy 0.856 [1.64] 1.405 [2.6] 1.488 [2.53] 0.961 [1.55] 0.866 [1.321 
Figure 4.4 Long-term Effects of Hot Market Issues on Capital Structure (Whole Sample) 
This Figure exhibits the long-term effect of the hot market issues on capital structure. It plots the differences 
between hot and cold market issuers with respect to changes of leverage. Hot (cold) months are defined as 
those with aggregated debt issue volumes larger (smaller) than the median over the sample period 1970-2000. 
The dash-point line shows the cumulative changes of debt ratio (dlA, -p,., 
) after the hot market issues. The wide 
dash line shows the levels of debt ratios (DIA, ) after the hot market issues. The point line shows annual the new 
equity issuances (elA, ) after the hot market issues. The solid line shows the annual new debt issuances 
(dlA, ) 
after the hot market issues. 
Hot market effect on capital sructure (All samples) 
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4.6.2. Structural shifts in the debt market 
The change in debt issue volume is economically intuitive in Figure 4.1. It can be 
seen that most of the hot months happened after 1985, while most of the pre-1985 
months were cold. The level of debt issues was overall higher after 1985, which 
was due to drastic changes in the US monetary and fiscal policies during the early 
1980s. The regime shift in the post-war United States was "that of the "Volcker 
experiment" in the early 1980s, when the Federal Reserve began a zero inflation 
policy in order to control raising inflation" (Butler et al. (2006), p. 1739). This 
period is the most commonly identified structural break in the term structure, time 
series and macroeconomics literature. The hot market dummy may reflect different 
characteristics of economy across regulation variations and debt market conditions. 
Although a full investigation of the history, causes and consequences of monetary 
and fiscal policy and their impact on US interest rates is beyond the scope of this 
study, this issue is addressed in the analysis based on the intuition gained from the 
sample distribution in Figure 4.1 and the considerable empirical evidence with 
respect to the regime shifts of both the monetary and fiscal policies that occurred in 
the early 1980s. It was, therefore, necessary to test whether the hot market effect on 
the capital structures was consistent across the structural break, or was it simply a 
proxy for the debt market structural break. 
The sample period was split into two sub-periods at 1982 when zero inflation was 
pursued as the target of the Federal Reserve and, as a result, the debt market 
experienced a regime shift86 . All the 
debt issues were sorted into hot and cold 
markets defined as the. months with cumulative debt issue volumes larger or 
smaller than the median of each sub-period. The analysis replicated that 
in the 
preceding section and the results of the short and long-term effects are reported 
in 
Table 4.9. In general, the results are qualitatively consistent with the previous 
findings. However, there are still some points to be noted. In the short term, the hot 
market effect was more significant in the post-1982 than 
in the pre-1982 period. 
Specifically, the percentage difference between the hot issue proceeds over the 
total assets of the hot and cold issues was even 
higher after 1982 (5.17% vs. 
86 The Federal Reserve D ata shows that the yield rates of the 10-year constant maturity 
Treasury bonds and the 
BAA corporate bonds reached the highest points (13.70% and 
16.04% in 198 1, and 13% and 16.11 % in 1982 
respectively) of the past three decades in 1981 and 
1982 (data from the Saint Louis's FRED database of the 
Federal Reverse Bank). 
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2.08%), as were the changes in and levels of debt ratios in the hot issue year. The 
pre-issue debt ratio of the hot issuers was found to be significantly higher than that 
of the cold issuers in the post-1982 period (t-value of 6.32), which may potentially 
be the result of the previous cumulated hot market effect. More importantly, the 
high pre-issue leverage ratio did not prevent the hot market issuers from further 
timing the debt market and issuing more debt. In the long term, the cumulative hot 
market effects existed during the pre-1982 period and more substantially during the 
post-1982 period. Similarly, the hot market firms issued more debt and less equity 
than the cold market firms, both before and after the debt market shift. This pattern 
is fully reflected in Figure 4.5. In contrast, the hot market effect was more apparent 
in the post-1982 period due to the desirable debt market conditions caused by the 
drastic change in the monetary and fiscal policies, i. e. low interest rates and 
inflation. Firms are more likely to time the debt market in these circumstances. 
However, the hot-cold dummy captures the general pattern of debt market timing 
which is applicable to different market environments. 
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Table 4.9 Hot Market Effect on Capital Structure between Regime Shift 
This table shows the short and long-term impacts of the hot market debt issues on the capital structures before 
and after the structural shift of the debt market in 1982, with the involvement of all samples. The hot (cold) 
markets are defined as the months with cumulative debt issue volumes larger (smaller) than the median 
(instead of the top or bottom 30%) monthly issue volume of each sub-period. The short-term effects are 
examined by the ratio of hot debt issues over total assets (ProceedslA, ), pre-issue debt ratio (DIAj), change in 
debt ratios (DIA, -DIA, -, 
) and post-issue debt ratios (DIA, ). The long-term impacts are examined by the 
accumulative changes in the debt ratios (dlA(t-pre)), annual new debt issues (d1A), annual new equity issues 
(e1A), and the levels of the year-end book debt ratios (DIA) in the five years after the hot debt issues. 
1970-1981 
Short-term effect Proceeds/Asset(t) D/A (t- I) D/A(t)-D/A(t- 1) D/A(t) 
Hot-cold 2.08 [5.51] -0.691 [499] 0.530 [1.8] 0.646 [2.03] 
N 
Long-term effect 
t 
N 
1357 
Issue year +1 
1349 
Hot-cold t 
1363 
Issue year +2 
1327 
Hot-cold t 
1357 
Issue year +3 
1312 
Hot-cold t 
1357 
Issue year +4 
1293 
Issue year +5 
1279 
Hot-cold t Hot-cold t 
d/A (t-pre) 0.577 [1.16] 0.341 [0.69] 1.539 [2.65] 1.395 [0.69] 1,536 [0.82] 
d/A (t) 0.395 [0.95] 0.188 [0.581 0.899 [2.81 0,400 [1.07] 0,175 [0.36] 
e/A (t) -0.063 [4121 -0,075 [-0.17] -1.046 [-2.36] -0.709 [-1.39] -0.152 [-0.24] 
D/A (t) -0.194 [-0.28] -0.362 [-0.54] 0.996 [1.36] 0.647 [0.8] 1,136 [1.271 
1982-2000 
Short-term ejfect Proceeds/Asset(t) D/A (t- I) D/A(t)-D/A(t-1) D/A(t) 
Hot-cold 5.17 [20.2] 3.469 [6.23] 2.477 [8.17] 5.343 [9.72] 
N 4692 4747 4692 4692 
Long-term effect 
I Issue year +1 Issue year +2 Issue year +3 Issue yea r +4 Issue year +5 
N 4511 4323 4167 4016 3874 
Hot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t 
d/A (t-pre) 2.368 [6.16] 2.465 [5.51] 3.277 [6.06] 3.529 [5.86] 2,952 (4.39] 
d/A (t) 0.222 (0.86] 0.210 [0.8] 0.514 [1.52] 0.692 [1.92] 0.008 [-0.02] 
e/A (t) -0.063 [-0.12] -0.075 [-0.171 -1.046 
[-2.36] -0.709 [-1.391 -0.152 [4241 
D/A (t) 4.435 [7.65] 4.450 [7.26] 5.341 [7.9] 5.597 [7.76] 4.696 [6.1] 
Figure 4.5 Hot Market Effects on Long-term Capital Structure between Regime Shift 
Figures 4.5a and 4.5b exhibit the long-term effect of the hot market issues on the capital structures before and 
after the regime shift in 1982 respectively. They plot the differences between the hot and cold market 
issuers 
with respect to changes of leverage. The dash-point line shows the cumulative changes of 
debt ratio (dlA, -p,,, 
) 
after the hot market issues. The wide dash line shows the levels of debt ratios (DIA, ) after the 
hot market issues. 
The point line shows annual the new equity issuances (elA, ) after the hot market issues. 
The solid line shows 
the annual new debt issuances (d/A, ) after the hot market issues. 
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Figure 4.5a 
4.6.3. Debt issue size and market timing 
The influence of debt issues on firms' capital structures and financial 
characteristics differs according to the size of the debt, which in turn essentially 
determines firms' subsequent financing decisions and policies. Large debt issues 
are more influential as regards the formation of the hot market which may 
potentially influence other issuers' financing decisions that follow. Therefore, an 
interesting investigation is into the effect of debt issue sizes on the pattern of 
issuers' financing policies. The sample was sorted into groups of large issues and 
small issues, measured by the median of all the debt issues over the sample period 
in the constant 2001 dollar. The relative size of the debt issues compared to firm 
assets was not used for this purpose because previous evidence has shown that 
firms raise the percentage of debt volume when the market is hot Therefore, the .X 
relative size may only proxy the hot market effect and cannot reflect the general 
difference in firms' financing patterns between hot and cold markets. The average 
proceeds of the large issues was 371.55 million 2001 dollars, compared to the 
average proceeds of small debt which were 87.36 million 2001 dollars. However, 
the relative sizes of the debt issues as measured by the issue proceeds over the total 
assets of the issuers (7.9% for the large size sample and 6.9% for the small size 
sample respectively), were not very different. Therefore, the absolute debt issue 
sizes, to a large extent, proxy the firm sizes of the issuers. A comparison of debt 
issuances in the hot market and the corresponding capital structure variations 
between large and small debt helps to reveal the different financing policies and 
capital structures of large and small firms. 
Table 4.10 shows the results of this investigation. First of all, the hot market effect 
can be seen for each of the large and small samples, while the difference between 
the hot and cold market firms was more significant for the large debt issues (4.3 vs. 
1.47). However, for the small debt issues, the pre-issue debt ratio of the hot market 
firms was lower than that of the cold market firms (-0.936 with a t-value -1.51). 
Similar to the previous results, it was not found that hot market issuers 
had higher 
investment rates and profitability (these results are not reported 
here). Therefore, 
the hot market effect may be due to large debt capacity and optimization of capital 
structure. Although, as a result of the hot market effect, the post-issue 
debt ratio 
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was higher for the hot market firms than the cold market firms (a difference of 
1.068 with a t-value 3.52), the hot market effect was found to disappear soon after 
the hot issue year and then the book debt ratio of the hot market firms became very 
close to that of the cold market firms. Meanwhile, the hot market firms tended to 
reduce new debt issues as well as increase equity issues during the post-hot-issue 
period. Therefore, apart from consistent debt market timing behaviour, an entirely 
different pattern of capital structure implementation for small size debt issuers was 
found. The evidence shows that the small debt issuers actively rebalanced their 
capital structure after making hot market debt issuances. In contrast, the results for 
the large issue sample followed the previous pattern even more significantly. The 
cumulative differences in the debt ratio changes of the hot and cold market firms 
were significantly positive for all of the five post-issue years, as were the year-end 
debt ratio levels. There was no tendency of the debt ratio differences being 
eliminated. The differences in the new debt issuances of the hot and cold market 
firms were positive for all of the five post-issue years (significant for the first three 
years), while the differences in the new equity issuances were negative for same 
period (significant for the first three years). 
Figure 4.6 shows the differences in the long-term capital structure variations of hot 
and cold market issuers for the large and small size debt issues respectively. The 
large-size debt exhibited a similar pattern to that in the previous results. The hot 
market effect lasted for the long term and there was no apparent tendency for the 
higher debt ratios of the hot market firms to decline in the five years. During this 
period, the new debt and equity issuances remained positive and negative 
respectively. However, it can be seen that the small debt issuers clearly reversed 
their high debt ratio resulting from the hot debt issues by reducing their debt and 
raising more equity between the second and fourth year after the hot issues. 
Accordingly, the cumulative effect of the hot debt issues declined and vanished in 
two to three years, and the higher leverage of the hot market firms also returned to 
the pre-issue level within about two years, These results are consistent with the 
evidence of Leary and Roberts (2005) that the effect of a large shock on leverage is 
erased within two to four years subsequent to the shock. According to the 
hypothesis of adjustment costs, firms may easily reverse their capital structure for 
small deviations using supplementary instruments such as short-term commercial 
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papers, which is also consistent with the results of Leary and Roberts (2005) that 
leverage adjustment costs are negatively correlated to the deviation levels of the 
leverage. On the other hand, since the sizes of debt issues may proxy the sizes of 
issuers, the different patterns of long-term capital structure variations may reflect 
not only the different financing policies but also the long-term capital structure 
strategies of large and small firms. 
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Table 4.10 Hot Market Effect on the Capital Structure of Large and Small Issuers 
This table shows the short and long-term impacts of the hot market debt issues on the capital structures of large 
and small debt issuers, sorted by the median volume with the involvement of all samples. The hot (cold) 
markets are defined as the months with cumulative debt issue volumes larger (smaller) than the median 
(instead of top or bottom 30%) monthly issue volume over the sample period January 1970 - December 2000. 
The short-term effects are examined by the ratio of hot debt issues over total assets (ProeeedslA, ), pre-issue 
debt ratio (DIA, 1), change in debt ratios (D1A, -D14, _j) and post-issue 
debt ratios (DIAJ. The long-term impacts 
are examined by the accumulative changes in the debt ratios (dlA(t-pre)), annual new debt issues (d1A), annual 
new equity issues (elA), and the levels of the year-end book debt ratios (DIA) in the five years after the hot debt 
issues. 
Small Issues 
Short-term effect 
Hot-cold 
N 
Long-term effect 
t 
Al 
d/A (t-pre) 
d/A (t) 
e/A (t) 
D/A (t) 
Large Issues 
Short-term effect 
Hot-cold 
N 
Long-term effect 
t 
N 
d/A (t-pre) 
d/A (t) 
e/A (t) 
D/A (t) 
P roceeds//Assf-, t ( L) D//A (t- I) D/A M -D/A (t -I) D/A (t) 
1.47 [4.691 -0.936 [-1,511 1.266 [3.871 1.068 [3.521 
3021 3054 3021 3021 
Issue year +1 Issue year +2 Issue year +3 Issue year +4 Issue year +5 
2926 2810 2723 2651 2561 
HOL-cold t Hot-cold t flot-col d t Hot-col d t Hot-cold t 
0.594 [1.371 0.988 [ 1.981 0.583 [0.961 -0.310 [-0.161 0.035 [0. oil 
-0.031 [-0.091 0.576 [ 1.821 -0.371 [-0.951 A. 755 [-1.741 0.214 [0.391 
-0.442 [-1.081 -0.748 [-1.841 0.451 [1] 0.550 [ 1.021 -0.157 [-0.251 
0.270 P0.431 0.148 rO. 221 L -0.201 
[-0.271 -0.862 [-L 091 -0.786 [-0.871 
Proccuds/Asset W D/A% (t-1) D/'A(t)-D/A(t-1) D, / A 
4.30 [2.591 1.55048 [1.911 1.145 [2.521 2.187 
3028 3056 3028 3028 
Issue year +1 Issue year +2 
T 
issue year +3 Issue year +4 
Issue year +5 
29M 2840 2756 2658 2592 
[lot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t Hot-cold t 
1.816 [1 391 2.588 [4.241 2.708 [3.841 2.231 [2.8711 2.033 [2.541 
0.659 [2,021 0.842 [2.541 0.959 [2.311 0.354 LO. 861 0.301 [0.651 
-1.231 [-2.831 -1.204 P2.471 -1.318 
[-2.811 -1.736 [-1.151 -1.505 [-0.981 
2.112 [2.521 2.841 D. 291 2.969 D. 241 2.415 [2.531 2.366 [2.191 
Figure 4.6 Hot Market Effects on the Long-term Capital Structure of Large and Small 
Issuers 
Figures 4.6a and 4.6b exhibit the long-term effect of the hot market issues on the capital structures of 
large and 
small issuers respectively. They plot the differences between the hot and cold market 
issuers with respect to 
changes of leverage. The dash-point line shows the cumulative changes of 
debt ratio (dlA, -p, 
) after the hot 
market issues. The wide dash line shows the levels of debt ratios 
(DIA, ) after the hot market issues. The point 
line shows annual the new equity issuances (elA, ) after the 
hot market issues. The solid line shows the annual 
new debt issuances (dlA, ) after the hot market issues. 
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4.64. Summary 
This section has described the robustness checks that were conducted on the hot 
market effect by using alternative measures of the hot market, dividing the sample 
period at the market structural break, and classifying the debt issues by size. The 
results are generally consistent with the previous findings in terms of both the 
short-term impact of the timing debt issue volume and its long-term effect on the 
issuer's capital structure. Firstly, regardless of which benchmarks are used for the 
hot and cold markets, the hotter is the debt market, the more likely firms are to 
time the market. Firms issue more debt in hot debt markets without better 
investment opportunities or profitable prospects, which therefore results in higher 
post-issue debt ratios. The higher debt ratios caused by the hot market effect do not 
disappear in five years and there is no evidence that hot market firms attempt to 
reverse the deviation of their capital structure. Secondly, this pattern remained 
consistent in different macroeconomic environments and market conditions across 
the debt market structural break in the early 1980s. In the post-1982 period, the 
timing behaviours were more drastic due to the much hotter debt market when 
interest rates declined substantially. This is also supportive of the results of the first 
check. Thirdly, firms time debt issue volumes for both large and small size debt. 
However, their long-term strategies as regards large and small debt issues clearly 
differ. Contrary to the large debt issuers, who remain with the long-lasting 
deviations of their debt ratios, the small debt issuers attempt to reverse their higher 
debt ratios by issuing less debt and more equity afterwards, and therefore the hot 
market effect of small issues vanishes within two to four years. 
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4.7. Conclusion 
The existing literature documents that firms are timing the capital market when 
raising new funds, and therefore their financing decisions are to a large extent 
determined by market conditions. On the other hand, a hot capital market with a 
high issue volume is formed as a result of the consistent understanding of firm 
managers regarding the desirable market conditions. This chapter has revealed the 
pattern of corporate debt issues in the hot market and its short and long-tenn 
influence on firms' capital structures. This notion contains three aspects. Firstly, do 
managers regard the hot market as a window of opportunity to time the market, or 
put differently, do hot markets capture firms' attempts at debt market timing? 
Whereas previous studies have documented evidence of debt market timing, the 
market condition factors commonly used, such as interest rates, term structures or 
inflation rates, only reflect part of the market environment. Moreover, there are 
complex economic links among these factors per se. The mechanisms used by 
firms when measuring market conditions and making financing decisions is not yet 
fully understood, and therefore the hot market is the better measure for reflecting 
the opinion of the majority of issuers regarding market conditions. Therefore, it has 
been the key issue throughout this chapter. Secondly, how do firms time the market 
when issuing debt? Firms raise debt funds for the basic reason of financing 
investment projects. Provided that their financing decisions involve the intention of 
market timing, there will be essential changes in various aspects of their debt issue 
decisions. While many previous studies have examined market timing by looking 
at debt maturity or yield type, this chapter has focused on whether managerial 
timing intention involves the abnormal changes in issue volume. Thirdly, the 
further question then arises as to what extent debt market timing influences firms' 
capital structure and financing policy afterwards. In contrast to cold market issuers, 
if firms time the market by issuing more debt when the market is hot, it is 
inevitable that they will confront the essential variations in capital structure and the 
corresponding consequences for other firm characteristics. An investigation of how 
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firms adopt financing policies and adjust capital structures is important because it 
reveals the theory of capital structure with the market timing factor involved. This 
chapter has examined each of the above questions in turn. 
The main findings are as follows. Firstly, firms issue significantly more debt in the 
hot market than in the cold market. The evidence shows that the percentage of hot 
debt issues over total assets of issuers was higher than that of cold debt issues. 
When comparing the hot and cold market firms, it was found that they did not 
differ in their pre-issue debt ratios or post-issue profitability. Therefore there is no 
evidence that hot market firms raise more debt for reasons of large debt capacity or 
good investment opportunities. Conversely, the investment ratio of the hot market 
firms was significantly lower in the post-issue period, which does not support the 
notion that hot market firms grow faster. As a result of the hot market effect, the 
firms' post-issue debt ratio was significantly higher than that of the cold market 
firms. Secondly, in contradiction of the trade-off theory of capital structure, the hot 
market firms did not attempt to reverse their high leverage resulting from hot debt 
market timing by issuing less debt and more equity. As a result, the cumulative 
changes in the debt ratio did not disappear in the five years after the hot debt issues. 
It can therefore be said that debt market timing in hot markets has a long-term 
influence on capital structure. Thirdly, the hot market effect remained significant 
even as the aggregate level of the debt issue volume increased, regardless of the 
benchmark of the hot market. Moreover, the short-term impact and the long-term 
persistence of the hot market effect were robust within and between regimes. This 
pattern was consistent for the periods before and after the debt market structure 
shift in the early 1980s. However, it was found that the debt issuers treated the 
deviation of capital structure resulting from the hot market effect in different ways. 
The hot market effect lasted in the long term for the large-size debt issues but 
disappeared quickly for the small-size debt. 
There is more to this than is at first apparent. Several implications can 
be drawn 
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from the empirical results which deserve further discussion. Above all, the hot 
market effect captures the attempts of firms' market timing since the hot-cold 
dummy variable is entirely orthogonal and has almost no relationship with the 
other control variables of firm-specific characteristics in determining the firms' 
capital structures. However, the underlying connection between the hot market and 
managerial market timing is not clear. Is the hot debt market the consequence or 
the cause of firms' market timing? Some clues can be gleaned from the comparison 
between the new issue markets of stock and debt. As first documented by lbbotson 
et al. (1975)87, the IPO underpricing phenomenon is always followed by heavy 
issue markets which then give way to periods of poor performance and light issue 
volume. "In 1971 there were 391 offerings with high average initial returns, 
followed by 562 offerings in 1972 with moderate returns, which in turn were 
followed by 105 offerings in 1973 with negative returns. In the mid-1970s, there 
were very few offerings... " (Ibbotson et al. (1988), p. 37). As regards the debt issue 
market, the data cited here concerns the debt issuances and interest rates for the 
period of the early 1980s when the debt market experienced a structural break. 
When the ten-year Treasury bond yield increased from 11.46 to 13.91 in 1981, the 
debt issue number decreased from 323 to 279. In 1982, the yield declined to 13.00 
and the deal number of debt issues increased to 306. Similarly, it can be seen that 
there was a clear tendency for the debt issue volumes to closely follow the 
contemporary variations in the market interest rates afterwards 
88 
. All these data 
show a tendency that there are obviously the waves of capital issuance following 
up the variations of market valuation. However, only the minority of firms actually 
capture the "timing", no matter they are really more "sophisticated" and then more 
capable to time the markets or they are simply lucky. In contrast to the pattern of 
the hot equity market, the debt market information was less asymmetric as between 
issuers and outside investors, and there remained few arbitrage opportunities 
for 
87 Other relevant studies include Ritter (1984,1991), lbbotson et al 
(1988,1994), Loughran et al. (1995), 
Eckbo et al. (2000). 
88 See the data in Table 2.1 of Chapter 2. Meanwhile, Chapter 2 documents that 
firm managers simply respond 
to the market movements rather than predict the future market conditions. 
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firm managers, including those with "sharp insight", to time the market. Therefore 
the managers who did not possess informational advantages, largely, tended to 
passively follow rather than accurately predict the market conditions. While rich 
literature reveals the cycles of issue waves and the market-wide "herd effect", the 
phenomenon does not appear to change, even if the benefits from market timing 
prove to be very little at best. The "herd effect" is consistent with the hypothesis of 
irrational managers suggested by Baker and Wurgler (2004). while the irrational 
manager approach, which departs further from theories of rational expectation and 
utility maximization, changes almost every aspect of corporate finance. 
There remain some questions which still cannot be explained with the irrational 
manager approach. The evidence shows that the hot market firms issued more debt 
in the hot markets and continued to issue debt rather than equity afterwards. If the 
short-term effect of hot market issues can be explained by managerial optimism 
and overconfidence, the long-term persistence of the hot market effect implies that 
managers believe their firms benefit from their judgment regarding market 
conditions and the implementations of their financing decisions. Since debt market 
timing per se cannot explain this, a potential explanation is that it is not an 
independent phenomenon. Rather, it is related to contemporary variations in the 
equity market environment. Specifically, hot debt markets result from the 
depression of the equity market when debt market conditions are more desirable. 
This suggests that a study of market timing ought to be an investigation of 
economy that jointly involves both the equity and debt markets. On the other hand, 
studies examining the firms' debt-equity choices should involve the market timing 
effect rather than focusing on firm-specific characteristics only. 
Another important issue highlighted by the empirical results in this chapter is the 
profound implication of capital structure theory. Traditional theories of capital 
structure, such as trade-off theory and pecking order theory, have been 
developed 
from the perspective of firms per se with no consideration given to the effects of 
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behavioural factors and psychological motivations. The market timing hypothesis 
plays an important role in firms' financing decisions. Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
found statistically significant indicators of the pecking order and market timing 
theories. However, it is preferable to regard it as an affiliated factor involved in the 
existing theories, referred to as the market-oriented pecking order theory. Firms 
treat the hot market (in this chapter, the debt market) as the place to raise low cost 
capital. In line with the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) which recorded that 
more than 70% of managers admitted that they were actively timing the market, 
this chapter has documented that the market-oriented pecking order theory is 
dominant in firms' financing decisions and persistently effects firms' capital 
structures in the long term. However, the empirical evidence regarding the market 
timing effect on capital structure is not consistent. For instance, Alti (2006) found 
that the equity market timing for IPOs has only a short-term effect on firms' capital 
structures and a clear reversal of leverage occurred soon after the hot issues of 
IPOs and is largely consistent with the existence of leverage targets; the same 
pattern can be seen with small-size hot debt issues in this study. It is uncertain as 
yet as to whether this divergence of results is due to different capital markets or 
different firm-specific financial characteristics. "Literature has never provided a 
universal theory for corporate capital structure and there is no reason to expect 
one" (Myer (2001), p. 81), while the market timing hypothesis may either create an 
entirely new theory or introduce a solution to bridge the existing gap. After all, 
market timing does by any means open a window on the growing field of 
behavioural corporate finance where managerial behaviours are critically 
considered. 
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Chapter 5-0 Conclusions 
5.1. The purposes of the thesis 
Market timing in corporate financing policies has drawn a substantial amount of 
attention from financial researchers. However, the scattered empirical evidence 
fails to form an integrated framework subject to divergent understandings 
regarding market timing. 
Firstly, the extent to which timing the market comprehensively affects firms' 
financial decisions has not yet been realized. Firms are found to time debt-equity 
choices (e. g. Baker and Wurgler (2000)), 1POs/SEOs (e. g. Lemer (1994), Gompers 
and Lemer (2003), Alti (2006), and Opler and Titman (2001)), debt issuance (e. g. 
Marsh (1982), Barclay and Smith (1995)) and debt maturity (e. g. Baker et al. 
(2003)), while market timing in other aspects of financial decisions needs to be 
further examined. These works will help understand the prior position and the 
comprehensive applications of market timing in corporate financial decisions. 
Secondly, there is no consensus on how firm managers time the market and 
whether firms benefit from the managerial market timing, especially in a relatively 
open and transparent debt market. The focus of contradiction lies on the different 
understandings on the forms of market timing. The difference between passive 
responses to the past information and successful predictions on the future 
variations of markets exists as the main gap in the literature. Therefore, an 
examination of the above two forms of market timing clarifies the underlying 
essence of managerial market timing and bridges the two sides of the contradiction. 
Thirdly, market timing plays a crucial role in corporate financing decisions, and 
therefore inevitably affects the financial characteristics of firms. This is especially 
important on the traditional capital structure theories. In the circumstance that the 
intention of market timing determines corporate financing decisions, to what extent 
223 
that the factor of market timing distorts the capital structure of firms and how 
persistently the influences last are open to question. moreoverý it is expectative that 
the issue of market timing provides a potential explanation on the traditional 
capital structure theories. 
Focusing on corporate debt issuance, the present thesis is dedicated to filling the 
above gaps in the literature regarding market timing. 
5.2. Empirical strategies, results and implications 
The present thesis contributes to the growing field of market timing with respect to 
corporate debt issuance, from underlying motivations, to implementation 
mechanisms, to consequences. Briefly, the findings are as follows. In contrast to 
hedging interest rate exposure, the primary' motivation for corporate debt issuance 
is timing the market to reduce the costs of capital. However, debt market timing is 
generally unsuccessful. Even so, timing the market tends to be a long-term 
financing strategy. 
Chapter 2 of the thesis examines the intention of timing the market in the decisions 
of corporate debt issuance, in contrast to the consideration of hedging interest rate 
exposure. The fundamental question is whether firms take advantage of debt 
issuance to hedge risk exposure or time the market to reduce capital costs. This is 
based on the assumption that corporate debt is an effective instrument of interest 
rate risk management. This chapter describes the development of a factor model for 
examining the determinants of debt issuance as regards the motivations of hedging 
interest rate exposure and market timing. First of all, the interest rate exposures 
were measured before and after the corporate debt issues. Although the risk 
management theory indicates the basic hedging function of liabilities, corporate 
debt is not employed as an instrument of hedging interest rate exposure. 
Conversely, it has been found in this chapter that a firm's overall interest rate 
exposure significantly increases after debt issuance. Moreover, consistent with 
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previous empirical evidence regarding market timing, debt maturity and yield type 
choices were found to be significantly correlated to the debt market condition 
variables. Furthermore, when examining the determinants of corporate debt 
issuance by using multivariate tests, the evidence shows that timing the debt 
market rather than hedging the interest rate exposure is the primary motivation 
when firms choose yield types and maturities for their newly issued debt. Market 
timing in firms' financing policies actually reflects the speculation intention of 
reducing capital costs. The underlying implication is that the practical 
implementations of corporate risk management are due to the motivation of firm 
value maximization rather than volatility minimization. It suggests that only 
downside risk exposure would be hedged, while managers tend to selectively make 
use of upside volatility to add firm value if they believe there is a window of 
opportunity to speculate. These findings bridge the gap between the initial risk 
management theory of immunization and its practical implementation in 
non-financial firms' interest rate risk management. Moreover, corresponding to 
previous studies, this chapter adds evidence to the sum of knowledge regarding 
debt market timing with respect to both maturity and yield types choice. 
Extending from the empirical evidence of debt market timing and the 
corresponding critical arguments, Chapter 3 examines how firm managers time the 
debt market. On the one hand, the co-variations between debt market variables and 
corporate debt issuance exhibit a significant correlation and mutual tendency. On 
the other hand, it is suspected that this evidence implies only a spurious 
relationship due to the plausible timing ability of managers. It is assumed that firm 
managers realize the market fluctuations and then make financing decisions based 
on their predictions to beat future market variations. The previous empirical 
evidence identified managers' timing behaviour in the former stage, explained as 
trying to time the market, while the arguments emphasized the results in the latter 
stage, explained as successfully time the market. Therefore, an underlying gap 
exists between the attempts and successes of managerial debt market timing. 
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Distinguishing passive responses to current market fluctuations from successful 
predictions of future market movements clarifies the definition of market timing. In 
this chapter, these two different forms of debt market timing, referred to as forward 
market timing and backward market timing, are examined respectively. The results 
are consistent with both sides of the argument. On the one hand, no significant 
differences are seen in debt issue volume or maturity before interest rates rise and 
decline. Thus, firms are not issuing more debt (or long-term debt) before the costs 
of debt (long-term debt) issues increase. On the other hand, debt issue volume and 
maturity are correlated to the relative interest rates compared to their historical 
levels. These findings essentially explain the existence of debt timing behaviours 
as well as the plausible informational advantages of firm managers. In the light of 
these findings, the previous fractional and mixed evidence of debt market timing 
have been associated together. In brief, the results in Chapter 3 suggest that 
managers are generally unsuccessful in timing future debt markets, while their 
timing decisions ondebt issues are simply responses to past market information. 
Now that debt market timing is prevalent in corporate financing policies, it is 
inevitable that it will affect firms' financial characteristics, especially capital 
structure. Chapter 4 examines the influences of debt market timing on firms' 
capital structure in both the short and long term, and provides a potential 
, explanation to the traditional capital structure theories. The hypothesis is that 
firms 
regard the hot debt market as signalling low costs of debt issuance, and so tend to 
time the market by issuing more debt. Defined by the cumulative issue volume of 
corporate debt, a hot market dummy variable is introduced as the indicator to 
distinguish debt issues in the hot and cold markets. The findings in this chapter are 
remarkable. By comparing the features of hot and cold market debt issues with the 
involvement of various firm-specific financial characteristics, the results show that 
the percentage of hot market debt over total assets of issuers is significantly higher 
than that of cold market debt. More importantly, the higher ratio of hot market debt 
cannot be explained by firm-specific financial characteristics, such as a 
low 
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leverage ratio, growth opportunities, or profitability. Moreover, the post-issue 
investment ratios of hot market issuers are lower than the corresponding ratios of 
cold market issuers. Therefore, these results are consistent with the hypothesis, that 
is, firms issue more debt than is necessary for their minimum capital requirements 
when the debt market is hot. On further examination of the long-term influence of 
the hot market effect, the higher post-issue debt ratios of the hot market issuers 
persisted for the long term. In contradiction of the trade-off theory, it was not found 
that hot market firms attempt to reverse the deviation of capital structures resulting 
from debt market timing. Collectively, hot debt markets capture the timing 
behaviour involved in corporate debt issuance. Moreover, the capital structure 
deviations resulting from debt market timing are persistent in the long term. The 
evidence suggests that managers view hot debt markets as the windows of 
opportunity to reduce the costs of capital. Therefore, market timing plays an 
important role in financing activities by shaping the firm's capital structure in the 
long term, which sheds light on the capital structure theory coupled with the 
behavioural factor. 
The present thesis not only reviews the previous evidence regarding debt market 
timing, but also comprehensively examines various aspects of debt market timing, 
including maturity, yield and issue volume. As a whole, it suggests that the 
concerns of market timing play a part in every aspect of corporate financing 
decisions. Moreover, consistent with the findings of previous survey studies, 
managerial timing behaviours are found to be prevalent across firms with different 
characteristics, which raises market timing to a common factor of corporate finance. 
Another important contribution of the present thesis is that it integrates previous 
fractional evidence regarding market timing and bridges the gap between 
behavioural finance and the efficient market hypothesis. Distinguishing passive 
responses from successful predictions explains the existence of managers' timing 
attempts as well as the general efficiency of capital markets. Therefore, all the 
evidence has been linked together through the clarification of the market timing 
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definition. Further, by identifying the long-term influence on firms' financing 
policies, this thesis raises the market timing theory as another explanation for the 
formation of capital structures. The prevalent existence of market timing behaviour 
suggests that it is necessary to rethink the effects and influences of market timing 
as a common factor in every corporate financial activity. In revealing the timing 
issue in traditional capital structure theories, thi, s thesis is no doubt one of the 
earliest studies in this area. 
5.3. Limitations and further researches 
Inevitably, the present thesis contains some limitations which will provide the 
motivation for future research. In Chapter 2, the research question is based on the 
immunization theory that firms may be able to immunize their firm value against 
changes in interest rates to some degree by matching the interest rate sensitivity of 
their assets and liabilities through active interest rate risk management. However, 
since the future cash flows of non-financial firms cannot be exactly known in 
advance and since the economic life of most of their assets is undermined, an 
accurate calculation for duration appears difficult as regards these firms. Even if 
firm managers indeed targeted in order to hedge interest rate exposure when 
issuing debt, they would still need an executable instruction for designing a debt 
duration structure to effectively eliminate the overall interest rate exposure of 
assets and cash flows. The lack of this executable strategy also explains why 
managers do not attempt to utilize this widely accepted theory in their practical 
implementation of risk management. Although in this chapter it is empirically 
reasonable to use stock price interest rate sensitivity to measure the interest rate 
exposure of firm values, this issue of how to predict and hedge future risk exposure 
has not been further pursued here. This is a gap to be bridged by further research 
with respect to corporate interest rate risk management, while the main obstacles 
would be the measurement of asset interest rate sensitivity, the linkage of variables 
measuring the interest rate exposure of assets and liabilities, and the dynamic 
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adjustment strategy corresponding to risk exposure volatility. 
In this thesis, empirical evidence is found that managers time the debt market 
based on the historical public information, while their predictions on future market 
variations are generally unsuccessful. However, this finding does not suggest that 
managers make decisions according only to past information. Financial markets are 
essentially a game played between firms and investors about the market 
information. As a matter of fact, survey studies have indicated that managers admit 
that their financing decisions include their views of future markets. Unfortunately, 
these survey studies shed no light on the methods or the benchmarks of estimation 
used for the future market movements. There is still a puzzle regarding the 
fundamental explanation of managerial market timing. On the one hand, timing 
behaviours exist generally although the benefits are at best very small. The 
irrational manager hypothesis answers many questions but cannot explain itself 
convincingly. On the other hand, financial researchers and practitioners have' never 
stopped looking for arbitrary opportunities to beat the market, as evidence 
regarding market anomalies does not support a perfect efficiency of capital market. 
Although no essential progress has been seen in this direction yet, there is still the 
possibility of managers' superior ability on detecting the market anomalies. 
Therefore, it is important to judge whether managers are wholly irrational or 
whether some of them do possess informational advantages and "sharp insight". 
This issue has not been investigated further in this thesis. There is no doubt much 
work to be done in the area of the behavioural. finance. However, the rationality 
and co-reaction of both firm managers and capital markets will continue to be the 
focus of corporate financial researches. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that it focuses only on the debt market per se 
and does not involve the correlations between the debt market and other capital 
markets such as the equity or derivative markets. As there are still some questions 
which cannot be explained regarding the regime of debt market timing, such as 
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consistent debt market timing, it is suggestive that there may be the underlying 
influence of contemporary equity market variations. As indicated by Baker et al. 
(2004), "one intriguing pattern that has been uncovered is that debt issues are 
followed by low equity returns (p. 25)", their empirical evidence shows that the 
debt market and other capital markets are not independent. Hot debt markets may 
result from the depression of the equity market which causes the debt market to be 
more desirable. The low returns of overvalued equity markets, on the one hand, 
reduce the cost of debt directly, on the other hand they release the leverage 
constraint and so enlarge the debt capacity. Apart from issuing overvalued equity, 
firms also have incentives to issue low-cost debt instead, while their debt-equity 
choice has to be a joint investigation involving both equity market timing and debt 
market timing as a whole. This seems like a promising direction for future 
research. 
In addition, a potential limitation of the present thesis is the use of data from 
different markets for different chapters. The UK and the US markets represent two 
major markets of the world and both are the developed and mature markets. It is 
also reasonable to assume that these two markets have similar and comparable 
features. Moreover, the objectives of different empirical chapters are independent 
of each other and are developed from previous literature. Chapter 2 extends the 
findings in Faulkender (2005) which is based on the chemical industry in the US. 
An investigation of the entire UK market not only reveals the market-wide market 
timing behaviour on corporate debt issue decisions, but more importantly, also 
explores the prevalent tendency of market timing across markets. By contrast, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 focus on market timing in the US. Further examination of 
the issues by employing different methodology but focusing on the same market 
and a similar database is suggested. In this sense, the different focuses across 
financial markets are reasonable. Moreover, the conclusions in individual empirical 
chapter do not entirely rely on those from the other chapters. Therefore, this 
potential limitation does not change the convincing conclusions that market timing 
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has comprehensive influences on firms' financing decisions. However, it will be 
reasonable to further examine timing issues in a sole market entirely as well as the 
different features across markets. 
The present thesis examines the phenomenon of managerial market timing in 
corporate debt issuance. It reveals that managers try to issue corporate debt when 
the market conditions suggest a low cost of capital, when they have misguided 
notions that they possess superior information about the market variations. It is 
assumed that managers make financial decisions in morality and justice to 
maximize shareholders' value instead of their own interests. However, literature 
regarding behavioural finance shows that this assumption may not hold in reality. It 
has been known that the changes in managerial ownerships distort the style of risk 
management. Managers are more likely to time the market when they realize a 
favourable outcome because of a risky strategy. With the same logic, tenures, 
compensation contracts and ages may all potentially affect managerial behaviour in 
decision-making, including market timing. The present thesis does not go further in 
the direction of managers' incentives based on their personal interests. Treating 
managers as normal persons instead of entirely rational financial experts, future 
research regarding the role of managerial ownership, tenure or other factors of 
personal interests on market timing is expected to be a fruitful dimension. 
There is clearly much work to be done before the market timing theory reaches 
maturity. In an effort to stimulate such interest, this thesis closes by highlighting a 
few further research questions. Market timing reflects the financial decisions and 
activities of firm managers corresponding to the market environment and their 
judgments on the future market variations. This poses the question as to whether 
the variation of debt market conditions is predictable. Furthermore, how do 
managers estimate the market conditions? Despite the usual challenges of 
measuring mispricing, the growing field of behavioural corporate finance suggests 
an increasing popularity of a stylised manner of making managerial decisions. Do 
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firms successfully time the debt market by using a stylised manner of financing? 
How does the market (investors) react to the corporate financial decisions in 
specific market circumstances? What are the influences of managers' market views 
on firms' financial characteristics and performance? As a developmental direction 
in corporate finance, these fundamental questions with respect to the behavioural 
factor of market timing should also be examined as regards other financial 
activities, such as takeovers, IPOs, repurchasing, and dividend payout, etc. As a 
matter of fact, almost all corporate financial activities involve managers' views of 
the market. The present thesis cannot be expected to solve or even raise all the 
relevant questions. However, it has pointed out a promising direction for the 
development of corporate finance. 
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